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
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Chowdhury Hasan Sarwardy
Mahmud Hussain

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN DEMOCRACY: BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE

Abstract

Civil-Military relations are an age-old phenomenon. It involves a multiplicity of relationship between civilian authorities and military institutions of a country. Since the 20th century, civil-military relations have been developing as an important area of study to understand the interactions between the two entities. Many scholars like Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz have tried to analyse civil-military relations in the context of political approaches and social fabrics of a country. The theoretical developments to understand civil-military relations are also noteworthy. The Post-Modernist Theory as well as the Democratic Peace Theory is relevant to understand civil-military relations in the context of contemporary developments. In modern democratic societies, civil-military relations are considered as a *sine qua non* for proper functioning of democratic institutions where military establishment remains under the full control of civilian authority and contributes in aid to civilian administration when necessary. However, the experiences of civil-military relations are not same in all the countries. Developing an effective civil-military relation still remains a challenge for many countries. Since independence in 1971, Bangladesh has experienced a lot of challenges to develop an effective framework in this regard. In this backdrop, the present paper is an endeavour to understand civil-military relations in the context of democracy as well as to make an assessment regarding the civil-military relations in Bangladesh. The findings of the paper are that the idea of civil-military relations is still evolving and to maintain a democratic order, a country needs to develop cohesive relations between civilian authority and military administration. Bangladesh has achieved a lot in the civil-military relations, but still faces a number of challenges in this regard. The country needs to address such challenges to ensure effective democratic functioning of the country.

1. Introduction

Civil-Military relations represent the interaction between the two most important elements of the society – civilians and the military. The military, as an institution, acts as the guardian of a country's sovereignty. On the other hand, civilians exercise their control over the military to ensure the professional growth of the latter. The theory of civil-military relations took its formal epistemic form at the turn of the

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20th century. Since then, there has been a profusion of literature on the subject. The main reason has been, despite the universally acclaimed uniqueness of the militaries, they are also the product of their societies' traditions, ethos and proclivities. But following the end of the Cold War and the mighty vindication of democracy as a tool of governance, the concept of post-modern soldier has gained eminence cemented by technological dominance in military profession. Transformations of the societies have also influenced the mould of civil-military relations model. This has also influenced the civil-military relations in Bangladesh where transition to durable democratic values has led to hypothesising this relation in a new light.

Effective civil-military relations based on mutual respect and understanding is important for promoting democracy and good governance. Over the period, the issues involved in civil-military relations, both in Western democracies and developing countries have changed largely. Till now, the debate over autonomy of the military and the nature of civilian control remains a major area of civil-military relations study. A large number of research works were carried out to explain the political role of the military in Asia, Africa and Latin America. These studies included the motives and the environments for political interventions, the types of military regimes and the impacts of the interventions on political development.¹ Although the Cold War era lacked the civil-military relations attributes, concurrent proliferation of democratic practices in place of authoritarian and military regimes took place in the post-Cold War period. During that time, many countries across Latin America, Eastern Europe, South Asia, the Pacific Rim and the erstwhile Soviet Union inaugurated mechanisms for civilian supervision of their militaries through rewritten and refurbished constitutions.² In a democratic state, the military accepts civilian political supremacy whereas political leadership agrees on not to politicise the military. A strictly apolitical military acts as a pillar of democracy rather than a threat. The role of the military in the areas of national and regional security seems to be very much important for overall development of a country. Thus, the focus is more on to what extent does the military help to develop democracy.

Since its independence, Bangladesh experienced civil-military relations with notable ups and downs in the relation. As the country faced a number of authoritarian regimes including periods of military rule, it has developed a mixed experience of civil-military relations for the people. Although Bangladesh faced several challenges regarding civil-military relations, its military has also made notable positive contributions which played a role in creating better democratic environment. Bangladesh military has created a place in the UN peacekeeping operations becoming the largest troops-sending country at present and securing an important decision making role in peacekeeping missions. It played a key role in restoring democracy in war-torn Haiti

¹ Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, "Civilian Control of Military and Democracy: Conceptual and Theoretical Perspectives", in Paul Chambers and Aurel Croissant (eds.), *Democracy under Stress: Civil-Military Relations in South and Southeast Asia*, Bangkok, Thailand: Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), 2010, pp. 21-25.

² Syed Anwar Husain, "Identifying and Promoting Goals to Build Confidence and Trust in Civil-Military Relations in Bangladesh", paper presented in the Workshop on *Civil-Military Relations: Trust Building*, organised by BIISS and Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI), USA on 22-23 June 2010 at Dhaka.

and Sierra Leone. In the domestic scene, Bangladesh military played a leading role in disaster management and many nation-building development activities.

Against this backdrop, the objective of the paper is to identify the challenges regarding civil-military relations in Bangladesh and find out possible solutions in this regard. To do so, the paper will review the concept of civil-military relations and its importance in a democratic state. It will look for the challenges of civil-military relations in Bangladesh and attempt to suggest possible actions to attain effective civil-military relations. Apart from the brief introduction, second section will conceptualise the issue of civil-military relations. The role of civil-military relations in a democratic state will be discussed in the third section. The overall situation of civil-military relations in the context of Bangladesh will be assessed in the fourth section with outlining the achievements and challenges of civil-military relations. The fifth section will try to come up with applicable policy suggestions to tackle the challenges. Finally, the sixth section will summarise and conclude the paper.

2. Understanding Civil-Military Relations

Conceptually, civil-military relations refer to relations between the civilian authority and the military establishment of a state. In a normative assumption, civil-military relations underline civilian control over military where the civilian government takes the major security policies and military implements the directions of civilian authority. Samuel P. Huntington explains civil-military relations as the whole gamut of interaction of military and political forces in a given state. His book, titled, *The Soldier and the State* is considered as a classic work to understand civil-military relations.³ He produced a rational theory about civil-military relations. Morris Janowitz's book, titled, *The Professional Soldier* is also considered as one of the influential works for understanding civil-military relations. Therefore, this section tries to review the significant efforts of Huntington and Janowitz along with the assessment of the contribution of Post-Modernist Theory and Democratic Peace Theory in the context of civil-military relations.

Huntington, in his book, *The Soldier and the State*, describes five types of civil-military relations along with their features.⁴ First type of civil-military relations is found in the primitive societies. This is based on "anti-military ideology, high military political power and low military professionalism" situation. More primitive societies offer this type of civil-military relations where military professionalism is neglected. This scenario is also observed in more advanced countries where there is sudden eruption of security threats and the military rapidly rise to political power. It was the characteristic of Turkey and Italy in the first quarter of the 20th century. In modern times, this pattern is followed in many oil-rich countries. Second pattern of civil-military relations is seen in societies where there is a strong political influence on the

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957.

⁴ *Ibid.*

military. This is based on the situation of “anti-military ideology, low military political power, and low military professionalism”. Authoritarian rulers in modern totalitarian states produce such behaviour. Syria or modern day Russia is example of this type.

Third type of civil-military relations is made upon the situation of “anti-military ideology, low military political power and high military professionalism”. A society which suffers few external threats is likely to produce this type of civil-military relations. The rise of professionalism after the Civil War in the United States (US) exemplifies this kind of behaviour. Fourth type of civil-military relations is made upon the situation on “pro-military ideology, high military political power and high military professionalism”. A society with continuing security threats will obviously produce an ideology sympathetic to military values with concurrent high military power in politics as well as high level of military professionalism. The most outstanding example of this type of civil-military relations is found in Germany during Otto Von Bismarck. The last type of civil-military relations is found in a society where civil-military relations are dominated by strong mutual respect of each other between political masters and military commanders. This is made upon the situation of “pro-military ideology, low military political power and high military professionalism”. This is a model for modern democracies. Britain has tended to this variety as a unique example.

Huntington closely observed the dynamics of power struggle between the two groups with the change in patterns discussed earlier. Power is essentially a symbol of strength. It is also an index of character. People with strong physical features often display weak personality. For politicians, it is also an indication of their ability to control or influence things according to their will. Therefore, political control over military establishes a kind of authority that guarantees a smooth and stable form of submission. However, mishandling of the military by the politicians can cause great damage to the institution and therefore, to the state also. He also mentioned about the concept of “objective civilian control”. This ensures civilian control over the military which increases security at the same time. Regarding this, Huntington argued that, “in practice, officership is strongest and most effective when it most closely approaches the professional ideal; it is weakest and most defective when it falls short of that ideal”⁵ He also argued that an officer corps is professional to the extent it exhibits the qualities of expertise, responsibility and corporateness. In addition to enhancing effectiveness, these traits also enhance civilian control because a professional military seeks to distance itself from politics.⁶

Morris Janowitz, another classic theorist, with brilliant ideas on the subject differs from Samuel P. Huntington. His book, titled *The Professional Soldier* showed that the professional military officer has changed a lot under the tremendous technological change. Morris Janowitz argued that the two World Wars have effectively blurred the distinction between civilian and military affairs. He welcomed the

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

supposed “civilianisation of the military”. He was pro-military and favoured a societal integration and recommended for a small but of high quality military professionals based on merit and competence. Civilian control of the military must be seen purely from organisational perspective. As an impersonal organic being, personal conflicts between military and political masters are neutralised by military’s absorption into society as a normal phenomenon. He focused on normative assumptions related to the theory of democracy. Janowitz used a methodology which included content analysis. He conducted a survey of 760 Generals and Admirals and 576 military officers from the Pentagon and interviewed over 100 high-level officers.

Like Huntington, Janowitz focused on military elites. He demonstrated the changing nature of organisational authority based on personnel management that promised similarities between the military and civilian spheres. This means that military’s new dimension of activities is shaped by corporatism. This is the consequence of professional pressures and conditions tending to make soldiers more technical and proficient in discharging their functions. More civilian participation is required to meet the specialised technical and scientific capacities of the military equipment and weapons. This has also led to narrowing the gap between the military and the civil in the broader sense. Janowitz found that the military commanders in the US, despite being professionally meritorious and competent, were drawn into politics in terms of policy formulation in national security. Politicians decide whether a state should go to war or not; and when the decision is in the affirmative, they look for support elsewhere for they know that they are not professionally qualified to prosecute the operational and tactical tasks of war-fighting. In that regard, a General or an Admiral is the most competent person to bring on board his specialised knowledge for which he has been trained and educated for long years. War and national security are the two most vital components in state life that a state cannot afford to ignore.⁷

Both Huntington and Janowitz produced an impact in the minds of the public and the soldier. Distinguishing features of their works have provided us with an episteme about an essential phenomenon of social existence. The anthropological perspectives of social divisions produce cultural differences that are rooted in the attitude, behaviour and organisational make-up. The role of social sciences is to dig deep into the causes of differences and make distinct the points that can bring togetherness amongst groups with rational pontification. Both forwarded alternative theories to fears of politicisation of the military as well as militarisation of politics. They were both civic and liberal in their approaches to find a role of the military in the society. Huntington’s “objective civilian control” or Janowitz’s “civic-republic order” was emphasising upon an objective realisation of the civil-military relations in terms of enjoying public sanction.

⁷ Suzanne C. Nielson, “Civil-Military Relations: Theory and Military Effectiveness”, *Public Administration and Management*, Vol.10, No. 2, 2005, pp. 61-84.

Apart from Huntinton and Janowitz's contribution to civil-military relations concept, other approaches such as Post-Modernist Theory and Democratic Peace Theory also offer significant knowledge about the concept of civil-military relations. The post-modernist approach offers the philosophy to understand human condition and the term is applied to a host of movements in the arts, architecture and criticism that is a departure from modernism. As a general theory for a historical movement, it was first used in 1939 by Arnold J. Toynbee: "Our own Post-Modern Age has been inaugurated by the general war of 1914–1918."⁸ Toynbee's approach to associate the start of a social movement with the profession of soldiers is illuminating. In true sense, post-modernism's most well-known interpretation is "deconstruction". Developed by French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, the notion looks for the interpretation of social relationship within the meaning of values created by the text. By text, Derrida signified the power of language. In line with this conception, the language which the military communicates should be called "Military Language" and may be treated as different from the one used by its civilian counterpart. This privileged position of the language carries with it several obligations. The post-modernist view of language coincides with current post-modernist notion of the military.

The term "post-modern" as applied to the military must imply some significant departure from earlier forms of military organisation. Drawing heavily on the historical experience, a three-fold typology of the military is worth recounting. The first is the modern type, which can date from the 19th century to the end of World War II. The second is the late-modern type, which prevailed from the mid 20th century into the early 1990s and is essentially co-terminus with the Cold War period. The post-modern type is the kind in the present age and is postulated to continue so into the indefinite future.⁹ Not in the distant past, a civilian had a discrete image of the military expressed in such terms as "uncivilised brute"; similarly, a military man when annoyed with the society would accost his civilian counterpart as "bloody civilian". This trend was more or less in vogue all over the world. This linguistic recrimination amounting to exchange of offensive language between the military and the civil only increased their distance.

The discourse on traditional threats to national security is giving way to that of non-traditional threats where the place of 'man' as the yardstick of human security occupies a higher position than man as a component unit of nation-state system. In this climate of pre-eminence of man's existence, it is useful to reflect on the proper role of the military. This role originates from the understanding that the military must educate themselves in liberal arts, while the civilians must educate themselves about defence issues and military culture. The intellectual challenge both to the society and the military as forming the essential organism of a structural process is the result of the mass movement towards advancement of human condition since the end of Cold War and remodelling of democratic ideals. Military is, no longer, considered to be

⁸ Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Volume 5, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 43.

⁹ Keynote Address delivered by Air Vice Marshal Mahmud Hussain at CIRDAP Auditorium on 17 February 2008.

merely a safe parcel of land to take shelter in cyclone. It is the legitimate tool in the hands of the state to be used not only in war but in peace as well. This changing view of the military emanates from a newer form of political society that takes inspiration from the traditions of democracy.

The latter approach, Democratic Peace Theory, explains the foreign policy behaviour of democratic states and the driving forces behind such behaviour. Democracies do not fight wars - this hypothesis has been validated in the post-modern era. Democratic peace is rooted theoretically in the writings of Immanuel Kant. His work, titled "Perpetual Peace" is still a source for citing the strong points of republican form of governments in ensuring peace and stability amongst states. Kant advocated for a 'citizens army'. He believed that such an army could realise the citizens' true inclination towards peace and assure the integration of the armed forces into the democratic system. Kant's tract appeared more than two centuries ago and cannot be approved at face value without strong opposition. Much has changed in international relations since then. Kant's perception that standing army increases the chances of war has not stood the test of time. He was speaking against the imperatives of "Westphalian" concept of nation-states built upon the importance of preserving states' territorial and sovereign integrity. Standing armies are trained soldiers and no state will accept its territorial boundaries to be left to the complexities of mobilising citizens for war only during conflict. The political and cultural diversity of the world makes absolute integration of human species into one unit of nation-state system a utopian prospect.

Military profession, in recent times, has become highly specialised and meritorious. Its greatest utility may subsist in its non-use for purposes of war and acting as deterrence to any offensive action by the enemy. This instills a sense of urgency for obligations other than war. In domestic arena, military's involvement in humanitarian crisis finds appropriate logic. Military is, no longer, confined to domestic functions. Its global outreach through the sanctions of the United Nations makes international peace and security an interdependent transaction amongst nation-states. This transition from statist to global role of the military which can be conceived as one aspect of Kantian doctrine of "perpetual peace" is indeed, a function of nation-states adopting democracy in greater numbers and becoming members of the United Nations, a world body whose appeal cannot be ignored in an anarchical society.

3. Civil-Military Relations in Democracy

For the promotion of democracy, healthy civil-military relations based on mutual respect and understanding is important. In the democratic system, the military provides security whereas the civilian authority provides the moral, financial and infrastructural support. In democracies, military service is voluntary but is signified by characteristic professional distinctions. Technological and scientific advances make

states suspicious of each other's motives. The age-old paradigm of security dilemma comes back to warn states to recast their military spirit. The institution which is now called upon to do the bidding for the state is the military itself and if needed hundreds of soldiers ought to die in order to protect the life of a single civilian - this is a normative truth which the military must embrace as a democratic ideal. Thus, in a democratic ideal, the military is faced with a serious challenge of keeping its position secure and institutionally balanced to meet its multi-faceted missions. The problems are acute with countries that have developed fast but still view democracy with impatience.

Despite democracy's development-deficit notoriety, for military leaders, the test is how to keep up with global standards of military professionalism and effectiveness. The reason is global requirement for the military to participate in UN-sanctioned missions where civil-military cooperation is the *sine qua non* for success. This preparedness of the military for external commitment helps in improving its capacity for internal duties. Military's involvement in national crisis and development activities depends on the civil-military "problematique". It is a real challenge for military leadership how it reconciles a military subordinate enough to do anything that the civilians ask them to do but strong enough to do it effectively without jeopardising its popular image. For the political leadership, it is equally a performance of competence to control the nation's military without damaging its professional effectiveness. Military activity occurs at multiple levels: political, strategic, operational and tactical. At all levels, there could be civil-military cooperation but it is the military hierarchy at political level that matters most for stabilising the relation. This level is identified with the positions of Chiefs of Staff, Area and Divisional Commanders. In fact, what is important to understand in a democratic environment is that a nation's military could become more effective without any loss of civilian control.¹⁰

The other challenging area where military skills are enhanced is the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Over the past sixty years, United Nations Peacekeeping has evolved into one of the main tools used by the international community to manage complex crises that pose a threat to international peace and security. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the number of military, police and civilian personnel deployed in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations around the world has reached unprecedented levels. Not only has the United Nations peacekeeping grown in size but it has become increasingly complex. Beyond simply monitoring cease-fires, today's multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon to facilitate the political process through the promotion of national dialogue and reconciliation, protection of civilians, assistance in disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration of combatants, support to the organisation of elections, protection and promotion of human rights and assistance in restoring the rule of law.

The ability to function in a multi-cultural environment under the command of different nationalities is both innovative and challenging. Soldiers of one country

¹⁰ Suzanne C. Nielson, *op. cit.*

learn to listen to the directives, instructions and orders of a commander belonging to another country. This helps in building mutual respect for cross-cultural values. The very notion that as a soldier his noble task is to materialise peace in the crisis area has a long-enduring value in his psyche which he carries back home as a good citizen. A peacekeeper is a harbinger of stability and tranquillity in social life. All these activities with which peacekeepers are involved are promotion towards democracy and as such, strengthen civil-military cooperation. It may be mentioned here that in a UN Peacekeeping Mission, a democratic structure is maintained like that in a well-defined political state. The Force Commander (FC) who is the military boss, functions under the authority of the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) who is the political boss of a mission. Peacekeeping missions offer very good example of articulation and meaningful exploitation of multi-national military assets under the clearly defined political objectives with overarching civilian control on military hierarchy. In a democratic society, military's role is rather conditioned by the expectations of society at large. Some of these expectations include political neutrality, professionalism, social responsibility and constitutional obligation.

Political Neutrality

The democratically elected politicians represent people of the country. Political involvement of the military runs the risk of seizure of popular mandate by military leaders. This may lead to military coercion of popular will and breakdown of social values like freedom, rule of law and good governance. In a democracy, politicians instinctively abhor military leaders for their adventurism that usurps their power base. The attitude of political power must subordinate the military in an 'inclusive' manner that gives enough space for mutual respectability and cohesion. In the liberal world of democracy, the military's position is not one of "isolationism" but of "interdependence". The society, which gives its communal structure an equilibrium through allocation of duties and commitments, finds harmony in proper and ethical subjection of one's position to higher order of the state. This higher order belongs to politics which can be true to its spirit only by being apolitical. The words of Samuel P. Huntington apodictic:

"Future problem in civil-military relations in new democracies are likely to come not from the military but from the civilian side of the equation. They will come from the failures of democratic governments to promote economic development and maintain law and order. They also will stem from weak political institutions and ambitious political leaders who may enlist the military as their accomplices in undermining or destroying democracy, as Alberto Fujimori did in Peru and as Boris Yeltsin, Lech Walesa, and others might be tempted to do in their own countries. The new countries have been more successful in dealing with civil-military relations than most of the other major challenges they face. Sustaining that success now depends on their

ability to make progress in dealing with the ills that lie outside their militaries and within their societies at large.”¹¹

The political involvement of military undermines democratic principles as well as the political desire of military hampers its professional excellence. However, as Huntington mentioned, sometimes elected governments involve military officials in the political affairs to use military for political purposes which challenges proper functioning of democracy. In a democratic system, military’s political neutrality is essential for proper functioning of democracy. When any government engages military for political purposes, it challenges democratic structure of a country.

Professionalism

All societies respect the military as the guardian of their country’s border. They wish to see military as an image of heroism and excellence. The society expects that soldiers should be model of integrity and unflinching obedience to higher political command. Professional education and training through rigorous discipline and comprehensive methodology inculcates aspirations for higher ideals of life. Samuel P. Huntington notes, “The intellectual content of the military profession requires the modern officer to devote about one-third of his professional life to formal schooling, probably a higher ratio of educational time to practice time than in any other profession.”¹² The task of a professional military officer is very complex as he deals with human beings as well as he needs to be prepared for combating. He needs a deeper understanding of both natural and social sciences. The state regulates all professions to some extent but in case of the military profession, the state reserves the exclusive power of monopoly.¹³ In earlier times, recruitment of mercenaries was a common practice but in modern democratic polity, there is no alternative to professional military apparatus. When he climbs up to the higher position, he needs more professional expertise in the strategic levels. Bernard Brodie makes a scintillating observation about the unique status of military professionalism in relation to politicians’ dilemma:

“It does not teach us that civilians are normally better informed on things military than the military themselves, or any other such nonsense. It simply tells us that there always has been and probably will always continue to be far too much pontification and posturing on the commodity called military judgement, which taken in itself, without supplemental inquiry and rumination, can be extremely limiting thing. It is also to say that war is not only too important to be left to the generals but too important and far too complex to be handled adequately by any one profession. And so far as concerns responsibility, the civilian leader who has the constitutional authority and obligation to control should have no fears

¹¹ Samuel P. Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations”, in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 11.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

or diffidence about his inherent competency, given suitable advisers, to do so. Naturally, it helps to have a sharp and judicious mind, which a President or a Secretary of Defence or of State ought to have anyway, and it is always necessary to take the trouble to acquaint oneself with the problem.”¹⁴

In democracies, the businessman may command more income; the politician may command more power; but the professional man (the army general) commands more respect.¹⁵ The professional values must be secured for the proper functioning of the military institutions and strategic policy making. Nevertheless, the professional lacuna of military can challenge democratic institutions and in the long term it may affect the governance structure of the country. The professionalism in military is, by and large, interlinked with the sovereignty of the country. An unprofessional military may not be able to fight when they are called. Moreover, in modern world sometimes military takes responsibility in the peacetimes also. When government engage them in any types of development activities, lack of professionalism will affect their efficiency and sincerity to serve the nation.

Social Responsibility

There are often confusions about military's peacetime role in society; whether its involvement in civilian tasks is justified or not. This is contrary to popular will. In moments of national crisis, people want military by their side and it renders unrequited humanitarian service. The military capabilities to support other agencies such as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Inter/Intra-Governmental Organisations and local bodies when called upon in aid of civil power are well established. Military, probably, is the strongest social unit. The bond between officers and soldiers is the most durable of any social groupings. Examples of soldiers sacrificing their lives to preserve those of their “buddies” abound through ages. There is a distinct social image of the military in historic literatures that creates a special emotional feeling for soldiers and officers. The literary image of the officer is the conscience of a man who is split between carrying the obligation of organised violence upon orders from the state and bearing a heavy burden of guilt for killing and maiming fellow human beings. The inhuman face of war has a compassionate and solemn effect on the soldier's spiritual content that wills to make up for the mental dogmatism by substituting it for strong social responsibility in times of societal crisis. Military is a tool in the hands of the state. Post-modern societies serve well by drawing the military closer to the social bondage.

Constitutional Obligation

Constitution is the substance of national will and philosophy. The musings of constitution often calls upon the nation to rise above the pettifogging chicaneries of narrow politics. Military officers, on being commissioned, have to invoke the

¹⁴ Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., p. 473.

¹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, 1996, *op. cit.*

constitution to remind themselves of their duty to the state. It decrees them to remain within constitutional obligation. In a way, the military by remaining within constitutional principles becomes its true guardian. It is important for military leaders to give their political masters sound advice and specialised knowledge. Great military commanders have shown exemplary acumen in upholding the values of democracy and safeguarding the cause of common man.

In a democracy, effective civil-military relations are essential to achieve national goals. Military can play necessary role if it can remain far from political alignment and the military officials need to be professional and loyal to the constitutional obligations. It is expected that military authority should be loyal to the civilian and implement the decisions that are forwarded by the civilian authority. The civilian authority can engage them in the state affairs where the government needs the role of military.

4. Civil-Military Relations in Bangladesh

Bangladesh has its own experience regarding civil-military relations issues. It faced a number of undemocratic regimes directly under military rule or civilian government under the control of military. These mixed practices have shaped the nature of civil-military relations in Bangladesh over the years. The civil-military relations in Bangladesh mean the relationship between defence forces and the people of the country. The term 'people' include the established government of the country elected by the people, business community, the intellectual and cultural communities, the students of higher educational institutions and the politicians.¹⁶ Like other developing countries, civil-military relations in Bangladesh are still in an evolving pattern rather than being a fixed and preconceived idea.¹⁷ In Bangladesh, civil-military relations emerged since the Liberation War where young and patriotic Bangladeshi soldiers revolted and joined the freedom fight and set one of the finest examples of civil-military relations even in a war situation.¹⁸ Bangladesh was born through nine month long Liberation War. It was a people's war in which the contribution of the military personnel in fighting along with civilians creates the proud history of Bangladesh. The unique pattern of civil-military relations was formed during that period. On 04 April 1971, some of the Bengali military officers who had revolted against Pakistani military crackdown formally organised the *Mukti Bahini*.¹⁹ After a bloody war of nine months, Bangladesh emerged as a new nation in the global map.

The subsequent history of civil-military interaction in Bangladesh is one of alternate shifts of turmoil and convergence. Bangladesh army was the lineal

¹⁶ Major General (ret'd.) Syed Muhammad Ibrahim, "Civil Military Relationship", *Dhaka Courier*, Vol. 20, Issue.23, 2004.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Syed Anwar Husain, *op. cit.*

¹⁹ Golam Hossain, *Civil-Military Relations in Bangladesh: A Comparative Study*, Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1991, pp. 37- 45.

descendant of liberation struggle. Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman enjoyed consummate acceptance as the unchallenged leader after his return from prison in Pakistan. He set himself to the task of building a strong and pro-people army as was often reflected through his speeches to army officers during his visits to military establishments. The officers who formed the top echelon of the military, proclaimed their commitment to a democratic society. Under the leadership of Bangabandhu from early 1972, Bangladesh military committed itself to professionalism and loyalty to political leadership. But this traditional and accepted pattern of civil-military relationship did not continue for long; soon great national tragedy befell Bangladesh. A handful of army officers and few errant politicians masterminded the killing of the father of the nation. It was a national catastrophe of colossal magnitude.

From 1975 till 1981, it was the military ruler Ziaur Rahman and his Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) which administered the country. General Zia's death was the result of factionalism within army. He founded BNP as an independent political entity but failed to keep army safe from political wrangling. His death demonstrated the harmful side of a general's involvement in politics without completely detaching himself from military affairs.

Upon the death of General Zia, Justice Abdus Sattar succeeded him as the President. He lacked both popularity and leadership skill to control the party. His falling health also aided continuous infighting within BNP. The party created highly volatile situation in politics encouraging army generals' strong desire for political power. The circumstances fitted strongly into civil-military relations' security paradigm of civil-civil conflict with poor management of democratic norms, thus creating opportunities for a strong probability of military influence in politics. His lack of political command and authority gave opportunity for General Hussein Mohammad Ershad to proclaim, "The army should be directly associated with the governance of the country which might fulfil the ambition of the army and might not lead to further coups."²⁰ Meanwhile, the law and order situation deteriorated with the concurrent worsening of the economic condition. Within the prevailing circumstance, President Ershad found an excellent opportunity to take over power. On 24 March 1982, he took over the government by a bloodless coup and declared martial law.²¹

In order to give legitimacy to his political ambitions, Ershad formed Jatiyo Party (JP) in January 1986.²² His rule of nine years is characterised by suppression of other political parties by manipulation. He used military and civil bureaucracies as tools for perpetuating his political control of state apparatus. For the first time in practical sense, the military got actively involved in politics. Military generals competed with each other to secure the President's favour to obtain ministerial positions. The involvement of military generals in politics, directly or indirectly, had resulted in negative effects on

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

military profession. Military was no longer an apolitical institution at top echelon. The feeling that politics gave power and power guaranteed privileged position in society was the enticement. The idea of politicians being public servant was largely subsumed by the power of power-politics of the military top brass in search of political career. Politics was, no longer, the domain of a stable political condition. But such a state of politics could not last for long in Bangladesh. Ultimately, his fall came as a result of popular demonstration by the two political parties - Awami League and BNP.

The fall of Ershad foretold a new era of democratic political revival in Bangladesh. It was also a message for the Generals to go back to the barracks and infuse their institution with age-old ideals of professionalism, duty and integrity. From 1990 till 2007, the country saw military's complete withdrawal from politics. In 2007, the country again plunged into a political chaos. The military-backed caretaker government between 2007 and 2009 was its follow-on. Both civil and military bureaucracies appropriated the role of politicians.

After the election of 2009, the elected government kept the military out of politics by avoiding political intervention in the military. The government's focus was to maintain a thoroughly professional standing army, navy and air force. Its use of military tools has been apolitical. It has displayed extra-ordinary wisdom by involving military in development and social activities that has given military its professional pride and prestige. The consequence of such civil-military relations is positive and has encouraged military to situate its proper role and functions in a democratic society.

Although Bangladesh has faced several ups and downs regarding civil-military relations, its military has also made notable positive contributions in creating better democratic environment and assisting in the development of Bangladesh. Bangladesh military has created a place in the UN peacekeeping operations, becoming the largest troops-sending country at present and securing an important decision making role in peacekeeping missions. At present, the total number of Bangladeshi contributors to UN Peacekeeping Missions is 7,051.²³ It played a key role in restoring democracy in war-torn Haiti and Sierra Leone. Bangladesh joined the Blue Helmets in 1988. Since then, Bangladeshi peacekeepers set values and proved their professionalism. For their outstanding contribution to the war-torn Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone government announced Bengali language as an honorary official language.

In the domestic scene, Bangladesh military played a leading role in disaster management and many nation-building development activities within the country.²⁴ Till now, the Bangladesh army has been involved in a number of notable development works and the Prime Minister has stressed the importance of military involvement

²³ "Contributors to the UN Peacekeeping Operations", available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/apr16_1.pdf, accessed on 12 May 2016.

²⁴ Ishfaq Ilahi Choudhury, "Civilian Control of the Military in Bangladesh: Moving towards a Democratic Tradition", *BISS Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1999, pp. 78.

in pro-people civil and infra-structural works. The government has demonstrated great confidence in army by entrusting it with the responsibility of supervising the construction of the Padma Bridge. The armed forces had been actively engaged in water supply management, preparing national voter ID cards, providing free medical treatment and providing food to the deprived people etc. The Bangladesh Army has also been engaged in distributing winter clothes to poor people and constructing roads and highways across the country.

The tragedy of Rana Plaza in 2013 and its aftermath has demonstrated civil-military coordination-cum-cooperation at its best. Within 20 minutes of the catastrophe, the “Government Initiative Rescue Operation” got momentum and started at its full swing. About 1132 people lost their lives in the catastrophe. The death toll could have been much more but the heroic efforts of Bangladesh Army, Fire Brigade, Bangladesh Garments Manufacturing and Exporting Association (BGMEA) and above all, the brave souls of rescue workers managed the whole rescue operation successfully. Rana Plaza rescue operation is a unique example of civil-military interface, a symbol of national cohesion and unity. The example of Rana Plaza demonstrated that “discipline” which is so much an instrument of the military can also be made national. It is during this crisis that military as an institution and society as the living organism of a state came to represent the power of nationality. This shows that the civil-military relations, at present times in Bangladesh, probably, enjoy the most resilient canon of democratic practice. These non-warlike development activities played a vital role in bringing the military into greater contact with the society at large.

As a democratic country, the civil-military relations in Bangladesh are always an important area to accomplish government activities. After 1975, military intervention in politics challenged a proper functioning of democracy and the role of military was not in line to develop a healthy democratic order. However, after return to democracy, the government took different initiatives to strengthen civil-military relations. It has shown a positive direction of civil-military relations, but the desired level needs more policy initiatives. Military’s role in the UN peacekeeping operations and its active contribution to build some of the war torn countries enhanced the image of Bangladesh in the international arena. Moreover, Bangladesh armed forces are active in the disaster management of the country as well as they are engaged in the different mega structures of the country. Engaging military in the development activities within the constitutional framework can help the country to achieve desired goals.

5. Addressing Future Challenges

Although Bangladesh Army gained lots of achievements over the years, it also faces many challenges which ultimately disturb the making of civil-military relations more effective. Therefore, seminal challenges that have negative impact on civil-military relations need a proper understanding. There is no complete national accord about the structure of

the army for the purpose of making the best use of military. Bangladesh Army originates out of the colonial tradition which makes the institution exclusive from the rest of the society. Various endeavours have been undertaken in many countries to bring the army closer to the society. For example, in Senegal, a new military code was adopted in May 1994 to facilitate civil military interaction.²⁵ This was made to ease the process of engaging military more in democracy. A comprehensive defence and security policy is a crucial need for proper direction of overall development and maintenance of better civil-military relations in Bangladesh. Experts, researchers, scholars and members of academia should come forward with implementable ideas to develop a national defence and security policy. Examples can also be drawn from other successful countries to develop a sustainable defence and security policy. The country is in need of a comprehensive defence and security policy which will act as a guideline for national development and making democracy successful.

Good governance is still lacking in Bangladesh. Corruption, lack of political commitment, lack of transparency and accountability, inadequate public participation, weak bureaucracy and lack of effective political leadership make the governance weak which largely hampers civil-military relations. Developing good governance is a prerequisite for attaining better civil-military relations. To obtain good governance, several steps such as reforming civil administration, improving selection procedures for all constitutional posts and autonomous recruitment for all constitutional bodies, increasing parliamentary oversight of the executive, strengthening anti-corruption commission, establishing rule of law, improving transparency in public procurement, relaxing restrictions on the freedom to vote in parliament and preventing boycott of parliament etc. are important to deal with. Such improvements would facilitate civil and military organisations to work together.

For making a better civil-military relations, understanding of the whole process and its respective stakeholders are very much important for all to know. Bangladesh's educational curriculum will largely help in this regard. But the educational curriculum lacks the information of the military and is not up-to-date about it. For that reason, the civilian largely remain uninformed about the military matters. An updated educational curriculum is vital to disseminate accurate and effective information about the military. There should be constructive discussion in the text books on the Bangladesh Army like the same way as other different organs of government are discussed. It will make military closer to the people.

Access of media in military affairs is not in a satisfactory level. In a democratic country, military should also be subject to examine on the ground of transparency and accountability. Therefore, media's access will ensure transparency and liability of the military. The role of media is a crucial one regarding civil-military relations practice in Bangladesh. For that reason, strengthening media's capability is very important. Monitoring media agency which provides media oversight and strengthening the press council are crucial. Decentralisation and depoliticisation are important in this regard.

²⁵ Technical Support Division, Culture, Gender and Human Rights Branch, UNEP, *Enlisting the Armed Forces to Protect Productive Health and Rights: Lessons Learned from Nine Countries*, 2013.

Isolating military in remote, fortress-like cantonments is no longer an option. This situation in some ways hampers civil-military relations process. A need for greater civil-military interaction still requires huge attention. A mutual trust is very much important between the civilian administration and the military. But Bangladesh is still experiencing trust gap between the two. Politicians and political parties' role in this regard are still not very strong. Insufficient information sharing, lack of openness, lack of interaction and negative public branding of the military are major obstacles in the making of mutual trust between the two. Improving mutual trust and confidence between civilian people and the military is very important for upholding civil-military relations. This could be done by establishing national oversight mechanism, establishing training programmes between civil and security sectors, sensitising national leadership to challenges, ensuring recruitment, promotions and postings based on only competence and merit.

Recruitment, promotions and postings should be free from political influence. Exchange programmes can play crucial role in mitigating gaps between civilian organisations and the military. Conducting of orientation, advocacy and awareness programme are also important. Improving military's ability to relate with civil society is another important part. Improving public relation capacity of the military, relaxing restrictions on military's interactions with the civil sector, upgrading authority and responsibility of Inter Services Public Relations Directorate (ISPR) as an institution and appointing an ISPR spokesperson can help to achieve such goals. Development of the capacity of civil support agencies, police and NGOs to limit military involvement is another important step to improve mutual trust between the two. This could be done by enhancing professionalism through career development programmes, proper material and fund resourcing, and increasing participation between stakeholders etc.

Although Bangladesh has a parliamentary committee on defence, it is only limited to certain supervisory role. Major appointments are always made by the Prime Minister but there is no such rule of parliamentary ratification for finalising the appointments. Parliamentary supervision is important regarding civil-military relations. Bangladesh Judiciary also has almost no role in the military affairs. Bangladesh judiciary cannot oversee the military including safeguarding the rights of the members of the armed forces from executive excesses. Engaging parliament and judiciary in the military affairs are necessary to uphold democratic principles in the civil-military relations. Moreover, political parties in Bangladesh lack democratic values. A good politician can better understand the value of democracy and democratic practice in each and every institution including military. Political parties of the country need to play important role in making civil-military relations a success. But the political parties of Bangladesh are still lacking democratic values. As a result, to democratise political parties, implementing agreed political party reform is very important. The organised democratic political parties can play crucial role in upholding civil-military relations concept.

As discussed earlier, civil-military relations imply subservience of military under civilian authority. The relation becomes problematic when it is violated. It is proved from the discussion earlier that, stable and established civil-military relations are important for any democratic state. Recently, Bangladesh is enjoying stable democratic environment and this situation is suitable for promoting civil-military relations to improve at its best. It is important that proper and effective policy initiatives should be taken into consideration as early as possible for attaining good civil-military relations. Civil-military interaction is clearly a need for nourishing civil-military relations attributes. Large scale professional and social engagement between the two will be helpful for developing closer interaction. Regarding this issue, joint seminars, workshops on national issues will act as the platform for sharing views and experiences.

6. Conclusion

Civil-military relation is a highly sensitive and politically complex affair. It brings within its fold society's two most significant elements and shapes them in need of viable social structure. While the military is conservative in its character and would very much like to remain within its defined professional boundaries, the politics, on the other hand, follows an open system subject to the popular will of the masses. The civilian chief controls the military chain of command. Thus, the relation becomes problematic when it is not well in order. As a result, stable and established civil-military relations with the establishment of military subordination to the elected representatives are important for any democratic state. Political neutrality, professionalism, social responsibility and constitutional obligation are some of the important elements which make civil-military relations to grow in a democratic state.

Bangladesh, as a democratic state, faced lots of challenges regarding civil-military relations since its independence. The country is still facing notable challenges like lack of good governance, absence of defence and security policy, absence of national consensus about the structure of the military, mutual trust between the two and so on. But despite negative experiences, Bangladesh can also be a model of good practice as the country has already observed the role of civil-military relations in nation-building development activities, disaster management works and notable contribution in the UN peacekeeping.

To move forward, the country needs to take effective action to tackle the challenges related to civil-military relations. Several implementable recommendations regarding this have been suggested in the earlier discussion such as developing good governance, improving mutual trust and confidence, democratisation of political parties, active role of media, effective role of the judiciary, parliamentary supervision, updated educational curriculum, comprehensive defence and security policy etc. Undertaking collaborative projects and increasing policy level prioritisation of the issue among policy makers and practitioners will largely play role in implementing these recommendations.

*Abul Kalam***MARITIME DESTINY OF BANGLADESH: ENTWINING CHALLENGES****Abstract**

Bangladesh won two successive international verdicts over its maritime claims with neighbouring Myanmar and India. The verdicts granted Bangladesh 200 nautical miles of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Bay of Bengal (BoB). Its continental shelf now extends up to 354 nautical miles, with sovereign rights on all living and mineral resources. All this added to the country's panoramic maritime domain, indubitably huge areas. Consequently, for business-related concerns, economic reasons and sustained development, the country's new maritime space warrant measures for ensuring its destiny. Some vital concerns remain: knowledge on the resources beneath the marine/seabed or at the aquatic level; the country's ability, skills and technology to access the resources or even its awareness of how to utilise the resources to its advantage; and, finally, the choices or means accessible for its maritime space or establishing its sway in its maritime domain. All such concerns call for rational analysis and reflection. How Bangladesh could countenance and meet the challenges of utilising its maritime spheres towards serving its overriding interests? In dealing with challenges facing the nation and actions required, the paper analyses some selected sectors that are entwined, keeping in view the conceptual-analytical trends in maritime studies. It pleads for futuristic planning and meticulous execution of neatly considered planning choices to ensure the nation a maritime destiny keeping matters of policy relevance in perspectives.

1. Introduction

Bangladesh is now an acknowledged maritime state. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in their respective judgements (14 March 2012 and 09 July 2014) helped resolve the country's prolonged disputes over maritime claims with neighbouring Myanmar (Burma) and India. Following the verdicts a new maritime-centric Bangladesh has emerged. Its current maritime geography is 1,18,813 sq km, whereas the land territory is 1,47,570 sq km. The country's rights over 200 nautical miles of EEZ have also been established. Its continental shelf now extends up to 354 nautical miles; it has sovereign rights there on all living and non-living resources.

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The foregoing maritime gains represent a big achievement for a country like Bangladesh with constraints of land area. Consequently, for business-related concerns, commercial prospects and economic interests, this added maritime boundary warrant appropriate measures for sustainable development. For Bangladesh to protect this large soft-underbelly and to explore and exploit the natural resources of deep seabed carry huge challenges. These represent a remarkable feat for the country; but the challenges emerge how to move towards a future that would redeem the national vision.

Indeed, acquiring maritime territories symbolise one objective gain; but accessing the potential resources and their fuller exploitation, both current and prospective, represents a different tale. The fact of owning huge aquatic space does offer significant ramifications. With regard to resource, the country has potentially furthered its maritime gains; it ushered in vistas of optimism for future and widened the prospect of accessing to and harnessing of resources, both above and under its oceanic possessions.¹ Spatially, Bangladesh has now wide openings to the Bay of Bengal (BoB) and the Indian Ocean, with significant situational advantages. (See Appendix 1 for Bangladesh Maritime Territorial Map). All these dimensions demand appropriate policy attention and action planning from the authorities concerned.

Pertinent questions arise: Does Bangladesh have the necessary data on resources underneath the marine/seabed or stream above? Does the country have the policy frame, ability, skills and technology to access the resources or the awareness of how to utilise the resources to its best advantage? What challenges does the country confront in its maritime domain? All such concerns are intertwined and could prove very tough for the nation. Hence, they call for rational analysis, thoughtful planning and policy reflections. The country has to spur its efforts toward countenance and meet the challenges of accessing its present maritime possessions. The objective is to serve the overriding interests of its people and utilise the resources to enhance the nation's destiny. With an objective to identify the challenges that Bangladesh faces, the paper in section two projects the entwined pattern of multi-sectoral analysis, specifying the analytical rationale of such an approach; section three considers six key sectors selected that interface the nation's maritime vision and require planning of actions seeing to their materialisation. The conclusion reviews the findings and reflects on policy/action-planning and future research.

2. Conceptual Context of Maritime Studies: Entwining Challenges

As a new maritime state, Bangladesh has to develop an integrated maritime policy; there is yet no definitive direction about how to achieve this. The country's knowledge and expertise in the area still seem inadequate. Therefore, it has to open up itself to a

¹ Abul Kalam, "Maritime Destiny of Bangladesh: Legacies and Prospects," *BIISS Journal*, Vol. 36, No. 4, October, 2015; Sharif Hasan and Lam-ya Mostaque, "Judgement at the Hague and Future Prospects," *Dhaka Tribune*, 18 July 2014.

learning process towards charting the course of its maritime destiny and catching up with the analytical approaches that prevail. To this end, it also needs to mature its maritime research and policy framing which are consistent with national vision.

The field of maritime analysis is relatively new — little more than a century old. Studies in the field had earlier been set in motion across the seas by global strategic concerns of the major powers pursuing their positional advantage. Therefore, the field is yet to overcome the challenges of identifying and maturing its analytical approaches. Maritime studies embody an emerging field. Methodological concerns include complex problems and issues involving oceanic governance which establishes the framework for management. These draw features such as legal and institutional structures and also entail multilevel mechanisms of implementation which are carried out at international, regional, national and local levels; these in turn include actions and policies of supranational bodies, state and non-state actors/stakeholders.²

Winning favourable verdicts of national claims to oceanic resources do not inevitably confer Bangladesh sovereign rights of ‘owning’ the global commons, such as both the BoB and Indian Ocean, where it now has lawful stake. Analysts working in macro/micro-level fields have to be mindful of all such concerns whilst selecting areas for research. As for policymaking, Bangladesh has to be equally watchful in all its maritime policy formulations about the challenging multilevel pursuits.

The key concerns include conceptualisation of relevant policies, policy appraisals and policy planning.³ Other concerns include raising policy aspirations and empowering the fellow researchers and policymakers for action planning and/or policy implementation. Action research is seen in this context as a way of investigating professional experience in areas relevant which link concepts and pattern of practice into a single, continuously developing sequence.⁴

A relevant key point perceptibly is to recognise ‘maritime geography’; this has its ramifications on the concepts in use for analytical/policy appraisals. Usually, three regions are identified:

²Biliana Cicin-Sain, Robert W. Knecht, Dosoo Jang and Gregory W. Fisk, *Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management: Concepts and Practices*, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, UNESCO, University of Delaware, College of Marine Studies, Island Press, 1998; Biliana Cicin-Sain, Robert W. Knecht, *The Future of U.S. Ocean Policy: Choices for the New Century*, Island Press, 2000; Miriam Sara Repetto, *Towards an Ocean Governance Framework and National Ocean Policy for Peru 2005*, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/repetto_0506_peru.pdf.

³ Charlotte Carter-Wall and Grahame Whitfield, “The Role of Aspirations, Attitudes and Behaviour in Closing the Educational Attainment Gap”, available at <https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/role-aspirations-attitudes-and-behaviour-closing-educational-attainment-gap>, accessed on 16 January 2016.

⁴ Richard Winter, “Some Principles and Procedures for the Conduct of Action Research”, in Ortrun Zuber-Skerritt (ed.), *New Directions in Action Research*, Routledge, 2003, pp. 13-27.

- ‘Brown-water’ - starting from the shoreline through to the end of the continental shelf;
- ‘Green-water’ - the main maritime arena, perhaps a few hundred miles from shore, including territorial sea, extending from the outer edge of the brown-water layer past any continental shelves, archipelagos and islands, and
- ‘Blue-water’ – seen also as ‘Open Ocean’, extending from the outer edge of the green-water zone through to the deep ocean.

Consequent to all these, there are also the use of operational notions of brown, green and blue water navies.⁵ In the current context, however, conceptually the most important are the four maritime forms of economic growth:

- ‘Brown economy’, also called ‘black economy’, i.e. economic growth that depends only on petrochemicals like coal, petroleum and natural gas. In the process of this form of production, great amounts of carbon dioxide and soot are released into the atmosphere.⁶
- ‘Green economy’, supported by UNEP since 2008, is defined as an economy that seeks to reduce environmental risks and ecological scarcities and promote sustainable development without degrading the environment.⁷
- ‘Blue economy’, or marine economy, is an emerging concept; it is designed to develop marine ocean resource, including also a service industry, directly or indirectly related to it.
- Finally, there is the notion of ‘Golden economy’ or ‘sunshine economy’; it conveys a sustainable economy that chooses non-fossil energy (based on wind, solar, water, biomass, geothermal, marine etc.) as basic energy supply. Golden economy encourages commonly public distribution of all facilities, such as marine and solar systems to improve the existing energy sources.⁸

All such conceptual approaches underscore the existence of some ‘deep fault lines’ in a range of socioeconomic concerns that generate alternative

⁵Available at <http://www.geographictravels.com/2009/08/maritime-geography-brown-green-and-blue.html>, accessed on 22 November 2015; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maritime_geography, accessed on 21 September 2015; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue-water_navy, accessed on 21 September 2015; Jacquelin Ringersma, Niels Batjes, David Dent Wageningen, *Green Water: Definitions and Data for Assessment*, Report 2003/2, ISRIC, World Soil Information, December 2003.

⁶Available at <http://zhongou.gotoip2.com/en/jingji.html>, accessed on 22 September 2015.

⁷Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_economy#Definition; http://twitter.com/ungreeneconomy?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw, accessed on 21 September 2015.

⁸Available at <http://zhongou.gotoip2.com/en/jingji.html>, accessed on 22 September 2015.

visions affecting sustainable development.⁹ Many in Bangladesh are inclined to embrace the notion of 'blue economy' without recognising the challenges of passing through competitive phases of brown and green economy. Most of the developing countries, including neighbouring India and other G-20 countries (responsible for 75 per cent of global emissions and its energy-related greenhouse gas emissions) are still at brown economy stage. Hence, the emphasis has been of a transition to move to a green, low-carbon economy.¹⁰ In terms of environment and sustainability, Bangladesh has been languishing in a low-state of brown economy. However, since the maritime verdicts the country has energised itself to host major events on 'blue economy', even though notionally it is still at an embryonic stage of evolution.¹¹ The efforts to conceptualise may be in the right direction as a learning strategy; but operationalising such an approach prerequisites an embrace by all policymakers concerned and action planners; equally important also for all the stakeholders at all levels within and beyond the region to draw up cooperative action plans encompassing areas from marine biotechnology to deep-sea fishing, ecosystemic threats, climate change and natural disasters etc.¹²

All these seem idealistic but still a far cry. Many of the key issues pertinent to maritime domain across the world are generally under-researched; these include how to access the gains, develop, explore resources and enhance competence.¹³ The challenges in the field are too numerous; these are also of interweaving natures and cover diverge concerns. The concerns include legacy and prospect, capital and human investment, knowhow, affordability and sustainability. They must also ensure welfare of the people/society concerned. All these challenges are intimately entwined in many ways through multiple traditions of human and resource development.¹⁴ In this backdrop, the analytical interests in the relevant fields still are largely pursued on a sectoral basis; an inherent idea is to ensure that the selected areas get greater clarity from intensive research, diagnostic findings through focused investigations; policy roles can then be assigned for action planning, which offer scope for spatial impacts

⁹Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2016/09/mil-160920_rferl02.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1823%2eaq0ao072mi%2e1ocg, accessed on 21 September 2015.

¹⁰Available at <http://blueandgreentomorrow.com/2016/09/01/g20-still-yet-transition-brown-green-economy/>, accessed on 22 September 2015.

¹¹See, for instance, *Proceedings of International Workshop on Blue Economy*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh, 01 September 2014; Abul Kalam Azad, "Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries and the Prospect of Blue Economy for Bangladesh: A Critical Overview," *Journal of International Relations*, Jahangirnagar University, Vol. VI, No. 6, 2015.

¹²"Bangladesh-India Relations: Progress Made and the Challenges Ahead", dialogue organised by the Daily Star and the Institute for Policy, Advocacy and Governance (IPAG), *The Daily Star*, 18 September 2016.

¹³Jon. S. Helmick, "Port and Maritime Security: A Research Perspective," *Journal of Transport Security*, Vol. 1, 2008, pp. 15-28.

¹⁴Rattan Lal, Klaus Lorenz, Reinhard F. Hüttl, *Ecosystem Services and Carbon Sequestration in the Biosphere* (eds.), Springer, 2013.

as interventions to support.¹⁵ Indeed, a sector-based approach in areas like maritime affairs is viewed as an important policy tool in national planning, as it tends to offer greater clarity from the policymakers to the sectoral stakeholders on the long-term national approaches.

Bangladesh cannot be an exception to this analytical trend. Indeed, sector-based analysis has been in use in the country's five-year perspective planning, including the current Seventh Five-Year Plan,¹⁶ though an analysis, casing maritime affairs has not been pervasive as the country attained its international maritime status only in recent years.¹⁷ In terms of available data, the BoB and its coastal areas are the most scantily studied areas.¹⁸ The means that are available have not been sufficient enough either to optimise its maritime resources or develop services in an adequate manner. Moreover, as many of the maritime sectors of the country are underdeveloped the scope at this stage for fuller or a focused scrutiny seem limited, as available in most developed countries.¹⁹

Consequently, in Bangladesh context all the fields relevant towards maritime awareness, resources and service development deserve greater analysis and in-depth scholarly attention. Any investigation of such fields has to keep in view their entwining natures. An intrinsic idea is to ensure that competencies are aligned with knowledge and skill development along with technological progression. There are also the

¹⁵ For such perspective see, Department for Business Innovation and Skills, "Industrial Strategy: UK Sector Analysis", *Economics Paper*, No. 8, September 2012, pp. 4-6; For case study of sector analysis see, Davies, Ian M. and David Pratt, "Strategic Sectoral Planning for Offshore Renewable Energy in Scotland", *Marine Renewable Energy Technology and Environmental Interactions*, Netherlands : Springer, 2014, pp. 141-152; Juan L. Suarez de Vivero, Juan C. Rodríguez Mateos and David Florido del Corral, "Geopolitical Factors of Maritime Policies and Marine Spatial Planning: State, Regions, and Geographical Planning Scope", *Marine Policy*, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2009, pp. 624-634.

¹⁶ General Economic Division, Bangladesh Planning Commission, Government of Bangladesh, *Seventh Five-Year Plan FY 2016-FY2021, Accelerating Growth, Empowering Citizens*, 2015.

¹⁷ M. Shahadat Hossain, Sayedur Rahman Chowdhury, Umme Kulsum Navera, Mostafa Ali Reza Hossain, Badrul Imam and S. M Sharifuzzaman, *Background Paper for Preparation of the Seventh Five Year Plan, Opportunities and Strategies for Ocean and River Resources Management*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Bangladesh Country Office, Dhaka, Bangladesh, December 2014; The work drafted by FAO is akin to maritime affairs. For analysis of sectors such as shipbuilding see, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/bangladesh/shipbuilding.htm>, accessed on 02 February 2016; see also O. Quader, "Coastal and Marine Biodiversity of Bangladesh (Bay of Bengal)", Proceedings of International Conference on Environmental Aspects of Bangladesh (ICEAB10), Japan, September 2010, p. 83; FB08 Space Research and Remote Sensing Organization (SPARRSO), available at <http://benjapan.org/iceab10/19.pdf>, accessed on 24 January 2016.

¹⁸ Md. Shahidul Islam, "Perspectives of the Coastal and Marine Fisheries of the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh." *Ocean and Coastal Management*, Vol. 46, No. 8, 2003, pp. 763-796.

¹⁹ For some case study insights see, Seung-Jun Kwak , Seung-Hoon Yoo , Jeong-In Chang, "The Role of the Maritime Industry in the Korean National Economy: An Input-Output Analysis", *Marine Policy*, Vol. 29, Issue 4, July 2005 , pp. 371-383; Hance D. Smith, "The Regional Development and Management of Fisheries: The UK case," *Marine Policy*, Vol. 37, Issue C, 2013, pp. 11-19.

challenging needs that exist in the contexts of contemporary maritime resource exploitation, conservation and development of related fields. These needs include habitation/community - as support-base, ports and infrastructure development, enhancing trade, skills, shipbuilding, shipping and transports. All such needs are also relevant to maritime resource advancement. It is of paramount importance that these competencies are developed in a manner that will widen maritime relevant knowhow. Likewise, such competencies have to contribute to business, employment and production as a whole. Similarly, the motivation has to enhance and meet the demand and maintain a competitive position in the regional/global communication, market and transports. Because of low levels of research and developmental intensity in Bangladesh or even in developed countries, gaps exist in knowledge with lack of research findings and inputs.²⁰

Bangladesh has meagre resource-base. It possesses inadequate means to develop relevant skills and technology. Hence, there is a compulsive need for meeting the entwining challenges of analytical research, policy appraisals, action-planning and competence development in the areas of maritime concerns crucial to the country.²¹ In this backdrop, the analytical orientation of this paper shall be to identify those entwined sectors for policy planning where the country needs to focus and prioritise them towards enhancing the nation's maritime destiny (See Chart 1) . Such an approach is consistent with the recent scholarly trends; it also has kept in view the pattern of sectoral planning of the country's Seventh Five-Year Plan.

3. Interfacing Vision and Realities: Challenges of Realising Policy Agenda

Any conceptualisation and consequent sectoral planning in maritime affairs has to keep up with national aspirations and policy vision. Bangladeshis do carry huge legacies as seafarers, boat-makers and shipbuilders. The culture of fishing in riverine Bangladesh and in its coastal areas has been so usual that made the Bengalis what they are: *Machey-Bhatae Bangalee*—fish-rice intake that governs the Bengali daily menu. The efforts to cash in from gas/energy exploitation have been more recent; but such efforts have been constrained, until recently, due to the maritime disputes with the neighbouring countries. Such concerns seem no longer relevant. However, the constraining factors such as lack of infrastructures, technology, oceanic services, skills and/or investment of resources continue to pose challenges.

²⁰ Jon. S. Helmick, *op. cit.*

²¹ Earlier works in the area of Bangladesh focused more on regional cooperation than on development and realisation of self-potentials. See, for instance, A. K. H. Murshed, "Cooperation in the Maritime Zones among and between the SAARC Countries," *BISS Journal*, Vol. 20, No 1, 1999, pp. 1-11; M. Khurshed Alam, "Regional Maritime Cooperation Under the Auspices of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)," *BISS Journal*, Vol. 18, 1997.

The country's aspiration and objective policy vision is neatly charted by its founding-father: turn Bangladesh into '*Switzerland of the East*', an Asian trade-transit hub and ultimately a '*Sonar Bangla*' (Golden Bengal). Such a cherished dream is consistent with the conceptual notion of 'Golden economy'. Such a portrayal is also depicted in the country's national anthem lent from Tagore's lyrics; the world-poet also portrayed the forward trail, the craft of trade, voiced in his melody *Sonar Tori* (Golden Boat), which conveyed the keystone of wealth creation. Following maritime gains, Bangladesh has now emerged bigger in dimensions with openings to the world beyond. Naturally, the dream of a 'Golden Bengal' necessitates 'Golden economy' notion to embrace the aquatic space beyond its shores.

A realisation of such futuristic aspirations entrust tasks upon the nation. How to materialise such dreams? It has to be in "the courage of those who dare to make dreams into reality;" they must join in developing "the capacity to translate vision into reality."²² Indeed, realisation of such dreams assign great duties to the Bengadeshis and leaderships both at socioeconomic and political levels. The higher level of vision-building may stay on for mapping potential routes of sustained development; but the nation must focus on knowledge and action-planning, moving through diagnosis to prognosis. No one can "cross the sea merely by standing and staring at the water," reminds Tagore,²³ who in his distinctive mode taught how to sustain animated dreams and materialise them. Towards voyaging the sea and availing its resources, the nation must implore Walt Disney, the architect of enchanting Disneyland, "get started and begin doing."²⁴ For concrete policy action, entreated Mark Twain, the guts must be one of both "ignorance and confidence and then success is sure."²⁵ As people, the people must have full faith in their creativity and "believe that we can."²⁶ The planning of actions must begin in earnest, as "it is the foundational key to all success."²⁷ The approach now should be multi-sectoral, as depicted, catered to bring the ideas together trailing them in an entwining fashion.

²² Available at <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/reality.html>, accessed on 19 February 2016.


²³ Available at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/r/rabindrana383735.html?src=t_motivational, accessed on 24 May 2015.

²⁴ Available at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/topics/topic_success.html, accessed on 23 May 2015.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Available at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/topics/topic_motivational.html, accessed on 23 May 2015.

²⁷ Quotes from Pablo Picasso available at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/topics/topic_success.html, accessed on 23 May 2015.



3.1 Knowledge-Gap

The principal challenge facing the nation is how to create or recreate a national awareness vis-a-vis maritime possessions and a perspective planning for the future. There can be no future for a country with severe land constraints and a bulging population but to make best use of its enormous maritime space. That Bangladesh is now a maritime state, with huge ocean/marine space, which equal or even surpass its land terrain, is hardly familiar nationally; an effort to create such awareness seems missing. The essence of what the country has won is still unknown; many seem oblivious of how to maximise the maritime benefits for the nation.²⁹

The government surely has taken initiatives over the past few years to augment the naval force components. Of particular significance is the relentless endeavours of the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina (PM also holds the defence portfolio); her recurrent visits from the ports to the coasts of the country to energise all in the relevant sectors matter a great deal. Events organised under the banner of 'blue economy' give impression that the government has embraced the concept; yet people generally seem still naive about what Bangladesh currently owns across its shores. Not many are aware about the maritime potentials — the future bastion of the nation's economy, their effective and efficient use which will determine the nation's future destiny. The fish, ships and waves may seem as oceanic ornaments.³⁰ Some may well feel enthralled by the waves of the Bay, enjoy taking a dive or swim in the sea; many love just being at the sea beach, playing cricket along the

²⁸ Dr. Shemin Kalam has appreciably drawn the Chart.

²⁹ Shykh Seraj, "Marine Resources in our Maritime Boundary", *The Daily Star*, 26 January 2016.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

coasts and even celebrate New Year in the scenic coasts; yet how many are awakened to maximise the maritime benefits or aware of how much resources are there beneath the sea or in the flow above? Indeed, the country's maritime boundary still remains shrouded in mystery. Generally, fisheries, mineral, water plantains and other water resources are known as maritime assets; but the resources remain untapped; no surveys have yet been done. With the maritime disputes behind it, Bangladesh can "now start planning about the resources, prospects and proper maritime management."³¹

The key issue is how to beat the yawning knowledge-gap? The answer is education, publicity, skill development, training, dedicated analysis and research. No doubt, there are research bodies, centres, institutes, university departments and even a university set up associating the name charisma of the nation's founding-father (see Table). Such institutions for maritime learning and marine resource development are in service sans significant accomplishments; they lack required dedication, visible productivity, monitoring, overseeing or guaranteed accountability and appreciable performance.³² All this has to change. Only knowledge, skill, commitment to research, developmental enquiries and productive output can unveil the vastness of wealth in the country's maritime boundary and help exploit the full marine potentials. A comprehensive and pragmatic survey of all marine resources in the territorial waters is an urgent demand. In this digital and knowledge-based society, it is not a difficult proposition or impossible task. The authorities, bodies created need to stream into life-activity, guidance, mobilisation and overseeing.

Bangladesh Navy itself maintains its professionalism in sharing and upholding whatever information it is assigned to distribute and project. It also sees maritime domain awareness as a challenge which it is committed to face like all other navies. However, the citizens and government departments/officials at all levels must be awakened to what the nation currently owns beyond its coasts and what needs to be done at their respective levels.

3.2 Energy Exploitation

A key challenge to the country in fulfilling its development vision is to overcome its chronic energy shortages, given its expanding and export-oriented industrial sector. The verdicts confirmed Bangladesh's right to exploit the potentially rich BoB zones and to enhance the country's expanded energy interests, as majority of the oil blocs under the seabed have come under Bangladesh jurisdiction.³³ However, the future prospects for conventional energy sources are subject to questions, as until now Bangladesh could only discover two gas fields at sea. Extensive marine scientific surveys using state of art technology with country's private/public sector

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Reaz Shajib, "Maritime Boundary; a 'Great Win' for Bangladesh", available at https://www.academia.edu/8211654/Maritime_Boundary_a_Great_Win_for_Bangladesh, accessed on 30 January 2016.

collaborations for extracting precious natural energy are necessary to discover further reserves.³⁴

For ensuring the future of the country's energy needs, it is vital to tap alternative energy sources including solar, tidal, wind and wave power.³⁵ Conventional energy sources are steadily depleting, whereas alternative energies from maritime domain are renewable, generated from the marine sources. The benefits include reduction of dependence on non-renewable energy which in turn reduces the production of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, as scientists and economists agree. It also helps create new job opportunities. While solar energy has been coming up fast, offering competitive cheaper options, wind power is also fast growing. Given the ocean's power, tide and wave energy seem promising sources of renewable energy. Tidal and wave powers are still at nascent stage but in the coming years they are likely to blossom, as projections suggest.³⁶

Bangladesh has enormous potential for exploiting such energy sources, principally in the coastal areas and offshore islands. The government does have plans to generate electricity from wind power under public/private initiatives. The coastal topography is viewed favourable: northern BoB is a semidiurnal 'macrotidal' environment, that means tide elevation rises and falls more than 4 meters (>13ft), up to 6m (>19ft) in some places, twice daily, resulting in strong tidal currents creating enormous potential for tapping this dynamic force for mechanical work and power generation.³⁷ However, a strongly favourable policy is essential for generating alternative energy from the maritime-based sources such as wind power or wave.

3.3 Marine Fishing

The challenges to marine fishing in Bangladesh are numerous; many are ecology/environment-related — interlacing with national, regional and global concerns. Its extended maritime boundary has very high potentials for fishing and contains 475 different species of fish. It can explore and exploit living and non-living resources of water, seabed and subsoil of 200 nm EEZ; it also won sovereign rights over its 354 nm continental shelf, where none can exploit resources without its prior consent.³⁸ Within the BoB, Bangladesh has the widest shallow shelf region extending more than 100 nautical miles (185 km), 3-4 times wider than that of Myanmar, the eastern coast of India and the global

³⁴ Commander Masudul Karim Siddique, (G), psc, "Increasing our Maritime Awareness", *The Daily Star*, 26 August 2015.

³⁵ G. Moula, F. Parvin and J. Ferdous, "The Prospects and Challenges before Bangladesh in Exploring and Exploiting Marine Resources: An Economic and Legal Study", *Beijing Law Review*, 2014, Vol. 5, pp. 249-252.

³⁶ Chelsea Harvey, "This Technology may be the Future of Solar Energy," available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/01/15/this-technology-may-be-the-future-of-solar-energy/?utm_term=.c36d6aef9760, accessed on 02 February 2016; Mia Henderson, "The Present and Future of Tidal Power", available at <http://www.environmentalleader.com/2013/04/10/the-present-and-future-of-tidal-power/>, accessed on 02 February 2016; Mike Barnard, "What is the Future of Ocean Power?", available at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2014/09/18/what-is-the-future-of-ocean-power/#3b9bf5ad2474>, accessed on 02 February 2016.

³⁷ Seventh Five-Year Plan, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

³⁸ G. Moula *et al.*, *op. cit.*

average (65 km). This provides a greater shallow bottom fishing area per unit length of coastline than its neighbours. There is now enhanced opportunities for the nation's fishing industry as fishing now can be carried out in the deep sea.³⁹

However, challenges are striking; concerns are mounting whether the country has the means to track foreign fishing trawlers which slip into Bangladesh side of the maritime territory. Bangladesh is yet to come to term with deep sea fishing.⁴⁰ Pelagic and deep-sea resources are still untapped. Compared to the vastness of fishing territory and high potentials, the fishing activity is limited, as merely 200 fishing trawlers are currently operating in the BoB; it covers a distance of no more than 60 kilometres, mostly because of a lack of deep sea operation capabilities.⁴¹ No doubt greater numbers of the mechanised and non-mechanised boats are engaged in fishing; but they do not possess deep sea operation capabilities. Moreover, fishing is only confined within 100-meter depth. Currently, wooden boats can venture up to 20 nautical miles and the motorised trawlers up to another 20 nautical miles accounting for a total catch of 6.0 million fish from the Bay annually.⁴² In the year 2006-07, fish production was 24.40 lac metric ton (mt) in which only 35,391 mt was trawl catch.⁴³

Marine fisheries suffer from numerous concerns and worries which include:

- Compared to the vast territory, Bangladesh marine fishing activity remains extremely limited, mostly because of a lack of deep sea operation capabilities.⁴⁴
- Almost all of Bangladesh's marine fishing is carried out in shallow and shelf waters, beyond which no fishing is being currently done due to lack of vessel capacity and appropriate fishing technologies.
- The fishing potentials can be ruined by either natural or man-made disasters.⁴⁵ Most of the commercially important fish stocks are either overexploited or under threat. The deadly signals are there already; varieties of fish and shrimp have been steadily on decline.⁴⁶
- There are no regulations for fish catching and foreign fishermen sneaking in very often.
- Since 1977-80, when surveys were conducted on BoB fisheries there are reports of steady depletion of the stock in terms of tonnage and varieties.

³⁹ Seventh Five-Year Plan, *op. cit.*

⁴⁰ Md Shahidul Islam, *op. cit.*

⁴¹ M. Shahadat Hossain *et al.*, *op. cit.*

⁴² Commander Masudul Karim Siddique, *op. cit.*

⁴³ Reaz Shajib, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ M. Shahadat Hossain *et al.*, *op. cit.*

⁴⁵ Shykh Seraj, *op. cit.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

Marine pollution has reached a level that could create an unmanageable situation in the near future; coastal shrimp farming particularly has generated considerable debates due to its adverse environmental and socioeconomic impacts.⁴⁷ Scientific studies also suggest that much of the BoB fishing areas are seriously in short of 'oxygen minimum zones', a 'brown economy' condition referred to as 'hypoxia'; animals find it hard to survive in such condition that affect biological productivity, particularly in the entire summer monsoon season, when the BoB can only support a smaller oceanic fish population.⁴⁸

The country might fall far behind if it fails to utilise the fishing resources properly. The government's policy intervention is needed to ensure the following:

- Its marine environment is not endangered due to pollution, overexploitation of living and non-living resources.⁴⁹
- Fishermen engaged in the BoB are not subject to extortion, hostage-taking, intrusion or terrorism.⁵⁰
- BoB does not suffer from pollution and acidification, which have their toll on the growth and varieties of fish in the Bay—not easy tasks given encroachment and degradation of natural resources, rapid urbanisation and infrastructure development—which have emerged as challenges negatively impacting upon fisheries and increasing pollution.
- Management of the combined river system of Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) are well-coordinated. GBM river system is rich in ranges and complexities in the Asian water networks, possessing the longest reaches of the major subcontinental rivers flowing through its lands, whereas the catchments are from India, Nepal, Bhutan and China.
- Finally, the country is enabled to reach out to the furthest limit of the sea and exploit the full fishing potential.

For all these, Bangladesh must ensure green environmental planning, procure well-equipped vessels with appropriate technology-base for deep sea fishing, keep the Marine Protected Areas (MPA) safe and secure neighbourly cooperation.⁵¹

3.4 Marine Skills and Oceanic Services

Historically, Bangladeshis are known as nautical-minded and seafaring, with the fame as boat-makers/shipbuilders and as suppliers of naval vessels even to advanced countries; yet it seems depressing that Bangladesh is unable to optimise its potentials

⁴⁷ Commander Masudul Karim Siddique, *op. cit.*; G. Moula, *et al.*, *op. cit.*

⁴⁸ M. Shahadat Hussain, *et al.*, *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ Commander Masudul Karim Siddique, *op. cit.*

⁵⁰ G. Moula, *et al.*, *op. cit.*; Commander Masudul Karim Siddique, *op. cit.*

⁵¹ M. Shahadat Hussain *et al.*, *op. cit.*

as a country with lofty marine skills, ocean transport and shipping compatible with its tradition. Why did Bangladesh fail to summon back its glorious image even 45-years after its independence as a shipbuilding nation, languishing still with the image of a 'ship-breaking' nation? All these spotlight a number of entwined concerns: *first*, lack of skilled mariners, *second*, dependence on external carriers, and, *third*, failure to enlarge shipbuilding.

First is the issue of augmentation of marine knowledge and shipping skills. Currently, Bangladesh does not have enough experienced or mature skilled hands to offer services nationally, deliver shipping/marine skills regionally or render such services internationally. Its endeavours for supplying skilled mariners to the international market are simply far too meagre. Its contribution till now is estimated to be about 4,000 skilled mariners for a country with 160 mn people, seem ignominious when compared to the Philippines, which (with less than 100 mn people) has emerged as the world's largest supplier of marines, around 400,000 personnel.⁵² Although this sector has enormous prospects in Bangladesh, the government or private sector stakeholders seem oblivious of the huge opportunity that marine skills offer. It seems ironic that in Bangladesh having dozens of private universities has anything to do with marine education or maritime qualification, whereas the private sectors in the Philippines offer most of the marine skill/maritime education.⁵³ The system and quality of marine education and skills provided to the learners in the marine fields raise concerns. In such backdrop, it seems proper to suggest that the country needs larger number of specialised places, with external skill-technical support under independent management system, for an expansion of well-managed skilled marine training institutes and centres of maritime learning.

Second is to overcome the country's high dependence on foreign carriers. Bangladesh has only seventy four registered merchant ships, of which the Bangladesh Shipping Corporation (BSC) has just eight vessels with a total deadweight tonnage of 121,820 mts. The country's fleet strength remorsefully is even lesser than many private enterprises of the world. Due to all these, nearly 2,500 foreign ships visit Bangladesh ports annually. It takes its toll on national economy because a lot of foreign exchange has to be spent to meet their freight charge. The country's private participation in the shipping business is not very encouraging either. The resulting heavy external dependence for shipping and transport can hardly be positive for the country.⁵⁴ It is important that this maritime sector draws larger private sector partaking and investment towards enhancing the size of its fleet.

Related *third* concern is requirement for a higher profiling of the country's shipbuilding industry. Bangladesh is a maritime/coastal country blessed with a wide internal network of riverine system and openings to the oceans beyond. Historically, the country served the cross-border needs of the neighbouring territories, apart from its enormous legacies in boat-making and shipbuilding. In the current contexts, it has huge potentials

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_maritime_colleges, accessed on 22 June 2016.

⁵⁴ Rear Admiral (Retd.) Md. Khurshed Alam, "Ocean Blue Economy for Bangladesh", Proceedings of International Workshop on Blue Economy, *op. cit.*, p. 38; Commander Masudul Karim Siddique, *op. cit.*

to develop its maritime industry and shipbuilding. However, over forty five years since its independence, Bangladesh has developed a fleet of about 20,000 vessels comprised of inland/coastal commercial vessels and various types of working/fishing craft. There are indigenous shipyards, over two hundred though not fully developed to meet the needs of the age. The industry does, however, offer services such as repair and maintenance of the vessels and a base for building ships of international standards.⁵⁵ Bangladesh Navy has also acquired control of major public sector shipyards/dockyards in Khulna, Chittagong and Narayanganj, enabling it to develop its expertise and manpower for repair, maintenance and in building of vessels. Bangladesh has already stepped into international arena.⁵⁶

The seaborne cargo globally has been growing 6-8 per cent per year and demand for new ships is increasing at the rate of 3-4 per cent per year. The existing suppliers are not in a position to meet this additional demand. Many of the ships built earlier are also aging out and there are increasing demands for smaller to medium-size ships for which major supplier countries are not very keen to take order.⁵⁷ In such backdrop, Bangladesh has mid-to-long-term scopes for adding value to its shipbuilding industry, a task both promising and challenging. Until very recently, the average rate of increase in tonnage was approximately 21 million GT (Gross Tonnage) per year. Considering US\$ 7,620 as construction cost per GT, total market size is US\$ 1,600 billion. If Bangladesh wins only one per cent share of this global market, it will be equal to US\$ 16 billion. In worst case, if Bangladesh can grab only one per cent of the global order for the smaller vessels, the local value could be US\$ 4.0 billion annually.⁵⁸

Such projection has realistic basis. Bangladesh is presently contributing to the shipbuilding industries globally through its exported workforce. These facts do not speak only of a heritage but of an inbuilt ability of shipbuilding of people who for ages have been nautical-minded. Shipbuilding is an ancient assembling industry producing tailored products. Accordingly, it is always moving to countries with lower wages of required skills, having the largest human input per unit of produce. Bangladesh has comparatively a lower cost of human inputs and can offer the best combination of cost, quality and productivity with its fast growing young workforce. It also produces a diversified variety of vessels in various shipyards around the country, including multipurpose/container vessels, tanker, hydrographical survey boat, hospital ship and water taxi etc.⁵⁹

Currently, Bangladesh has mere ten per cent world class vessels; locally it manufactures only fifty per cent of the total material, machineries and equipment of the inland/coastal vessels built. To gain greater access to world share, it has to fully appraise the sector's current weaknesses. Lacking/action-points include:

⁵⁵ Mansur Ahamed, "Report on Ship Building Industry of Bangladesh", available at <http://jbbc.co.jp/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/A-Report-on-Shipbuilding-Industry-of-Bangladesh.pdf>, accessed on 02 February 2016.

⁵⁶ Few of the private sector firms, especially *Ananda Shipyard & Slipways Limited* (ASSL), Dhaka and *Western Marine Shipyards* (WMS), Chittagong, have attained the capability for manufacturing ships to international buyers, *ibid*.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*.

- High financing cost, scarcity of capital and relevant high technology, inadequate electric supply, insufficient management pool for expanding shipbuilding industries, lack of basic design abilities, longer lead time in material mobilisation.
- Inclusive skill development, policy body to advise government on the relevant issues, diplomatic drive to draw market attention, subsidies/support services as are provided in various shipbuilding countries.
- Sector-wise there is a strong need to build the backward linking industries.
- Thousands of SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprise) in the country, mostly land-based, must be provided support and skill-training, enabling them to contribute in the manufacturing and supply of components and services required for manufacturing of ships.
- A fuller appraisal is essential to exploit the comparative advantage that would attract foreign investment in shipbuilding sector, including cost-effective human resources in comparison with other shipbuilding nations.
- Simplification of import of raw materials and duty free market/access for Bangladeshi ships to other countries.
- The concern over productivity of the Bangladeshi work force engaged in shipbuilding, which is 11.4 - the lowest in the world, must be overcome by upgrading through conducting training programmes, modernising yard facilities and employing more integrated production technology.⁶⁰
- A sustained effort must go to make the sector competitive in the long-run, which requires both effective projection and facilitation, making the products attractive for marketing and investments.
- Dedicated efforts must go to find market, where there is demand and to access developed technologies for overcoming the challenges facing the maritime and shipbuilding industry.
- The embassies must be equipped with marketing knowledge to attract buyers and entice Muslim countries with surplus capital to invest.⁶¹

Considering its huge prospects and capability to develop country's multi-dimensional production base as linkage industries the government seems to be keen to promote shipbuilding as a thrust sector. It has introduced a five-year tax-holiday, Green Channel method of clearance against any export order for encouraging FDI to transform the industry into a basket of major export earners.⁶² With legacies,

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*

skilled and semi-skilled workforce in this sector, given higher skills, right technology and appropriate policy support to meet the challenges of a competitive market Bangladesh holds the prospect to emerge as a major shipbuilding player.

3.5 Trade-Servicing/Infrastructure Planning

Bangladesh is blessed with an access to the outside world with its maritime gains for unimpeded trade via the seas. More than ninety per cent of the country's trade, including hundred per cent oil haulage takes place via seas. Ports are lifelines for the country's international trade. Its two existing seaports — Chittagong and Mongla — are affected by sedimentation; both are too shallow for large container ships requiring costly load transfers to smaller vessels to get cargo in and out. These affect their global competitiveness.⁶³ The Chittagong Port, country's 'economic engine' presently handles ninety five per cent of sea borne export-import trade.⁶⁴ Still it is the only major port capable of handling total import-export, not heartening for a country that came into being forty five years ago. Mongla remains largely underutilised, due to its inherent snag of long-routing, navigational and connectivity concerns. That might change once the Padma Bridge becomes operational.⁶⁵

However, there are wider issues of economic trade and connectivity involving the Asian neighbourhood. Bangladesh has its situational advantage of market accessibility. With its market of 160 mn people, it comes in the middle with India's 1.2 bn markets in the north-west-east, China with 1.4 bn markets in the north, Myanmar's 70 mn and Thailand's 67 mn markets in the east. There are then the trading needs of the landlocked territories which include Nepal, Bhutan, India's northeastern states, China's southern territories and Myanmar's Shan and Rakhine states. Apart from Chittagong and Mongla, Bangladesh has other prospective vicinities along its coasts which are well-located to offer deep sea facilities to meet its own needs and serve the neighbours. Being the geo-maritime centre, Bangladesh would presumably reap substantial benefits with excellent bonding among these huge markets; a frenzy of economic activity is projected among all the countries.⁶⁶ The challenge for the country is to fully exploit the emerging trend of trade by enhancing existing port facilities, building infrastructure for connectivities and by building deep sea port and such other deep sea-based service facilities.⁶⁷

However, the country needs to have access to superior naval equipment, technology and vessels in favourable terms. With its ranking as the world's second most dynamic textile industry, Bangladesh is one of the world's fastest growing economies.

⁶³ Wade Shepard, "Bangladesh's Deep Sea Port Problem", *The Diplomat*, 07 June 2016.

⁶⁴ Seventh Five-Year Plan, *op. cit.*

⁶⁵ Commander Masudul Karim Siddique, *op. cit.*

⁶⁶ "Diplomatic Access", 18 November 2015, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/diplomatic-access-bangladesh/>, accessed on 12 February 2016.

⁶⁷ A. K. M Zakaria, *Prothom Alo*, 05 August 2015.

It is poised to grow at 7.5 per cent rate this year. It has also a booming export sector, tipped to be \$50 billion per year in value by 2021. It has been on Goldman Sachs's list of the "Next 11". All this is in a country without adequate maritime infrastructure and deep sea port facilities to serve its growing exports and to provide provisions to others in the neighbouring regions badly requiring such services.⁶⁸ Therefore, to build its economic future and generate significant economic activity the infrastructure planning along the coastal belt and development of trading services are essential; yet the country remains handicapped due to lack of capital, relevant expertise, knowhow and the technology required.

Thus, in addition to Chittagong and Mongla, Bangladesh requires deep sea port/trading facilities to cope with its own fast expanding trade and to offer services to neighbouring states and landlocked territories. Obviously, selecting such options and their execution will expedite the country's economic advancement; they are also in tune with its envisioning as Asia's trade-transit hub. The current proposals include ports/deep-sea facilities at Payra (already made operational), Sonadia and Matarbari. A fully, independently operational oil terminal at Moheshkhal Island is also in process.⁶⁹ The challenges in the selection and development of these sites arise due to regional power rivalry and wider game of global geo-maritime politics engulfing the entire Indo-Pacific region.⁷⁰ Such rivalries climaxed when Bangladesh sought to select the sites and probable financiers for its much-needed deep sea port and relevant facilities. The interested powers include India, China, Japan, EU, UK and USA; they all are the country's development partners and have evinced eagerness to become engaged in its coastal and maritime undertakings. The competing powers were often making great financial and political strides to secure their own interests, whilst keeping those of others at bay.⁷¹ Such outcome would obviously put Bangladesh in troubled waters and inhibit national interest.

The challenges on selection and development of deep seaports and related service facilities thus appeared problematic for Bangladesh. It has to choose range of options in site-selection/developmental help and identify players who will aid such undertakings along its coastal belt. At certain points it appeared that there were just too many powerful players pushing for too many contending plans; they were offering aid that made Bangladesh somewhat "geopolitically stalemated, making and breaking deals, going with one project and then changing position and going with another. Ultimately, this plethora of options has pitted China, Japan and India in direct competition with each other to build Bangladesh's first deep sea port".⁷²

⁶⁸ Wade Shepard, *op. cit.*

⁶⁹ A. K. M. Zakaria, *op. cit.*

⁷⁰ Prashanth Parameswaran, "The Malabar Exercise: An Emerging Platform for Indo-Pacific Cooperation?" available at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/the-malabar-exercise-an-emerging-platform-for-indo-pacific-cooperation/>, accessed on 12 June 2016.

⁷¹ Wade Shepard, *op. cit.*

⁷² *Ibid.*

After a lot of hassles, the government focused its design for infrastructure/ deep sea port planning as 3-phase part at Payra.⁷³ Ten countries sought to invest a total of US\$ 15.5 billion in different components of the deep seaport project. The government will have to invest only US\$ 400 million in the deep seaport. The full-fledged port activities in Payra will start by 2023. And then it will have the capacity to house 75,000 containers, whereas the existing capacity of Chittagong Port is only 1,500 containers.⁷⁴ With the enactment of the Payra Port Authority Act, 2013, the process of establishing a port at Payra in Patuakhali District is on, including the provisions for a Coal-fired Power Plant and an international airport etc.⁷⁵ Similarly, the 1200 MW Matarbari Ultra Super Critical Coal-fired Power Plant project funded by Japan contains the important component: the deep sea-port for the coal import, which will provide the opportunity for generation companies planning to develop the coal-fired power plants to procure the international coal in relatively cheaper price.

3.6 Coastal Habitat/Oceanic Community

The coastal zone of Bangladesh covers 19 districts and the EEZs. It is prone to multiple threats, including recurrent natural disasters, salinity, flooding and erosion. Current major land uses comprise agriculture, salt-making, shrimp and fish farming, forestry, urban development and other settlement needs, while the needs for new exploitation is also emerging. A series of Acts passed since 2001 sought to improve coordination, demarcation of land zoning, mangrove afforestation through community participation, better preparedness against disaster and develop modern land management systems.⁷⁶ Lately, the government has also undertaken major infrastructure projects, deep seaports, EEZs, communication networks/ railways for better connectivities within and beyond.

For advancing all these, Bangladesh needs work-cum-service oriented personnel along its coastal belts. The country with its severe land constraints and torrential projections of wreaking havocs caused by the ravages of climate change cannot but develop futuristic visions. When planning development projects around its newly acquired maritime territory the futuristic plans may serve as safeguards. Such vision-oriented plans could include initiatives like water surface planning or help build a boat community or habitation of people in boats/yachts. All these go well with the country's huge legacies in boatbuilding and of a floating population living in boats, a culture growing worldwide; second, perhaps a more innovative initiative could be planning underwater or under-ocean habitation and third, a more realistic

⁷³ Rupak Bhattacharjee, "Port Development in Bangladesh", *bdnews24.com*, 04 June 2016; Rejaul Karim Byron and Sarwar A Chowdhury, "Bangladesh's Third Seaport at Payra", *The Daily Star*, 30 October 2015.

⁷⁴ Rejaul Karim *et al.*, *op. cit.*

⁷⁵ Seventh Five-Year Plan, *op. cit.*, p. 363.

⁷⁶ Rafiqul Islam, "Pre and Post-Tsunami Coastal Planning and Land-Use Policies and Issues in Bangladesh", *Proceedings of the Workshop on Coastal Area Planning and Management in Asian Tsunami-affected Countries*, FAO, available at <http://www.fao.org/3/a-ag124e/AG124E05.htm>, accessed on 24 September 2015.

project that is closer to Prime Minister's inventive notion of *Ekti Bari/Ekti Khamar* (One House/One Farm), a project for poorer population, currently being implemented, could be extended to the coastal belt on a planned basis.

Such concepts arose due to the growing realisation that over three-quarter of oceanic world remains unused whilst there are increasing land space constraints for human habitation. The conceptual planning started off with the ominous forecasts of global climate change over the years. Efforts are underway to innovate and improve technology with endeavours to create an oceanic habitat or coastal community. Underwater habitats are being planned with regenerative systems for air, water, food, electricity, and other resources. The Paris Agreement enshrining COP21 (December 2015), signed by 195 countries, including Bangladesh, already recognised oceans within the context of 'Ecosystem Integrity.'⁷⁷ Living under sea is no longer a science fiction or sci-fi film story. Super-basement and undersea economic activities/hotels under the waves across richer Asian and European cities are familiar. Similarly, building an underwater residential area is not a fantasy anymore, as Japan's Shimizu Corporation already has drawn up plans to build one by 2030. By the turn of the next century, underground cities and floating neighbours are projected to become commonplace as the population is squeezed out of cities.⁷⁸

For Bangladesh, the very notion of oceanic underwater habitat may sound absurd; yet it is not immaterial. Bangladesh has its major constraints of habitable land for an ever bulging population. There are also compelling projections by climatologists about a third of its current land going under water due to sea-level rise. Now that the country has acquired an extended marine space across its shores, it should seriously consider embracing the notion of oceanic habitat and work experimenting in suitable spaces for building marine community, developing its own technology/expertise/vision. Bangladeshis are adept pretty well in innovation, embracing and empowering at the base of social pyramid, when it comes to finance or technology.⁷⁹ Its microfinance models are admired and replicated worldwide. If its entrepreneurs can build 'Fantasy Kingdoms' or 'Future Parks' they could also replicate what fellow Asian countries can do.

⁷⁷ Available at http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php, accessed on 11 June 2016.

⁷⁸ "Rachel Nuwer, "Will we ever live in underwater cities?", 30 September 2013, available at www.bbc.com/future/story/20130930-can-we-build-underwater-cities, accessed on 27 January 2015; "Living under sea: Japanese visionaries unveil underwater city plan", available at <https://www.rt.com/news/207407-underwater-city-plan-japan/>, accessed on 14 September 2015; Jeff Kelly, "10 Underwater Facilities You Could Actually Live In", 23 January 2014, available at <http://listverse.com/2014/01/23/10-underwater-facilities-you-could-actually-live-in/>, accessed on 28 January 2016; Elizabeth Anderson, "Humans will live underwater in 100 years' time as the population is squeezed out of cities", *The Telegraph*, 15 February 2016, available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/constructionandproperty/12157503/>, accessed on 17 February 2016.

⁷⁹ "Bangladesh a Silicon Valley of Pro-Poor Financial Innovation", *bdnews24.com*, 25 September 2016, available at <http://bdnews24.com/economy/2016/09/25/bangladesh-a-silicon-valley-of-pro-poor-financial-innovation-ex-bb-governor-atiur>, accessed on 25 September 2016.

Despite resource bar, marine biologists, oceanographers, water resource and techno-experts of the country should be enabled and encouraged to take such challenges for analysis, experimentation and research in the particular contexts of Bangladesh. Efforts must go towards creating awareness among the land-starved populace of the country as well; the private sectors may be encouraged to create ideas for coastal habitat/oceanic community or underwater eco-spots along the coastal belt for developing recreational/marine tourism purposes.

4. Conclusion

Some conclusive remarks are appropriate. These involve a summing up, coupled with thoughts on critical aspects of policy and areas for further research. The challenges facing Bangladesh in ensuring its maritime destiny are enormous and entwined, not uncommon for a country that underwent tumultuous processes of sacrifice and struggle. The government seems committed to beat the challenges; yet deficits in knowledge, equipment, technology, skills and services, infrastructure, investment and connectivity continue to constrain the nation's maritime aspirations. It is now over two years since Bangladesh had won its maritime claims; yet there remains a serious knowledge-gap about what resources are there in its aquatic space or under the seabed.

The nation is well-placed with its vision. That must be nurtured; it has to resonate in policy and actions, spot on route for shaping its maritime destiny. The processes of rebuilding the nation must continue undaunted till it is enabled to pass from brown, graduate through both green and blue economy; embracing golden economy is the brazen way forward to fulfil *Sonar Bangla*. The tasks of tough voyaging remind the sombre melody of the national poet, Nazrul's spirited soldierly assonance '*Durgomo Giri Kantar Moru Dostar Parabar*'— now Bangladesh's martial hymn; it strikes the nation into life, reverberate people's soul to cruise through and accomplish the nation's maritime dream. That is the potent way forward how to match vision with realities, move from envisioning to nation-building and fulfil through concrete plan of actions. The nation must be energised to exploit the marine resources available, harness energy, develop fishing, knowhow and skill; proficient oceanic services must be built up with enlarged shipbuilding and propped up business/trade links. The learning must be built upon past legacies; a future must be explored that is packed with actions, consistent with what was laid down by the nation's founding-father in his futuristic Asia's 'trade-transit hub' concept.

Maritime-wise Bangladesh has little option but to espouse its development tapestry on a short-to-mid-long-term basis for accessing funds and investments, knowhow and technology. It has to be artful in pursuing its maritime interests: appraise and update itself with every emerging situation whilst dealing with other nations. International and regional relations, like any other aspects of human relations are

dynamic and subject to situational change or variation; each of these needs to be judged in their unique contexts, whether bilateral, trilateral, regional and/or international basis for cooperation and development — be that maritime strategic or ecosystemic.

All this operationally convey the logic that Bangladesh must keep its distance from power bickering or squabbling; it has to dedicate itself solely to the pursuit of its national interest. It must remain focused on advancing its developmental interests; it ought to leverage its keystone position between major powers on a give-and-take basis, grow to be “a friend to everyone”— an extremely delicate task in a world of power contentions.⁸⁰ The country’s key rule must be *not* to get drawn as an active partaker in any designed maritime wrangling or rivalry; it has to ensure that its own aspirations for greater connectivities stay unhampered, its own quest to be an Asian Gateway and logistic hub remain unimpeded. The nation must ensue greater benefits in the process of maritime transactions. Should Bangladesh be able to lay down its sense of policy direction artfully along the suggested route it is bound to gain the objective ground.

For all that, the country now needs to define its agenda on a sectoral basis, make a diagnosis of the prevailing concerns and then take on prescriptive or prognostic measures for actions. Knowledge is power, especially so in the digital/knowledge-based global age. There are global concerns about the state of oceanic health; the vast portions of the Planet Earth (90 per cent of earth’s spaces), consisting of oceans face dire ecosystemic extinction due to ‘civilisational culture’ of abuse, with particular cruel ramifications on biodiversity. The fates awaiting the Bengal delta, as often predicted, may be quite catastrophic. In the backdrop of prevailing gap in knowledge in the country, a critical challenge would be to equip the nation conceptually, develop and mature the comprehension: how the nation moves on, what ought to be yardstick guiding the nation to overcome the prevailing challenges in maritime affairs?

The Prime Minister is passionate, quite appropriately, about promoting nation’s maritime goals, but laments a lack of momentum in knowledge-gathering. She has expressed her anguish that with all the profound efforts given towards favourable verdicts, no survey has been done yet on the resources, that marine fisheries and other valuable resources may be lost to others, and that lack of skills, expertise and effective institutions might pose challenge. The country’s top maritime specialist and policy planner reckons the need for an integrated maritime policy.⁸¹ Following ideas are offered for policy reflection and action:

⁸⁰ Wade Shepard, *op.cit.*

⁸¹ Rear Admiral (Retd.) Md. Khurshed Alam, Proceedings of International Workshop on Blue Economy, *op. cit.*

- For integrated policy planning and coordination, a National Maritime Commission/Council (NMC) seems to be crucial as a unifying inter-agency/ministerial body with monitoring cells. Like the Planning Commission, the Prime Minister herself ought to chair NMC, authorise conceptual labelling and affix dynamism to maritime policy coordination/integration.
- The NMC can get draft previews from interim *Task Forces* (TF - patterned on the vibrant initiatives of Professor Rehman Sobhan during the first Caretaker Government), with analytical tasks assigned on each sector; these could serve as guideposts for enhanced maritime research, policy planning and provide the momentum needed for policy intervention.
- All relevant government agencies/departments should have research cells.
- The reported recent instructions of the University Grants Commission to the public/private sector universities to offer maritime courses should be enforced.⁸²
- Private sectors should be enabled to spur efforts to enhance marine education and skills, as in the Philippines.
- Marine education should be run by an independent board and maintain the standard set by the International Maritime Organization.
- The Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Maritime University (BSMRMU) and the existing relevant departments/institutes should offer service-oriented certificate/Diploma level 'crash programmes' to meet the country's urgent maritime-related skill-needs.
- To meet foregoing ends skill-support may be sought from the UK, which has the longest experiences in maritime fields and has also rendered similar-type of assistance before.
- The private sectors (engaged in shipping, marine skill-training/trade, transports, and tourism) must have their own research wings.
- The citizens at all levels must be awakened to the nation's rights over extended maritime space; as in India, a 'National Maritime Domain Awareness Day' may be fixed (preferably each year on 13 April, remindful of Bangabandhu's farsighted initiative, the day when 'Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1974' was officially gazetted) for celebration with both learning sessions and festivities.

⁸² *ibid.*

- Relevant textbooks should incorporate appropriate knowledge about the country's newly acquired maritime space and the prospects thereby offered to the nation.

The world powers have all been judged by their strength at sea whether for defence or trade. Why should Bangladesh lag far behind? The sectors of marine skills and shipbuilding could envision state-of-art milieus, which are also consistent with the nation's tradition, ensuring complete graduation into full competence as a 'shipbuilding nation'. Vietnam, a fellow Asian country, ravaged by decades of colonial/neo-colonial wars, that had won its liberation four years after Bangladesh, now ranks fifth in the world in shipbuilding; it has also emerged as a principal attraction for foreign shipping companies.⁸³ With the Bangladesh Navy having control over the nation's major ship/dockyards, Bangladesh does have potentials to develop its naval harbour to build state-of-the-art nautical, cruise, fishing trawlers and survey ships. The sector might also consider partnerships with European companies looking for production facilities; such supports seem crucial to adapt organisational approaches to develop relevant technology in shipbuilding. The richer Muslim countries may be enticed for investments/partnerships. The Prime Minister's desire to develop eco-tourism hotspots and integrated resorts/sea-beach fronts from Teknaf-Cox's Bazaar to Sundarbans-Kuakata,⁸⁴ with a *Strait Riviera* are already included in the Seventh Five-Year Plan.⁸⁵ It seems feasible to incorporate coastal habitat/oceanic community as features in an integrated plan for both works on ecosystemic/infrastructure projects.

Few closing remarks are due toward furtherance of conceptual dimensions of maritime research in Bangladesh. There are challenges of comprehension of condition and process. Only research and development can unveil the vastness of the marine resources and delineate the way forward. Maritime challenges are entwined with sectors identified in all their manifestations. They also need vital conceptual clarity in terms of both security and strategy: the former refers to condition that has to be met, whilst the latter conveys the process of decision making for policy action. There are, then, concepts like 'green economy, 'blue economy'/'blue ocean strategy' and 'golden economy'; these are meant to exploit the resources of the seas-oceans, seen as 'development space.' The objects are to integrate conservation, sustainable use of living/non-living resources, bio-prospecting, sustainable energy making and marine transport. The thrust is to incorporate the principles of social habitation/inclusion, environmental sustainability, and innovative/dynamic business models. Attempts are underway to address such concepts in Bangladesh contexts; but it is imperative that research


⁸³Available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/vietnam/shipbuilding.htm>; Özgür Umur Senturk (2011), "The Shipbuilding Industry in Viet Nam", *OECD Journal: General Papers*, Vol. 3, 2010, DOI, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/gen_papers-2010-5kg6z7tg35kf, accessed on 16 September 2015.

⁸⁴"Bangladesh Takes up Mega Plan to Develop Tourism Hotspots", *bdnews24.com*, 03 April 2015, available at <http://bdnews24.com/business/2015/03/04/bangladesh-takes-up-mega-plan-to-develop-tourism-hotspots-for-foreigners-in-2016>, accessed on 27 January 2016.

⁸⁵ Seventh Five-Year Plan, *op. cit.*

efforts in the field embrace concepts for policymaking. The drive must be how these could be applied more fittingly to serve the country's maritime interests in suitable fashion. All the conceptual facets must be found parsimonious, operational and applicable so that these can be marketed to the entrepreneurs/policymakers for operational purposes and action planning.

Appendix 1: Bangladesh Maritime Territorial Map



Source: Available at https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=bangladesh+maritime+territorial+map&tbs=isch&tbs=rimg:CRXUiB_1ccmxOljg2RDrQ0clC0yjCZ-N55bP18lcxw4BFSeEaradu_w_1wid_1_1u63yjQErqu7mc..., accessed on 22 December 2015.

Appendix 2: Maritime Institutions of Learning (Names/Supporting Authorities) ⁸⁶		
1	Bangladesh Marine Academy, Juldia, Chittagong	Government
2	National Maritime Institute, Halishahar, Chittagong	Government
3	Maritime Institute of Science & Technology (MIST), Shantinagar, Dhaka	Private
4	Bangladesh Maritime Training Institute (BMTI), Uttara Model Town, Dhaka	Private
5	Shah Marine & Business Institute Shamoli, Dhaka-1207	Private
6	MAS Maritime Academy Halishahar Housing State, Chittagong	Private
7	Academy of Marine Education and Technology (AMET), Chittagong	Private
8	International Maritime Academy (IMA), Uttara Model Town, Dhaka-1230	Private
9	United Marine Academy, Tejgaon Industrial Area, Dhaka	Private
10	Bay Maritime Training Institute, Sk. Mujib Road, Agrabad, Chittagong	Private
11	Atlantic Maritime Academy, Uttara, Dhaka	Private
12	Cambridge Maritime College (CMC), Uttara, Dhaka-1230	Private
13	Ocean Maritime Academy, Faujdarhat, Chittagong	Private
14	International Maritime Training Academy (IMTA), Green Road, Dhaka-1205	Private
15	Marina Academy, Boro Moghbazar, Dhaka-1217	Private
16	Western Maritime Academy, Mohakhali, Banani, Dhaka-1000	Private
17	Asian Maritime Academy Uttara, Dhaka-1230	Private
18	Pacific Maritime Academy Uttara Model Town, Dhaka	Private
19	Sheikh Fazilatunnesa Mujib Fisheries College, Jamalpur	Private
20	National Marine Academy of Bangladesh, Pahartoli, Chittagong	Private
21	Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Maritime University (BSMMU) Government Chittagong/Dhaka	Government
22	Institute of Marine Sciences and Fisheries, University of Chittagong Government	Government

23	Department of Water Resources Engineering, Bangladesh University of Engineering & Technology (BUET), Dhaka	Government
24	Bangladesh Marine Fisheries Academy (BMFA), in Juldia, Chittagong	Government
25	The Department of Oceanography, University of Dhaka	Government
26	National Oceanographic Research Institute, Ramu, Cox's Bazar	Government
27	Department of Fisheries & Marine Resource Technology, Khulna University	Government
28	Department of Oceanography, Shahjalal University of Science & Technology, Sylhet	Government
29	Department of Fisheries and Marine Science, Noakhali Science & Technology University	Government
30	Department of Coastal and Marine Fisheries, Sylhet Agricultural University	Government
31	Department of Marine Fisheries, Patuakhali Science & Technology University	Government
32	Department of Aquaculture, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Agricultural University Government Gazipur,	Government
33	Department of Fisheries and Marine Bioscience, Jessore University of Science	Government
34	Following new public/government-sector marine academies are also under construction:	Government
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Mercantile Marine Academy, Barisal b. Mercantile Marine Academy, Pabna c. Mercantile Marine Academy, Rangpur d. Mercantile Marine Academy, Sylhet. 	

⁸⁶Available at <http://dos.gov.bd/maritime-training/approved-maritime-training-academyinstitutes/>; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh_Marine_Fisheries_Academy; <http://www.sfmfc.org/>, accessed on 28-30 May 2016.

Mohammad Jasim Uddin

ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY OF BANGLADESH: ODA IN PERSPECTIVE

Abstract

Studies on economic diplomacy of Bangladesh examine foreign policy and external economic aspects of the country. Such studies have not yet focused on Bangladesh's Official Development Assistance (ODA) centric economic diplomacy. Instead of assessing how much and whether ODA is required for Bangladesh's development priorities, this paper examines the major issues of ODA-centric economic diplomacy of the country and how they are to be dealt with. The paper thus limits its scopes – what is on offer or what ODA is on supply keeping aside Bangladesh's development needs. Rather than providing concrete policy measures for various key ministries and divisions, this paper provides some propositions that could be taken by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) into consideration. Realising dynamism of global assistance, assessing conditionalities of ODA, lessening gap between commitment of aid and its disbursement, emphasising more on Aid for Trade (AFT) and mobilising climate financing are important issues for ODA-centric economic diplomacy of Bangladesh. No sources at multiple levels which are not tied with tough conditions should in general be left aside by the country. Priority needs to be given to countries or organisations which have already provided soft loans or grants, are still willing to do so as well as those which have emerged as new sources of assistance. The GoB requires exercising effective economic diplomacy to respond to these issues.

1. Introduction

Fluctuating Country Programmable Aid (CPA), shifting priority from grants to loans and diverse preferences for funnelling foreign aid are radical developments of global aid diplomacy in recent times. This fact indicates how foreign aid is going to be a key subject matter of economic diplomacy. Though economic diplomacy of a developing state like Bangladesh has been shifting from foreign aid to international trade, the former is still significant to meet the development priorities of the country.

A set of literature explains indistinctiveness of economic diplomacy and foreign aid. Haan¹ shows that economic diplomacy is a key to handle outbound and inbound Official Development Assistance (ODA). Dahal et al.² state that economic diplomacy

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¹ Arjan de Haan, "Development Cooperation as Economic Diplomacy", *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 203-217.

² Madan Kumar Dahal, Moham Man Sainju, Mohan Prasad Lohani, Shankar Prasad Sharma and Umakant Parajuli, "Nepal: A Generic Guideline for Development through Economic Diplomacy", 2008, available at

deals with foreign aid usually disbursed for directing development programmes and the former plays a significant role to attain climate fund. Accordingly, climate diplomacy is a key subject matter of aid diplomacy. Rana³ argues that economic diplomacy eases tensions between Development Partners (DPs) and recipients. Showing aid diplomacy for donors, Baranay⁴ states that “economic diplomacy is the universal mechanism of involving the countries in direct dependence on donors.” He also quotes S. Rogov, “economic aid has political consequences.”⁵ Thus, economic diplomacy and ODA are interlinked.

Existing literature on economic diplomacy of Bangladesh usually deal with external economic aspects of the country. Therefore, the issue of ODA comes, though not with a particular wide-ranging focus, in some of the literature. On what issues, at what levels, with which countries and organisations, by which actors and through what instruments, Bangladesh’s ODA-centric economic diplomacy should be advanced? Such explicit questions are yet to be studied. This paper is an attempt to address this research gap. It also reviews (a) long-term flow of external assistance (food, commodity and project aid), grants and loans received by Bangladesh, (b) major DPs of the country, their focused sectors and conditionalities, (c) sector-wise long-term disbursement of ODA in Bangladesh and; (d) long-term aid summary (pipeline, commitment and disbursement) of the country. It is to note that the paper is not an effort to (i) examine whether/how much ODA is required in Bangladesh’s development context and (ii) offer policy measures for specific actors assigned to deal with ODA-centric economic diplomacy of the country.

The paper adopts a framework of economic diplomacy given by S. Khatibzadeh.⁶ The framework is consisted of five components: issues, actors, levels and instruments of economic diplomacy and countries with whom to practice economic diplomacy. As the components are qualitative and have causal relations with politico-economic institutions, the framework is adopted and applied on a single case, Bangladesh, and on a major pillar of economic diplomacy, ODA.⁷ For data elicitation, the paper examines documents (e.g., existing literature) and interview transcripts. Documentary information helps tactics of collecting explicit data and usually comes from a variety of sources e.g., government documents, academic studies, clippings and articles sourced from print media, documents from various organisations etc. On the other hand, the paper adopts semi-structured interview comprised of four phases:

<http://www.ifa.org.np/pdf/diplimacy.pdf>, accessed on 12 June 2013.

³ Kishan S. Rana, “Economic Diplomacy: What Might Best Serve A Developing Country”, *International Journal of Diplomacy and Economy*, Vol. 1, Issue 3/4, 2013, pp. 232-247.

⁴ Pavol Baranay, “Modern Economic Diplomacy”, 2009, p. 3, available at http://www.dec.lv/mi/Baranay_Pavol_engl.pdf, accessed on 10 March 2011.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Saeed Khatibzadeh, “Iran’s Economic Diplomacy: An Assessment of Iran Economic and Trade Cooperation with Japan, China and South Korea”, *V.R.F. Series No. 417*, 2006, available at <http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Vrf/pdf/417.pdf>, accessed on 26 December 2011.

⁷ Mohammad Jasim Uddin, “Conceptualising Economic Diplomacy”, *BISS Journal*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2015, pp. 133-150.

constructing topic guide, selecting respondents, arranging interview and setting up of interpretive outlines in realising relations of actors with predefined theoretical concepts and observations. The paper undertakes interpretive approach, a method of qualitative data analysis. The approach is of two types – thin and thick. To analyse scope of and observations on Bangladesh’s ODA-centric economic diplomacy, thick interpretation is adopted.

The paper reveals that understanding international aid dynamism, examining aid-oriented terms and conditions, meeting gap between commitment and disbursement of ODA, accessing Aid for Trade (AfT) and mobilising aid for addressing climate vulnerabilities are some of the major issues of Bangladesh’s ODA-centric economic diplomacy. Relevant actors, importantly the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) need to be aware of the issues while practicing economic diplomacy. The paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews literature. Section three explains several aspects of ODA in Bangladesh. Section four addresses economic diplomacy of ODA in Bangladesh perspective. Section five concludes the paper.

2. Literature Review

Since its independence, Bangladesh accelerated its efforts towards practicing economic diplomacy though the term flourished in the country significantly in the 1990s. Tajuddin⁸ discussed how vital economic diplomacy was immediately after Bangladesh’s independence. Shafullah⁹ explained important elements (e.g., foreign assistance, investment, manpower export, trade in goods, etc.) of Bangladesh’s economic diplomacy. Hasan¹⁰, Haq¹¹ and Singh¹² focused on linking economic diplomacy with foreign policy of Bangladesh. Absar¹³ stated that rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are planned in a way that the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) like Bangladesh are concerned with several trade conditionalities. Therefore, the country should be aware of labour and environmental standards while practicing economic, particularly trade diplomacy. Hussain¹⁴ identified nexus between economic diplomacy and foreign policy of Bangladesh. Hussain also showed how important Southeast and East Asia would be for Bangladesh’s economic and trade diplomacy.

⁸ Mohammad Tajuddin, “Diplomacy of Bangladesh in the Formative Phase”, *BISS Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1998, p. 68.

⁹ M Shafullah, “Economic Diplomacy and Bangladesh Syndrome”, *The Independent*, Dhaka, 27 December 2001.

¹⁰ A. Al Hasan, “Economic Foreign Policy (Diplomacy): Perspective Bangladesh – A New Concept”, *Unpublished Paper*, Defence Services Command and Staff College, Bangladesh, 2002.

¹¹ M. S. Haq, “Economic Diplomacy and Bangladesh”, *The Independent*, Dhaka, 18 June 2002.

¹² Narendra Kr. Singh, *Bangladesh Diplomacy and Foreign Policy*, New Delhi: Anmol Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2003.

¹³ Syeda Sharmin Absar, “Economic Diplomacy for Bangladesh: A Prescription for Less Developed Countries in the World Trade Organisation Era”, *Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2003, pp. 349-57.

¹⁴ Akmal Hussain, “Bangladesh’s New Foreign Policy Direction in Southeast and East Asia: Perspective and Goals”, *Journal of International Development and Cooperation*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2005, pp. 1-14.

With some specific examples, Abdin¹⁵ revealed that foreign policy of Bangladesh should give special emphasis on its economic diplomacy. Reasons behind this were to dig up both geo-strategic and geo-economic platforms in order to take advantages of the forthcoming multilateralism. It would help Bangladesh in mobilising inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), availing modern technical and technological know-how, boosting trade and receiving inbound ODA. Rashid¹⁶ supported the arguments of Abdin and also argued how important economic diplomacy in the coming decades would be for Bangladesh in negotiating complicated global economic issues. The GoB set some key tasks of Bangladesh's economic diplomacy – "ensuring greater market access for exports, expanding overseas employment opportunities, increasing FDI inflow and exploring terms of ODA suited to developmental needs."¹⁷

Since second decade of the 21st century, literature on economic diplomacy of Bangladesh began to be context and sector specific. Ahmed¹⁸ argued that international economic diplomacy would in near future be increasingly guided by both bilateral and multilateral dialogue and cooperation. Bangladesh has to understand such dynamism not only for its economic survival but also for promoting its growth and development. Dorussen *et al.*¹⁹ critically assessed how significant economic diplomacy would be for South Asia. Bangladesh as a part of the subcontinent should realise it. Sobhan²⁰ focused on economic diplomacy and set its priority tasks for Bangladesh. The tasks are: signing Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)/agreement on global trade, FDI and avoidance of double taxation; tackling issues on debt; gaining ODA for both infrastructure and climate change issues. Islam²¹ questions whether economic diplomacy of Bangladesh. Shikha²² reassessed nexus between foreign policy and economic diplomacy of Bangladesh. She also showed how economic diplomacy at regional level would be beneficial for Bangladesh's trade, FDI and ODA. Uddin²³ argued that Bangladesh is yet to meet its foreign policy goals significantly through exercising economic diplomacy. Rahman²⁴ observed that the country would require producing diverse sets of negotiators having specialisation in varied fields.

¹⁵ Md. Joynal Abdin, "Economic Diplomacy", *The Daily Star*, Dhaka, 31 August 2009.

¹⁶ Harun ur Rashid (ed.), *Bangladesh Foreign Policy Realities, Priorities and Challenges*, Dhaka: Academic Press and Publishers Library (APPL), 2009.

¹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Government of Bangladesh, "Diplomatic Initiatives and Activities of the MoFA in 2009", *Bangladesh Foreign Policy 2009 in Perspectives*, 2009, p. 68.

¹⁸ Hemayetuddin Ahmed, "Economic Diplomacy in A Multi-polar World", *The Daily Star*, Dhaka, 07 January 2010.

¹⁹ Han Dorussen, Syed Mansoob Murshed and Hugh Ward, "Any Tied that Bind? Economic Diplomacy on the South Asian Subcontinent", in Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, Maaïke Okano-Heijmans and Jan Melissen (eds.), *Economic Diplomacy Economic and Political Perspectives*, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011.

²⁰ Farooq Sobhan, "Focus on Economic Diplomacy: the Priority Tasks", 2011, available at www.bei-bd.org/downloadreports/publicationdownload/55/download, accessed on 23 November 2011.

²¹ M. Serajul Islam, "Whither Bangladesh's Economic Diplomacy?", *The Daily Sun*, Dhaka, 22 October 2012.

²² Meherun Nesa Shikha, "Economic Diplomacy between Bangladesh and East Asia", *The Daily Star*, Dhaka, 19 May 2012.

²³ Mohammad Jasim Uddin, "Economic Diplomacy and Foreign Policy", *The Daily Star*, Dhaka, 28 February 2013.

²⁴ AKM Masudur Rahman, "Economic Diplomacy and Bangladesh", *The Financial Express*, Dhaka, 20 April 2014.

Literature aforesaid were mainly focused on important aspects of economic diplomacy and foreign policy of Bangladesh as well as link between the two. A few were on why is economic diplomacy important for Bangladesh allied with subsidiary international economic issues. Some were on prioritising areas of identifying challenges and specifying areas-specific potential outlooks for Bangladesh's economic diplomacy. Till now, sectors or contexts- specific major undertakings on economic diplomacy of the country are understudied. On what issues and at what levels ODA-centric economic diplomacy should be advanced? What are the major countries and organisations and who are the main actors? What are the vital instruments to address the major issues? Available literatures on Bangladesh's economic diplomacy are yet to focus the questions and these are the mainstays of this paper. Before addressing these questions, the paper looks into a discourse of ODA in Bangladesh.

3. Bangladesh and ODA: A Discourse

Bangladesh had to seek ODA to meet its development needs immediately after its independence. Several states, Global Financial Institutions (GFIs), voluntary and other organisations did respond. In 1974, after setting up of Bangladesh Aid Group (BAG) now known as Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF) aid started to flow officially to Bangladesh. In the BAG/BDF meeting, the GoB used to highlight its development plan and financial needs for upcoming year while DPs used to assess aid effectiveness and commit accordingly.²⁵ Economic Relations Division (ERD) under the Ministry of Finance (MoF) is now a coordination point where both parties meet and assess their demands. Analyses of the flow of external assistance (Annex 1), grants and loans received (Annex 2), ODA by twenty major DPs (Annex 3) and disbursement by economic sectors (Annex 4) over the last four and half decades give an idea about the following:

- (i) changing quantity and composition of aid in Bangladesh e.g., project assistance, technical assistance and mainly loans have largely replaced contemporary grants and other forms of aid,
- (ii) decreasing and increasing contribution of bilateral and multilateral [e.g., World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) DPs respectively to total ODA, and
- (iii) changing sectoral composition of aid in Bangladesh.

In addition, some recent changes include:

²⁵ Rehman Sobhan, *The Crisis of External Dependence: The Political Economy of Foreign Aid to Bangladesh*, Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1982.

- (a) inflow of bilateral aid significantly from emerging sources (e.g., South Korea, Kuwait, Russia, China and India) rather than from some of the traditional ones (e.g., US, Canada, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Australia),
- (b) reduction of aid dependency and dropping of net aid flow by far to Bangladesh,
- (c) declining contribution of aid to deficit financing, and
- (d) changing political economy and operational modalities of foreign aid in Bangladesh.²⁶

In the 1980s and until the late 1990s, aid was guided by Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP). Since then conditionalities (Annex 5) for aid started to focus more on human rights, institutional reforms and governance issues of Bangladesh. It continued even after undertaking Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), a policy direction to gain aid and adjust needs of recipients and DPs. PRSP was a substitution of Five-Year Plan (FYP). However, the GoB continues to negotiate with DPs in line with its FYPs. Since late 1990s, there were further developments in Bangladesh's aid programmes. For example, increasing amount of aid started to inflow to the Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), activities related to rural poverty, socio-economic wellbeing of rural women and private sector development. The aims of growing sum of aid in private sector development were to facilitate market-oriented reforms, make the scenario of FDI and business friendly environment better and to support involvement of private entities in developmental activities. Besides, two recent developments are ODA in AfT²⁷ and climate vulnerability. Still, projects funded by AfT in Bangladesh focus on developing trade policy and regulation, international trade, infrastructure related to trade and productive capacity. Climate aid is a recent experience. Bangladesh has already created Climate Change Trust Fund (CCTF) by its own resources. On the other hand, Bangladesh has formed Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF) with the help of UK, Sweden, Denmark, EU, Switzerland, Australia and the US. While some of the donors (e.g., UK) have already assured to contribute more aid to BCCRF and said that the aid will not be mixed up with traditional ODA, some (e.g., Germany) have agreed to supply grants to the programmes on adaptation and mitigation.²⁸

²⁶ Binayak Sen, interviewed by *The Daily Star*, Dhaka, on 07 June 2012, said: "In our economic reality we cannot avoid foreign assistance, at least for now."

²⁷ Hasanuzzaman, "Aid for Trade (AfT) Agenda: Moving Ahead", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 14, No. 1&2, 2010, pp. 85-102; Hasanuzzaman, "Assessing the Aid for Trade (AfT) Agenda: Bangladesh Case Study", *Asia Pacific Business Review*, Vol. VI, No. 2, 2011, pp. 5-14.

²⁸ The GoB as of 2015 has received more than hundred million as climate fund. For details see, Saleemul Huq, "Innovation in Climate Finance", available at <http://www.icccad.net/innovation-in-climate-finance/>, accessed on 02 October 2015.

It is to be noted that over the decades, the GoB has failed to utilise approved project assistance. Again, DPs have not disbursed as much as they committed. In effect, aid gap among the pipeline, commitment and disbursement increased annually (Annex 6). Both sides have identified some reasons. Low capacity to absorb aid, poor capacity to implement projects, bureaucratic bottlenecks, lack of good governance, delays in appointment of consultants and awarding contracts are identified by DPs. On the contrary, the GoB has identified several reasons for shrivelling of overseas aid: (a) delays to get permission from DPs in different stages of tender process (b) lack of matching fund to use project loans (c) error in designing project (d) elongated duration for land acquisition (e) delays in employing or changing consultant (f) delays in calling re-tender (g) contractor's aversion to work due to rising expenditure (h) delays in implementing projects due to intricacy sometimes from high court, and (i) politicisation of bidding processes and delays in the bidding process. However, hitch continues between the DPs and GoB on the ways of utilising aid and conditionalities imposed. A contradiction was observed between the GoB and WB in funding Padma Bridge. In effect, two other donors in the project, ADB and Islamic Development Bank (IDB), also denied supplying loans to the project. At times, Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) produces dilemma; if one denies, others follow it and this is because of intrusive approach of the DPs. Interaction between DPs and the GoB over foreign aid is thus friendly in public but sometimes conflicting practically.²⁹ Therefore, the issue of aid effectiveness comes to the fore.

The GoB has been involved with global initiatives on aid effectiveness. In 2005, it signed Paris Declaration (PD).³⁰ Since then, it participated in several events focusing on harmonising global aid and enhancing its effectiveness. In 2008, the GoB agreed with Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) that is planned to fortify and intensify implementation of the PD.³¹ Both the Declaration and the Agenda helped the GoB formulate Harmonisation Action Plan (HAP) to publicise PD and speed up its functioning. The GoB in 2010 signed a Joint Cooperation Strategy (JCS) with its DPs to lessen hitch between the two. The aim of the JCS is to expedite effective aid utilisation and functioning of development projects. Thereafter, HAP and JCS have

²⁹ Naomi Hossain, "The Real-life Relationship between Donors and Recipients in Bangladesh: Explanatory Research into the Sociology of Aid Relations", Unpublished Paper, Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex, February 2004.

³⁰ PD is a practical action-oriented roadmap to improve quality of aid and its impact on development. It gives implementation measures and establishes monitoring system to assess progress and ensures that donors and recipients hold each other accountable for their commitments. It outlines five principles for making aid effective: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results and mutual accountability. For details, see at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>, accessed on 16 August 2015.

³¹ AAA takes stock of progress and sets agenda for accelerated advancement towards Paris targets. It proposes four areas for improvement: ownership, inclusive partnerships, delivering results and capacity development. For details, see, *ibid*.

produced two developments: (i). growing number of joint arrangements in the form of Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) and partnerships under Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF); and (ii). exercising common procedures in financial management and procurement in case of partnerships under the joint arrangements.³² On the other hand, Bangladesh has become one of the few countries in the world to set up a locally developed online aid information platform called Aid Information Management System (AIMS) - a web-based software application that helps Bangladesh to track and manage its aid flows. To manage aid in a coordinated way, the GoB has also created Aid Effective Unit (AEU) in its ERD. Besides, a Local Consultative Framework (LCF) is launched jointly by the GoB and DPs to evaluate development projects. Again, holding of meetings among DPs and Project Directors in ERD has been a regular phenomenon. These help the GoB improve interaction with DPs, speed up inflowing committed aid and reach a consensus on how to further utilise disbursed aid. Even after that, the GoB needs to pay attention to aid-driven developmental activities to be planned, executed and monitored well.

4. ODA-Centric Economic Diplomacy: Bangladesh Perspective

Availability of ODA for a recipient and its management clearly fall within the rubric of economic diplomacy.³³ Persistent and required inflow of ODA is vital for a recipient like Bangladesh and the inflow relies partly on how Bangladesh showcases herself before international community and fits it in economic diplomacy of global aid. It is thus significant to recapitulate on which issues, at what levels, with which countries, by what actors and through what instruments, Bangladesh's ODA-centric economic diplomacy should be advanced.

4.1 Issues

Supplying 0.7 per cent of gross national income by rich economies as ODA to low-income economies is a global consensus. Some of the rich economies are yet to meet the consensus. Likewise, DPs are yet to disburse what they have committed. Therefore, issues of lessening gap between commitment of ODA and its disbursement, assessing preconditions of ODA effectively and realising dynamism of global ODA are crucial.³⁴ These will help Bangladesh understand the rationales of having ODA and carrying out its implementation. One of the

³² Economic Relations Division (ERD), Ministry of Finance (MoF), *Aid Effectiveness and Bangladesh Context*, Aid Effectiveness Unit, Foreign Aid Budget and Accounts (FABA), Government of Bangladesh, 2012.

³³ Kishan S Rana and Bipul Chatterjee, "Introduction: The Role of Embassies", in Kishan S Rana and Bipul Chatterjee (eds.), *Economic Diplomacy: India's Experience*, Jaipur: CUTS International, 2011, pp. 1-23.

³⁴ Author's interview with Dr Maxim Basak, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation in Bangladesh, in 2014.

important sources of Bangladesh's ODA is Japan. Sometimes, Bangladesh's uneconomical consumption of Japanese ODA and recent initiative of Japan to curb its ODA for low-income states could reduce Japan's ODA to Bangladesh. On the other hand, Japan is uneasy to MDTF since engaging more than one DP in a single project creates dilemma. Bangladesh has to exercise effective economic diplomacy to respond to the issues and should deepen its interaction with Japan to get ODA uninterruptedly. Besides, there are some developing countries (e.g., Russia, India, China, etc.) that are emerging as the new DPs. Economic relations between Bangladesh and the developing countries are growing. Therefore, assessing whether the emerging DPs could be the new sources of ODA for Bangladesh is important.

It was a fact that pulling out of WB loans for Bangladesh's Padma Bridge gave rise to off-putting impression over other donors. In effect, ADB and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) called their loans off to the project. Lessening hiccups among the GoB and GFIs (e.g., WB, ADB, JICA, etc.) as well as gaps between or among the GFIs are crucial. Since, it could interrupt persistent inflow of ODA to Bangladesh. Again, poor implementation in Annual Development Programmes, low Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating and lack of consensus on the modalities of ODA are critical challenges of Bangladesh to avail sufficient International Development Association (IDA) allocations. Therefore, the issue of how to fully access allocations provided by IDA is important. Another vital issue is AfT. Despite unconvincing negotiation on Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and economic recession in Europe, both AfT commitment and disbursement are in rising trend.³⁵ AfT is going to be potential as it helps developing economies improve transport connectivity, trade-related capacity building and realise benefits of liberalising trade. Though multi-party DPs are eager to supply growing ODA to facilitate international trade of developing economies, Bangladesh has not yet received adequate fund from such donors on its trade-related aspects. The GoB needs to push DPs for supplying fiduciary assistance to Bangladesh's infrastructure-related development projects to promote trade-facilitation measures of the country. Therefore, negotiating persistently at multilateral level (e.g., the WTO) to avail required amount of AfT and upgrading existing mechanisms of releasing ODA in utilising AfT funds effectively are significant.

Like AfT, ODA for climate change related issues is almost recent. The GFIs, some of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states and globally agreed arrangements on climate change issues are committing ODA for the LDCs to help them face climate change related hazards. Therefore,

³⁵ Organisation for Economic and Cooperation Development (OECD), *Aid for Trade and Development Results: A Management Framework*, The Development Dimension, OECD Publishing, 19 June 2013.

competition to avail such ODA is growing among the LDCs. Again, some of the DPs want to mix up traditional ODA and assistance for climate change issues. The LDCs argue that ODA for climate change issues must be separated from contemporary ODA and provided as grants. They oppose even minimum engagement of the WB with global climate financing. The GoB should be aware of the issues. Therefore, blending of Bangladesh's climate diplomacy with its economic diplomacy is important to avail ODA for climate vulnerabilities bilaterally and multilaterally.³⁶ Besides, it is evident that a significant portion of global ODA is being mobilised through International NGOs (INGOs). NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are growing in number in Bangladesh. It is thus essential to support renowned national and local NGOs so that they can increase interactions with INGOs to get ODA.

4.2 *Countries, Organisations and Levels*

Except loans with tough conditions, no sources of ODA should in general be left aside by Bangladesh, which are soft loans or grants as well as based on the country's development priorities or aspirations.³⁷ Priority thus needs to be given to countries and organisations which have already provided and are still willing to offer soft foreign assistance. Hence, some of OECD, *Development Assistance Committee* (DAC), Middle-east and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) states (identified in Annex 3), along with emerging South Korea, Russia, India and China are important sources. Among the GFIs, the WB, ADB, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and IDB need to be under close eyes. It is also essential to focus on New Development Bank (NDB), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), JICA, UK aid, Canadian and Switzerland International Development Agencies and UN agencies, Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), etc. To address climate vulnerabilities, mobilising ODA from bilateral DPs is crucial. Sources supplying generally to development projects are vital as they are committing to provide ODA also to climate vulnerabilities. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing States (UN-REDD), European Commission (EC) and *United Nations Development Programme* (UNDP) are important sources for climate financing. The GoB should negotiate persistently with these organisations. Economic diplomacy should also be carried out with BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) and OPEC states. Besides, three major blocs i.e. European Union (EU), the US supported by Japan and Canada, and G-77 developing countries in the UN and China are

³⁶ Author's interview with Dr Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad, Chairman, Palli Karma-Sahayak foundation (PKSF), Bangladesh, in 2014.

³⁷ Author's interview with Dr Jiban Ranjan Majumder, Joint Chief, ERD and Economic Minister, Economic Wing, Bangladesh Embassy in Japan, in 2014.

important stakeholders, with whom Bangladesh needs to continue negotiation. Furthermore, other regional groups e.g. African Group, LDC Group and Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Environmental Integrity and Umbrella Group should be under the close eye of GoB. Voluntary organisations providing climate funds should as well not be overlooked.

For mobilising ODA, the GoB should focus not only on GFIs but also pay attention to bilateral, regional, multilateral and plurilateral (EU) levels. At regional level, Bangladesh needs to work on how to mobilise South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation i.e. SAARC fund. As several global organisations (e.g., UN), International CSOs (ICSOs) and INGOs offer assistance, the GoB also needs to value the sources. For climate fund, Bangladesh should first concentrate to bilateral level, as some (e.g. UK, Switzerland and Canada) of bilateral donors have already created their own climate funds, committed to supply climate aid and started disbursing some of the aid to help the most vulnerable countries. Accessing such aid by meeting conditions provided by bilateral DPs is vital. As the EU is keen to supply fund to climate change related projects, availing fund at plurilateral level is also crucial.

Although South Asian states view climate change related concerns in their own way, SAARC being a regional entity should persistently raise its voice at global forums so that multiparty sources disburse their committed funds for climate vulnerabilities in time. Bangladesh needs to be aligned with SAARC initiatives. The country should also persist negotiating at meetings of Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), Meetings of Parties (MOP), Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA).³⁸ The GoB should as well negotiate with G77 and China, LDC group and wider plenary taking all parties into account.

4.3 Actors and Instruments

The Prime Minister (PM) and her Office, Ministry of Planning (MoP), Ministry of Finance (MoF), particularly Economic Relations Division (ERD), Ministry of Commerce (MoC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and its overseas counterparts are important actors of Bangladesh's ODA-centric economic diplomacy. Other actors in Bangladesh include CSOs and local NGOs, INGOs (e.g., Saferworld), embassies and consulates of major donors and offices of global, regional and unilateral financial institutions e.g., the WB, IMF, ADB, IDB, JICA, etc.

³⁸ Author's interview with Dr Abdur Rob Khan, Associate Professor, North South University, and Director, Institute of Development, Environment and Strategic Studies (IDESS), Bangladesh, in 2014.

It is atypical that the MoFA deals with foreign aid. Rather, the MoP or MoF is usually assigned to do it. Diplomatic offices abroad maintain interactions with DPs in countries of assignments. Very few emerging states (e.g., India) appoint permanent expert on global aid in their diplomatic establishments abroad. Such practice is not available in many donor countries. What is available is growing amount of aid supplied by overseas NGOs to recipient ones. Given that, making contact, if possible, with INGOs and realising their outbound aid priorities are within the assignments of foreign embassies. Bangladesh's foreign diplomatic offices are to understand such dynamism of global aid and increase interactions with DPs in countries of assignments. Therefore, assigning aid diplomats in vital foreign embassies of Bangladesh is important.³⁹

Bangladesh is one of those countries which carried out 2011 Survey on Monitoring Paris Declaration (PD). In 2008 and 2010, PD Evaluation Phase I and II were completed. The ERD under the MoF of Bangladesh took part in both evaluations. Being coordinator of Asia-Pacific region in 2011 Busan High Level Forum (HLF), it played a key role in drafting documents to be adopted in the HLF. In 2014, representatives from the ERD and MoF also played significant role participating in the high level meeting on Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation held in Mexico that reiterated political promise to make development cooperation effective. On the other hand, spokespersons from the ERD and MoC actively participated in several global conferences on AfT and raised their voices. However, survey, evaluation or forum aforesaid focus on aid effectiveness and thus concerned stakeholders need to continue to increase their involvement with such global arrangements. They should take attempts to achieve better ranking in identified indicators of global survey and evaluation on overseas aid.

It is to be noted that Bangladesh so far has received ODA even from such arrangements [e.g., Saudi fund, Kuwait fund, OPEC fund, Least Development Fund (LDF)] that do not have branch-offices in the country. At times, it creates dilemma e.g., inconsistent contact between donor and recipient. Therefore, disbursement of aid is delayed. It is essential to negotiate with those arrangements in order to launch branch-points in home country. It is also important to influence headquarters of some regional financial institutions (e.g., ADB) and GFIs to more empower their branch-offices placed in the recipient country. It will help the GoB taking quick decision on aid to be disbursed, minimising its aid-driven project costs and saving time.

³⁹ Author's interview with Professor Shamsul Alam, Member, General Economics Division (GED), Planning Commission, Bangladesh, in 2014.

A recent experience is that some donors are making their priority lists where they would supply ODA in future. For example, the Netherlands has already made its priority lists. It has included Bangladesh as one of its priority countries-list to supply ODA for the long-term developmental aspects. The GoB should realise donors' psychology⁴⁰ and convince them. It is crucial to shrivel hitch among the major GFIs, bilateral donors and the GoB. Bangladesh needs to be aware of new crisis on earlier tension as well as work on future aid diplomacy (of major and new DPs) and priorities of donors. The GoB also needs to continue regular interactions with separate donors.

Besides, developing and capitalising expertise of Bangladesh prior to international review on Aft, supporting national NGOs and CSOs to create and maintain contact with INGOs and ICOSOs eager to supply aid to developmental aspects are vital. Furthermore, requesting, persistently negotiating and creating pressure on donors to functionalise their new and earlier commitments on ODA, synchronising strategies and development goals of donors and the GoB are essential. Negotiating with DPs on conditionalities of aid and their flexibilisation is also essential.

For mobilising climate fund, besides traditional sources of ODA, especially ERD, Ministry of Environment (MoE), NGOs and INGOs working on climate vulnerabilities in Bangladesh and their experts are key actors. DPs, global communities aware of climate change issues, three major and other regional blocs identified in section 4.2 are also vital. One of the important instruments for mobilising climate aid is to take active part in climate change related bilateral, regional and multilateral forums in order to demand Bangladesh's needs justifiably. Dispatching delegations comprised of public and private (e.g., NGOs, CSOs, professionals, media) entities to the Conference of the Parties (CoPs) is essential. It is also essential to increase diplomatic initiatives for being a co-chair or member of Technology Executive Committee (TEC), Technical Assistance (TA) and high-level discussion groups on climate finance for helping to design governance and structure of Green Climate Fund (GCF). Besides, the GoB needs to be fully aware of First Start Finance (FSF), Global Climate Fund (GCF), adaptation fund, Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and their developments. Playing active role in sideline meetings of multi-party negotiations within and with G-77 plus China is vital. Again, it is also vital to organise regional dialogue in between the two CoPs in reaching regional consensus on climate fund. Furthermore, intensifying diplomatic steps to be the leader of LDCs for raising the concerns of Bangladesh is needed.⁴¹ Importantly (a) increasing bilateral efforts (signing MoU/agreement); (b) utilising already disbursed ODA effectively; (c) be fully aware of climate change

⁴⁰ Author's interview with M M Akash, Professor, Department of Economics, University of Dhaka, in 2014.

⁴¹ Author's interview with Dr Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad, *op. cit.*

related global developments; (d) increasing negotiation capability; (e) showcasing climate change oriented success stories globally; and (f) promoting sectors (e.g., energy) where donors (e.g., Germany) are keen to support are significant instruments for mobilising ODA on climate vulnerabilities. However, climate aid has to be in addition to traditional ODA and the GoB should raise its voice if there is any disagreement between the two.

5. Concluding Remarks

This paper aimed at identifying important issues of Bangladesh's ODA-centric economic diplomacy and ways of dealing with the issues. It finds that the major issues include: (a) realising global aid dynamism; (b) reducing commitment-disbursement gap of aid; (c) lessening difficulties among the GoB and GFIs as well as between/among the GFIs; (d) examining conditionalities of aid; (e) assessing cost benefit of using MDTF in a single project; (f) studying emerging DPs as new sources of ODA; (g) assessing aid modalities to fully access IDA allocations; (h) examining conditionalities to access AfT and global climate fund; and (i) blending of climate and economic diplomacy. While addressing the issues, the GoB in general needs to focus not only on the GFIs but also at multiple levels in order to mobilise ODA. Thus, advocating organisations and actors governing ODA, increasing capacity of the GoB to continue active interactions with vital DPs and major GFIs as well as understanding country-aid ownership are indispensable.

In particular, there are several instruments of economic diplomacy that this paper identifies to deal with major issues of Bangladesh's ODA-centric economic diplomacy. These include:

(a) negotiating with DPs on aid conditionalities and their flexibilisation, realising outbound aid priorities and psychology of donors, assigning aid diplomats in vital foreign embassies of Bangladesh, managing better ranks in several indicators of various surveys and evaluations on global aid;

(b) participating actively in global aid forums and raising voice by dispatching delegations, studying long-term plans of major DPs and continuing negotiations to be included in priority lists of DPs, encouraging non-traditional DPs to set up their country-level offices in Bangladesh, influencing headquarters of regional and global financial institutions to more empower their branch offices in Bangladesh;

(c) meeting gap between major GFIs, bilateral donors and the GoB, strengthening already established joint aid assessment mechanisms, pressurising

DPs to continue their commitments, advocating local NGOs, INGOs and requesting DPs to harmonise their aid strategies with Bangladesh's developmental goals;

(d) for mobilising climate aid, important instruments are (i) participating actively through dispatching experts in climate change related multiple-level forums; (ii) increasing bilateral efforts through signing MoUs and agreements; (iii) showcasing Bangladesh to climate change related global watchdogs and donors on how already disbursed funds are being utilised and how committed funds would be used; and (iv) aligning climate diplomacy with economic diplomacy.

Annex 1: Flow of External Assistance (US\$ million)				
Fiscal Years	Food Aid	Commodity Aid	Project Aid	Total Aid
1971-1980	2090	2768	1749	6607
1981-1990	2346	4435	7340	14121
1991-2000	1537	3169	10911	15617
2001-2010	613	536	15104	16253
2011-2014	212.55	0.00	9586.838	9799.388
2015	37.530	0.00	3005.542	3043.072

Source: Economic Relations Division (ERD), 2015.

Annex 2: Grants and Loans Received (US\$ million)			
Fiscal Years	Grants	Loans	Total Aid
1972-1980	3360	3247	6607
1981-1990	6742	7379	14121
1991-2000	7379	8238	15617
2001-2010	5122	11131	16253
2011-2014	2556.82	10001.4	12558.22
2015	570.825	2472.247	3043.072

Source: ERD (2015), MoF, the GoB.

Annex 3: ODA by 20 Major DPs (US\$ million): FY (1972-2013), FY 2014 and FY 2015							
DPs	Grant	Loan	Total	FY 2014	FY 2015	GT	%
IDA	562	12551	13113	936.05	977.89	15026.94	22.1
Japan	3350	4100	7450	450.78	366.46	8267.24	12.5
ADB	162	8968	9130	464.68	715.75	10310.43	15.3
USA	2787	763	3550	0.46	1.53	3551.99	5.9
Canada	2123	16	2139	16.28	13.28	2168.56	3.6
UN ex. UNICEF	3062	00	3062	26.63	144.76	3233.39	5.1
Germany	1520	268	1788	35.34	30.07	1833.41	3.0
UK	2215	83	2298	116.02	79.30	2493.32	3.8
EU	1572	48	1620	51.12	29.74	1700.86	2.7
N.lands	1109	71	1180	6.96	0.93	1187.89	1.9
KSA	587	318	905	6.42	9.76	921.18	1.5
Sweden	833	24	857	23.97	10.15	891.12	1.4
Norway	709	3	712	--	2.84	714.84	1.2
France	325	256	581	0.00	00	581	0.9
Denmark	845	102	947	62.67	29.53	1039.2	1.5
UNICEF	1038	00	1038	16.88	39.16	1094.04	1.7
Russia	35	359	394	--	--	394	0.6
Australia	388	49	437	0.00	00	437	0.7

India	206	247	453	123.37	93.99	670.36	0.7
IDB	22	557	579	76.94	132.92	788.86	0.9
Total	23450	28783	52233	2414.57	2678.06	57325.63	88
All DPs	24661	34650	59311	3084.39	3029.24	65424.63	

Source: ERD (2015), MoF, the GoB.

Note: -- data not available. Out of US\$ 3084.39 million, other sources provided US\$ 669.82m in FY2014; other sources include China (US\$ 472.71m), South Korea (US\$ 35.54m), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (US\$ 14.28m), Kuwait (US\$ 9.35m), OPEC (US\$ 6.65m), Nordic Development Fund (NDF) (US\$ 4.6m), and others (US\$ 126.69m). Although China ranked 3rd in FY2014, it is not included in table 4. For FY2015, out of US\$ 3029.24 million, other sources provided US\$ 351.18m; one of the vital other sources was China, providing US\$ 121.23m.

The shaded figures only represent ODA by DPs for FY2014 and FY2015. Other figures including percentages represent the time FY1972-FY2013. GT (Grand Total) represents sum of FY (1972-2013), FY 2014 and FY2015.

Annex 4: Disbursement by Economic Sectors (US\$ million): FY (1972-2013), FY2014 and FY2015

Sector	1972-1980	1981-1990	1991-2000	2001-2010	2011-2013	2014	2015	Total (1972-2013)
Agriculture	112	623.6	668.5	549.2	188.2	122.7	208	2141.5
Rural Development and Institution	37.7	310.2	603.3	569.9	142.4	49.1	49.9	1663.5
Water Resources	134.1	765.9	1260.3	628.8	194.5	96.6	89.3	2983.3
Power	256.1	1555.2	1607.3	2076.3	1230.4	498.9	629	6725.1
Oil, Gas and Natural Resources	64.2	631.1	566.8	393.8	102.5	69.8	18.1	1658.4
Science and Technology	3.1	20.9	00	00	00	00	00	24
Transport	408.5	919.8	2198.1	1632.9	456.4	431.2	282.1	5615.8
Communication	40.8	170.3	215.6	357.3	157	113.3	96.1	940.8
Industries	364.6	945.2	314.3	253.9	233.8	321.3	82	2111.7
Education and Religion	47	305.6	867.5	1866.9	940.8	352.9	375.1	4127.8
Sports and Culture	00	0.5	0.5	0.3	00	00	00	1.3
Health, Population and Family Welfare	52.8	182.8	542.9	1446.5	722.7	242.7	177.4	2947.5
Family Welfare*	63.6	276.1	576.4	00	00			916.3
Social Welfare, Women and Youth Development	16.3	7.4	32.6	100.4	126.8	92.4	66.6	283.3
Labour and Manpower	5.1	4.8	0.7	2.1	00	00	0.6	12.7
Public Administration	2	22.6	208.8	3872.4	1561.1	468.7	621.6	5669.7
Physical Planning, Water Supply and Housing	46.9	232	810.2	1141.3	483.8	187	295.9	2814.4
Mass Media	00	0.4	16.1	8	00	00	00	24.5
Cyclone Reconstruction	25.1	00	00	00	00	--	--	25.1
Private	69	465.1	417.6	4.7	00	--	--	956.5

Source: ERD (2015), MoF, the GoB.

Note: -- These two sectors were not included in FY 2014 and FY 2015. *Merged with Health and Family Welfare since July 1998. The shaded figures only represent sectors-wise ODA for FY 2014 and FY 2015.

Annex 5: Sources, Sectors Focusing and Conditionalities		
Major Sources	Sectors Focusing	Conditionalities
Japan	Infrastructure, power, health, HR development, climate vulnerability, NGOs, R&D, local governance	1% rate of interest, payable within 40 years; for technical assistance, public private partnership is required
USA	Earlier: productivity, food, developing lives of people; recently: democracy, governance, population growth, long-term economic development, health and food security, climate vulnerability	Conditionalities attached with democracy, human rights and governance
UK	Earlier: MDGs; recently: climate vulnerability	Effectiveness, disbursement procedure and better financial management of aid
Canada	Eager on health, education, economic growth	
Germany	Earlier: MDGs; recently: climate vulnerability	effectiveness, disbursement procedure and better financial management of aid
South Korea	Poverty, ICT, HR, renewable energy, governance, health security, climate vulnerability	Tough conditionalities, with delayed disbursement
Russia	Power, energy, procurement of arms	Credit with an interest rate of Libor plus 1.75 per cent; returnable within defined years with a 10-year grace period
China	Infrastructure	Political/environmental conditionalities are not attached; accessibility is quick and easy
India	Transport, railway, construction	1% rate of interest, 0.5% commitment fee on unutilised credit after 1 year from the date of commercial contract approval; 20-years repayment period including a grace period of 5 years; purchasing 85% of required inputs from India; remaining might be purchased from Bangladesh if and when contractors are botched to supply inputs from India; intra-country competition bidding process
WB	Earlier: poverty, peoples' lives; recently: infrastructure	In terms of interest, loans are cheapest but conditionalities are difficult and thus rate of disbursement is slow
ADB	Agriculture, education, energy, finance, health, industry, trade, transport, ICT, water supply, public- and multi- sector, climate vulnerability, strengthening sub-regional physical connectivity	Continuing reforms, accelerating project execution, stepping up of DPP/TPP endorsement, lessening setbacks in activating project, getting better procurement procedure

IMF	Structural reforms	No interest but introducing controlled and moderate policy for monetary and fiscal consolidation, trimming down barriers on trade, increasing energy and fuel price, removing lending limit for banks, continuing reforms for banks, fixing retail petroleum price taking global price of petroleum into consideration
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Source: Compiled from various documents.

Annex 6: Aid Summary - Pipeline, Commitment and Disbursement: FY1972-2015 (US\$ million)

Fiscal Year	Opening Pipeline	Commitment	Disbursement
1972	-	610.804	270.800
1973	340.004	878.413	551.444
1974	666.973	555.068	461.237
1975	760.804	1266.690	901.049
1976	1126.445	958.881	800.530
1977	1284.796	726.981	534.712
1978	1477.065	1147.874	833.860
1979	1791.079	1760.239	1030.049
1980	2521.269	1153.257	1223.061
1981	2451.465	1559.237	1146.445
1982	2864.257	1922.849	1239.631
1983	3547.475	1522.532	1177.383
1984	3892.624	1694.987	1268.399
1985	4319.212	1980.709	1269.446
1986	4639.263	1661.445	1305.928
1987	5425.393	1603.257	1595.160
1988	5214.931	1529.778	1640.380
1989	5458.172	1873.470	1668.478
1990	5348.495	2175.066	1809.559
1991	5915.160	1370.344	1732.575
1992	5290.420	1915.610	1611.468
1993	5979.856	1274.548	1675.008
1994	5312.363	2410.184	1558.643
1995	5914.939	1612.212	1739.091
1996	6230.617	1279.575	1443.750
1997	5431.237	1661.117	1481.230
1998	4697.092	1790.715	1251.373
1999	4895.530	2648.516	1536.057
2000	5979.575	1475.027	1587.948
2001	5752.268	2052.840	1368.804

2002	5857.955	878.744	1442.234
2003	5450.047	1692.571	1585.022
2004	5738.109	1923.080	1033.432
2005	6911.062	1580.707	1488.447
2006	6694.542	1787.360	1567.636
2007	6759.480	2256.128	1630.575
2008	7288.340	2842.444	2061.514
2009	8682.135	2444.317	1847.305
2010	8861.288	2983.677	2227.774
2011	9429.360	5968.626	1776.742
2012	14151.983	4764.525	2126.478
2013	15436.142	5854.607	2811.000
2014	16637.698	5844.22	3084.39
2015	18174.791	5258.465	3043.072
Total	250601.711	92151.856	65439.116

Source: ERD (2015), MoF, the GoB.

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THEORY OF CHANGE IN DEVELOPMENT: A MICRO LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM BANGLADESH

Abstract

Theory of change as a research tool is adopted considerably to comprehend the socio-economic changes resulted from development interventions. The main objective is to understand whether, to what extent and in which areas the interventions have brought significant changes. Bangladesh is widely known as a 'social laboratory' where thousands of programmes and projects are being implemented to bring about positive economic and social changes. In the present study, 'theory of change' has been operationalised for assessing Empowerment of the Poor through Integrated Agriculture (EPIA) programme adopting quantitative method in the implementation area. The empirical findings suggest that the EPIA programme has brought about significant changes among its beneficiaries located at Bauphal upazila in Patuakhali district which is a backward coastal area of Bangladesh. The results reveal that considerably positive changes took place in income and asset building of the beneficiaries in a quite short period of time in a rural coastal area where the problems of multiple natural hazards like cyclone and salinity are recurrent phenomenon. The positive outcomes and lessons can be learnt through further in-depth study in the programme area, scaled up and replicated widely in other backward areas of the country through necessary customisation.

1. Introduction

The theory of change is an effort to find ways of evaluating processes and outcomes in community-based programmes that were not adequately addressed by existing approaches. In generating this theory, steps are taken to link the original problem or context in which the programme began with the activities planned to address the problem and the medium and longer-term outcomes intended. This framework has much in common with the development programmes and interventions.¹ Connell

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¹ R. Pawson and N. Tilley, *Realistic Evaluation*, London: Sage Publications, 1997; C.H. Weiss, "Nothing as Practical as Good Theory: Exploring Theory-based Evaluation for Comprehensive Community Initiatives for Children and Families", in J. P. Connell, A. C. Kubisch, L. B. Schorr and C. H. Weiss (eds.), *New Approaches to Evaluating Community Initiatives: Concepts, Methods and Contexts*, Washington, DC: Aspen Institute, 1995.

and Kubisch² define a theory of change approach as a systematic and cumulative study of the links between activities, outcomes, and contexts of the initiative. This definition suggests that the first step to evaluate an intervention towards determining its intended outcomes, the activities it expects to implement to achieve those outcomes, and the contextual factors that may have an effect on implementation of activities and their potential to bring about desired outcomes.

Connell and Kubisch³ also argue that a theory of change can sharpen the planning and implementation of an initiative. An emphasis on programme logic or theory during the design phase can increase the probability that stakeholders will clearly specify the intended outcomes of an initiative, the activities that need to be implemented in order to achieve them, and the contextual factors that are likely to influence them. Moreover, with a theory of change approach, the measurement and data collection elements of the evaluation process will be facilitated. It requires stakeholders to be as clear as possible about not only the final outcomes and impacts they hope to achieve but also about the means by which they expect to achieve them. This knowledge is used to focus scarce evaluation resources on what and how to measure these key elements. Finally, and most importantly, articulating a theory of change early in the life of an initiative and gaining agreement about it by all the stakeholders helps to reduce problems associated with causal attribution of impact.

This study is an attempt to map out the changes brought about by the “Empowerment of the Poor through Integrated Agriculture” (EPIA) programme implemented at Bauphal upazila in Patuakhali district, which is one of the most disaster-stricken, vulnerable and marginalised coastal areas of Bangladesh. The project is a poverty reduction initiative implemented from 2008 to 2013 when it enrolled around 3,000 households as beneficiaries and provided them with training, technical support and credit. The households were selected in three batches, around 1,000 in each batch, in each year from 2008-09 to 2010-11. The project was an integrated approach in agriculture combining family poultry, small scale aquaculture and homestead gardening. The project supported establishment of a poultry rearing model, a sustainable family level fish culture and homestead gardening by improvement of traditional practices with technical support, scientific knowledge and local resources. The project facilitated transfer of technology to about 3,000 poor and subsistence level beneficiaries in the upazila. The project is conceived of as an innovative and experimental one and therefore, its area of operation has been limited to only Bauphal upazila for ease of intensive supervision and technology transfer to bring sustainable “change” in the

² J. P. Connell and A. C. Kubisch, “Applying a theory of change approach to the evaluation of comprehensive community initiatives: progress, prospects, and problems”, in K. Fulbright-Anderson, A. C. Kubisch and J. P. Connell (eds.), *New Approaches to Evaluating Community Initiatives: Theory, Measurement, and Analysis* (Volume 2), Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 1998.

³ *Ibid.*

lives of its beneficiaries so that the good practices and lessons of the project can be replicated.

The broad objective of the study is to assess whether there had been noticeable change in the lives of the beneficiaries as a result of the interventions of the EPIA project. Specifically, the objectives of the evaluation were to assess the change in family income of the beneficiaries; the level of empowerment of women and change in gender parity; the impact of awareness, training and vaccination on the mortality of poultry and livestock; the change in nutrition of beneficiaries as a result of production of vegetables, fishes, eggs and meat; the degree of employment generation and self-employment as a result of project interventions; and the change in the livelihood of direct participants of local community through income generation activities in homestead gardening, fish cultivation and poultry rearing. Thus, this study aims at assessing changes that might have occurred in the lives of the beneficiaries by comparing their condition in the year 2011-12 with their condition in the year of enrolment as an application of the theory of change.

The paper has been organised as follows. After this brief prelude, section 2 reviews the literature on the theory of change to connect it with the present study. Section 3 outlines the methodology of the study that includes study area, sample size and data. Section 4 presents the study findings and analyses to map out the changes happened during the project period. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. A Review of Literature

Currently, the theory of change is being adopted considerably to comprehend the socio-economic changes resulted from development interventions usually through introducing programmes and projects. The main objective is to understand whether, to what extent and in which areas the interventions have brought significant changes along with the qualitative dimensions of the changes. As Vogel⁴ argues, the theory of change approach has stemmed from both evaluation and informed social practice, and has become a mainstream and popular discourse, tool and approach for assessing a development intervention. Given a set of assumptions related to explain the process of change, the theory helps ascertain the multi-dimensional changes going beyond the traditional static 'programme theory' and incorporate a more reflective and adaptive understanding of change.⁵ As James⁶ suggests, "A Theory of Change is an ongoing process of reflection to explore change and how it happens — and what that means for the part we play in a particular context, sector and/or group of people."

⁴ I. Vogel, *Review of the use of "Theory of Change" in International Development*, London: DFID, 2012.

⁵ C. Valters, *Theories of Change: Time for a Radical Approach to Learning in Development*, London: ODI, 2015.

⁶ C. James, *Theory of Change Review*, London: Comic Relief, 2011.

Using a theory of change approach includes the use of research tools, quantitative or qualitative or both. However, its objective is much broader than merely the tools by reflecting a desire to embed a critical and adaptive approach to development thinking and practice to capture the micro, meso or macro level changes due to a development programme.⁷ Therefore, it can be readily adopted to good practices in a range of programmes and projects implemented by different organisations for scaling up and wider replications. As Stein and Valters⁸ describe, theories of change satisfy a range of objectives that incorporates basic four: strategic planning, communication, accountability and learning. Beyond project or programme, a theory of change can be adopted at macro, sectoral and institutional level to make out and strengthen the ongoing interventions.⁹ However, it can be best applied at micro or local level to explicitly and critically gauge the change processes at each level. The main difference between log-frame analysis and theory of change is that the earlier reflects a blueprint or 'control-oriented' assessment of programme or project,¹⁰ while the later adopts a more process-orientated approach.¹¹

Theory of change can foster assessing a development in two inter-linked ways. First, it provides enough space and freedom to make assumptions for uncovering the reasons behind a change through devising quantitative and qualitative techniques as research tools by providing the scope of revisiting the context of study and addressing the knowledge gaps. Second, it encourages applying critical reflection on both the specific (changing) context and how programme rationales and strategies fit into this as it is an approach to development thinking and practice. Thus, it is consistent with current development narratives and discourse that development initiatives should be continuously adaptive and take account of political context and social complexities.¹² As Booth argues, the notion of adaptive or process-oriented assessment is pertinent and is in line with the mainstream development thinking and practice.¹³ It bridges gap of the conventional programme management tools, which tend to ignore 'process elements', treating projects as 'closed, controllable and unchanging systems'.¹⁴ In this way, theories of change can promote undertaking new approach of assessment by paying attention to the oft-forgotten assumptions linking programme or project

⁷ D. Stein and C. Valters, "Understanding "Theory of Change", in *International Development: A Review of Existing Knowledge*, London: JSRP and The Asia Foundation, 2012.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ James (2011), *op cit.*

¹⁰ D. Booth, "Still Watering White Elephants? The Blueprint Versus Process Debate Thirty Years On", in A.M. Kjær, L. Engberg Pedersen and L. Buur (eds.), *Perspective on Politics, Production, and Public Administration in Africa: Essays in Honour of Ole Therkildsen*, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015.

¹¹ I. Retolaza, *Theory of Change: A Thinking and Action Approach to Navigate in the Complexity of Social Change Processes*, New York: Hivos, UNDP and Democratic Dialogue, 2011; I. Vogel, *op. cit.*

¹² L. Wild, D. Booth, C. Cummings, M. Foresti and J. Wales, *Adapting Development: Improving Services to the Poor*, London: ODI, 2015.

¹³ D. Booth, *op. cit.*

¹⁴ D. Mosse, "Process-Orientated Approaches to Development Practice and Social Research", in D. Mosse, J. Farrington and A. Rew (eds.), *Development as Process*, New York: Routledge, 1998.

activities and outcomes, and by extending a broader perspective of ‘learning process’ approach, which is flexible and adaptive in nature.

Bangladesh is widely known as a ‘social laboratory’ where thousands of programmes and projects are being implemented to bring about positive economic and social changes.¹⁵ In the present study, theory of change has been operationalised for assessing EPIA programme as ‘structured experiential learning’, through adopting quantitative method in the implementation area. A range of socio-economic variables are taken to understand the change due to programme intervention and to assess whether the changes are positive, significant and encouraging in nature. It paves the way for taking initiatives to scale up the programme and replicate widely to re-establish Bangladesh as a successful ‘social laboratory’.

3. Methodology and Data


The research design for the evaluation followed the pattern of a quasi-experimental research design where conditions of EPIA beneficiaries before and after their enrolment to the project were compared. The population of the study consists of the beneficiaries selected by the EPIA project. The selection was done in three phases, in each year of the period from 2008-09 to 2010-11. There have been cases of drop outs from the selection as well. The distribution of selection and dropout by year of selection is shown in Table 1. About 83 per cent of the households selected as beneficiaries of EPIA has been continuing their projects.

Table 1: Sample Distribution for Questionnaire Survey					
Batch	Population			Sample	
	Selection	Dropout	Remaining % of Selection	Interviewed	Valid
2008-09	709	140	84.1	70	36
2009-10	1478	388	73.8	70	58
2010-11	1000	-	100.0	70	67
Total	3187	528	83.4	210	161

Source: Interview Records, Mid-Term Evaluation of EPIA, 2012.

Note: Although 210 interviews were conducted, only 161 interviews were considered for analysis as baseline information for the rest was found to be irrational and problematic.

¹⁵ A. Rahman, M. Kabir and A. Razzaque, “Civic Participation in Sub-National Budgeting”, in A. Shah (ed.), *Participatory Budgeting*, Vol. III, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007, pp. 1-29.



The formula for determining sample size for assessing proportions is as follows:

$$SS = \frac{z^2 p(1-p)}{C^2}$$

where

SS = sample size

z = z-value (e.g., 1.96 for a 95 per cent confidence level)

p = Percentage of population picking a choice, expressed in decimal

c = Confidence interval, expressed as decimal (e.g., .04 or ± 4 percentage points)

In our case, although 210 interviews were taken, only 161 interviews were considered as effective as in the case of the rest, the associated baseline records were unable to furnish clear or meaningful information. So, in our case,

$$SS = 160$$

z = 1.96 for a 95 per cent confidence level

p = 0.5 (50 per cent)

Therefore, we can use the following formula to determine confidence interval for this sample size:

$$\begin{aligned}
 C &= \sqrt{\frac{z^2 p(1-p)}{SS}} \\
 &= \sqrt{\frac{(1.96)^2(0.5)(0.5)}{161}} \\
 &= 0.772 (\approx 8 \text{ per cent})
 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the resultant means of this study might be considered valid within ± 8 per cent interval with 95 per cent confidence level.

4. Results and Analyses

This section presents results showing the changes in selected indicators that the beneficiaries have experienced due to their involvement in the project. The difference between their baseline condition and immediate past year's condition was also tested for statistical significance. The results are presented here separately for 2008-09, 2009-10 and 2010-11 batches.

4.1 Change between 2008-09 and 2012

Table 2 presents the changes in the socio-economic conditions of the EPIA participants between baseline year (2008-09) and survey year (2012)

Table 2: Impact of EPIA between 2008-09 and 2012

Indicators	Paired Difference Mean	Std. deviation	t-ratio ¹
<i>Household assets</i>			
Land (in decimal)	27.4	89.4	2.51**
Pond	5.41	2.14	2.52**
Chicken	-18.8	21.7	-0.86
Livestock	1.27	0.95	1.32
<i>Household income (Tk.)</i>			
a. Income from field crop	5,623	2,968	1.89*
b. Income from vegetable	1,692	2,953	4.7***
c. Income from chicken	-1,829	4,621	-0.39
d. Income from fish	8,233	20,612	2.62***
e. Income from livestock	5,944	12,061	2.96***
Yearly farm income (a+b+c+d+e)	13,383	49,176	2.2**
Yearly non-farm income	24,871	7,664	3.2***
Total yearly Income (farm and non-farm)	36,092	77,586	3.8***
<i>Household expenses (Tk.)</i>			
a. Field crop expense	7,073	12,511	3.96***
b. Vegetable expense	411	199	2.1**
c. Chicken expense	-439	1,581	-0.28
d. Fish expense	866	9,629	-0.64
e. Livestock expense	2,765	3,843	4.67***
Yearly farm expense (a+b+c+d+e)	5,914	23,890	2.1**
Yearly non-farm expense	9,542	5,575	1.4
Total yearly expense (farm and non-farm)	15,470	53,520	2.4**
<i>Vegetable land</i>			
Available vegetable land cultivated (decimal)	0.10	0.58	1.42
<i>Poultry farming</i>			
Number of local chicken (yearly)	7	14	3.89***
Yearly egg from local chicken	60	229	3.8***
Yearly flesh from local chicken (kg)	12.4	16.7	5.9***
Yearly expense for local chicken (Tk.)	800	2,506	2.6***

Yearly income from local chicken (Tk.)	1679.7	3439.1	3.8***
Fish production			
Pond areas (decimal)	6.3	20.9	2.2**
Pond production (kg.)	102.9	289.9	2.5**
Yearly fish expense (Tk.)	4,269	11,926	2.58***
Yearly income from fish(Tk.)	9,457	19,744	3.4***

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1 per cent ($p < 0.01$), 5 per cent ($p < 0.05$), and 10 per cent ($p < 0.10$) level, respectively.

¹ The reported t-test values were derived as

$$t = \frac{\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_2}{\sqrt{\frac{n_1 n_2}{n_1 + n_2}}}$$

where

$$s = \sqrt{\frac{(n_1 - 1)s_1^2 + (n_2 - 1)s_2^2}{n_1 + n_2 - 2}}$$

\bar{x}_1 and \bar{x}_2 are sample means of the participants in the base year (2008/09) and comparison year (2012), respectively, and n_1, n_2 represent project participants in the current year (2012) and base year (2008/09), respectively.

Four assets of the EPIA project beneficiaries have been used to assess the impact on assets which are land, pond, chicken and livestock. The pattern of impact has been presented in the above Table 2. It is seen from the table that households' land and number of ponds used for fish cultivation have increased significantly. One plausible explanation of this significant positive change over the years is that households could increase their operated land either through buying or taking lease or by sharecropping. During the period, households' land increased by 58 per cent from 46.43 decimal to 73.83 decimal land.¹⁶ Fish cultivation has been increasing over the years and the project beneficiaries are increasingly interested to bring their fallow land under fish production. The intensive supervision and technical support of the EPIA project trainers could be a significant factor towards this significant positive change. The other two categories of assets namely number of chicken and livestock did not change virtually over the years.

During the project period, not only the household assets but also their incomes from different sources namely incomes from crop, vegetable, fish and livestock have

¹⁶ Traditionally, farmers in the study areas use decimal to measure the land. 247 decimals = 1 hectare.

increased significantly. The average household income for the beneficiary increased from 2010-11 to 2012 by more than 57 per cent for crops (from Tk. 9,766 to 15,389), 317 per cent for vegetables (from Tk. 534 to 2,226), 1100 per cent for fish and 303 per cent for livestock. However, the income from chicken displayed a negative change although not statistically significant. A large number of respondents mentioned that chicken died out of some diseases in 2012 that contributed towards this negative change of the chicken incomes compared to base year 2008-09. Overall, farm-income increased by 74 per cent (from Tk. 17,993 to 31,376). The major non-farm income categories such as income from job, shop, wage labour, money-lending etc. also increased to a large extent. It has been observed that the average non-farm income increased by 36 per cent (from Tk. 69,366 to 94,238). For the project participants, the yearly average income from all sources registered an impressive increase of 41 per cent (from Tk. 88,116 to 124,201).

Not only the household income but also their expenditures for different categories namely expenditures for crop, vegetables, and livestock have increased significantly. The average household expenditures for the beneficiary from 2008-09 to 2012 increased by more than 163 per cent for crops (from Tk. 4,332 to 11,404), 80 per cent for vegetables (from Tk. 513 to 925). Overall, farm expenditures increased by 66 per cent (from Tk. 8,956 to 14,870) while the overall non-farm expenditures increased by 14 per cent (from Tk. 66,691 to 76,233). It has been observed that the average yearly expenditures of the project participants increased by 17 per cent (from Tk. 75,647 to 91,117). It is also indicated by the responses of the project beneficiaries during the focused group discussion (FGD) that their expenditures for different household categories such as expenditures for food, clothing, education, medical care and others have increased compared to baseline year 2008-09.

It was found that the EPIA project participants increased the proportion of land available for vegetable cultivation. Although not statistically significant, the project participants increased the proportion of available vegetable land under cultivation by 44 per cent (0.25 to 0.36 decimal). This indeed is a clear testimony to the positive attitudes of the project participants for vegetable cultivation.

There has been a significant improvement of the households in terms of poultry rearing. On average the project participants increased the local chicken rearing by 44 per cent (from 9 to 16), yearly egg production by 66 per cent (from 92 to 153), yearly flesh production by 200 per cent (from 6 kilogram to 18 kilogram), yearly expense for chicken rearing by 229 per cent (from Tk. 350 to 1,150) and income from local chicken rearing by 144 per cent (from Tk. 1,169 to 2,849).

Like other indicators fish production, land under fish production, yearly expense incurred for fish production and yearly income from fish production have increased significantly. On average, fish production areas increased from 7 to 13

decimal, fish production increased from 10 to 113 kilograms, expenditures for fish from Tk. 481 to 4,750 and the yearly income from fish from Tk. 718 to 10,174. A plausible explanation for this significant increase could be that many project beneficiaries are becoming more interested for fish production and they are bringing fallow pond areas under production. It has been also found that many project beneficiaries are taking lease for commercial fish production.

4.2 Change between 2009-10 and 2012

Again, four similar assets (*viz.* land, pond, chicken and livestock) of the beneficiaries are considered to assess the impact of the project on asset building. Table 3 describes the numerical changes by each asset, which portrays that households' chicken production has increased significantly in 2012 compared to that of 2009-10. Between the period, households' poultry production increased by 19 per cent per year, which was statistically significant. Other assets have also witnessed positive changes but these are not statistically significant.

In addition to household assets, income from crop, vegetables, fish and livestock increased significantly between 2009-10 and 2012. Average household income for the beneficiary increased by about 253 per cent for crops (from Tk. 3,565 to 12,588), 400 per cent for vegetables (from Tk. 352 to 2,053), 211 per cent for chicken and 148 per cent for fish (from Tk. 1,379 to 3,422). Overall, farm income increased from Tk. 6,695 to 27,570, which was quite large. The major non-farm income, such as income from job, shop, wage labour, money lending, etc. also increased considerably. It has been observed that the average non-farm income increased by 19 per cent (from Tk. 65,361 to 77,767) and the annual average income from all sources increased substantially by 57 per cent (from Tk. 67,220 to 105,337). It means that the participants gained notably in terms of increased income from different components of the project.

In the expenditure side, household spending for crop, vegetables and livestock increased significantly during the project period. Specifically, average household spending for the beneficiary increased by more than 24 per cent for crops (from Tk. 5,745 to 7,138), 360 per cent for vegetables (from Tk. 195 to 898), 218 per cent for chickens (from Tk. 333 to 1,059), and 126 per cent for fish (from Tk. 700 to 1,585). Overall, farm level spending increased by 68 per cent (from Tk. 7830 to 13,174) while the overall non-farm spending increased by 31 per cent (from Tk. 52,105 to 68,040) even though the magnitude of non-farm spending was significantly higher. Overall, the average annual spending of the beneficiaries increased by 36 per cent (from Tk. 59,935 to 81,214). The FGD with the project participants reveal that their expenditures for various household purposes, such as expenditures for food, clothing, education, medical care and others have increased considerably compared to that of 2008-09.

The proportion of land under vegetable cultivation in total operated area has increased for project participants. The project participants increased the proportion of land under vegetable cultivation by 27 per cent (from 0.51 to 0.65 decimals), which demonstrates that a positive attitude emerged among the project participants for vegetable cultivation during the entire project period. Moreover, there has been a notable improvement of the households in poultry rearing. Average annual local chicken rearing has increased by 15 per cent (from 13 to 15), meat by 25 per cent (from 9 to 12 kilogram), yearly expense for chicken rearing by 278 per cent (from Tk. 303 to 856) and income from local chicken rearing by 207 per cent (from Tk. 798 to 2,443) among the project participants.

Among the fishery indicators, fish production, cultivation land for fish production, yearly expense incurred for fish production and yearly income from fish production increased significantly. As shown in Table 3, the area of annual total fish production increased from 5 to 6 decimal, while fish production increased from 15 to 86 kilograms, spending for fish from Tk. 546 to 1,339 and annual income from fish from Tk. 1,003 to 5,274. All these changes happened perhaps due to the fact that increasing number of project participants are becoming more interested to fish production by bringing fallow pond areas under production and taking lease to commercially cultivate fish keeping in mind the commercial viability of the fishery sector.

Table 3: Impact of EPIA between 2009-10 and 2012			
Indicators	Paired Difference Mean	Std. deviation	t-ratio ²
<i>Household assets</i>			
Land (in decimal)	-8.18	87.1	-0.71
Pond	0.62	7.5	0.62
Chicken	3	12	2.0***
Livestock	0.69	2.81	1.86
<i>Household income (Tk.)</i>			
a. Income from field crop	9,023	26,488	2.59***
b. Income from vegetable	1,701	4,010	3.23***
c. Income from chicken	1,647	2,531	4.96***
d. Income from fish	3,284	6,909	3.62***
e. Income from livestock	5,135	17,430	2.22**
<i>Yearly farm income (a+b+c+d+e)</i>	20,857	42,231	3.76***
<i>Yearly non-farm income</i>	12,406	53,485	1.77*
Total yearly Income (farm and non-farm)	38,117	61,556	4.72***
<i>Household expenses (Tk.)</i>			
a. Field crop expense	1,393	10,208	0.99

b. Vegetable expense	703	2,606	2.02
c. Chicken expense	726	1,217	4.54***
d. Fish expense	886	2,053	3.08***
e. Livestock expense	2,369	8,860	1.92
Yearly farm expense (a+b+c+d+e)	5,344	14,091	2.89***
Yearly non-farm expense	15,934	37,577	3.23***
Total yearly expense (farm and non-farm)	21,279	36,969	4.38***
Vegetable land			
Available vegetable land cultivated (decimal)	0.60	0.56	8.21***
Poultry farming			
Number of local chicken (yearly)	1.91	12.24	1.19
Yearly egg from local chicken	4	18	0.16
Yearly flesh from local chicken (kg)	2.80	9.86	2.16**
Yearly expense for local chicken (Tk.)	542	873	4.73
Yearly income from local chicken (Tk.)	1,649	2,405	5.17
Fish production			
Pond areas (in decimal)	1.33	8.11	1.25
Pond under fish production (kg)	71.05	162.37	3.33***
Yearly fish expense (Tk.)	793	2,496	2.41**
Yearly income from fish (Tk.)	5,171	9,143	4.30***

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1 per cent ($p < 0.01$), 5 per cent ($p < 0.05$), and 10 per cent ($p < 0.10$) level, respectively.

² The reported t-test values were derived as

$$t = \frac{\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_2}{\sqrt{\frac{n_1 n_2}{n_1 + n_2}}}$$

where

$$s = \sqrt{\frac{(n_1 - 1)s_1^2 + (n_2 - 1)s_2^2}{n_1 + n_2 - 2}}$$

\bar{x}_1 and \bar{x}_2 are sample means of the participants in the base year (2009-10) and comparison year (2012), respectively, and n_1, n_2 represent project participants in the current year (2012) and base year (2009-10), respectively.

4.3 Change between 2010-11 and 2012

In the last comparing year of the project, the changes in asset building have

not been encouraging for land, pond, chicken and livestock. It is seen from Table 4 that households' chicken and number of livestock have increased over the years. However, the change is not statistically significant. On the other hand, household land area and number of ponds decreased over the years. It may be because the participating households have already reached their optimum in these assets.

Conversely, incomes from crop, vegetables, fish and livestock have increased significantly. The average household income for the beneficiary from 2010-11 to 2012 increased by more than 137 per cent for crops (from Tk. 5,331 to 12,640), 241 per cent for vegetables (from Tk. 1,097 to 3,739), 300 per cent for fish (from Tk. 1,298 to 5,219) and the income from chicken increased by 286 per cent. Overall, farm income increased considerably by 233 per cent (from Tk. 10535 to 35,088). The most important sources of non-farm income, e.g., income from job, shop, wage labour, money lending, etc. also demonstrated increase quite visibly. The annual average non-farm income increased from Tk. 8,472 to 76,683. Overall, the annual average income from all sources witnessed a growth of 488 per cent (from Tk. 19,006 to 111,771). This high relative growth of income is not surprising. For example, Institute of Microfinance (InM) in its recent occasional paper reported that their project participants could increase their incomes by 110 per cent in two years.¹⁷ Our findings conform this finding of the project.

Table 4: Impact of EPIA between 2010-11 and 2012

Indicators	Paired Difference Mean	Std. deviation	t-ratio ³
<i>Household assets</i>			
Land (in decimal)	-31.72	129.12	-1.47
Pond	-2.63	15.48	-1.02
Chicken	8.67	6.64	1.30
Livestock	0.19	1.70	0.68
<i>Household Income (Tk.)</i>			
a. Income from field crop	7,309	24,171	1.79*
b. Income from vegetable	2,642	8,549	1.85*
c. Income from chicken	3,917	13,503	1.74*
d. Income from fish	3,922	18,888	1.25
e. Income from livestock	7,633	21,619	2.11**
Yearly farm income (a+b+c+d+e)	24,552	45,410	3.24***
Yearly non-farm income	68,212	65,789	6.22***
Total yearly income (farm and non-farm)	92,764	66,278	8.39***

¹⁷ PKSF, *Financial Impact Evaluation of Financial Services for the Poorest Project: Impact Evaluation*, PKSF, 2008, Dhaka; Institute of Microfinance, *Occasional paper*, September 2011, Dhaka.

Household Expenses (Tk.)			
a. Field crop expense	4,656	6,432	3.76***
b. Vegetable expense	1,231	4,279	1.57
c. Chicken expense	1,528	6,491	1.35
d. Fish expense	3,630	13,762	1.27
e. Livestock expense	5,640	6,075	4.15***
Yearly farm expense (a+b+c+d+e)	9,871	19,603	3.02***
Yearly non-farm expense	28,898	40,220	4.31***
Total yearly expense (farm and non-farm)	38,769	45,945	5.06***
Vegetable land			
Available vegetable land cultivated (decimal)	0.006	0.50	0.07
Poultry Farming			
Number of local chicken (yearly)	2	20	0.45

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1 per cent (p<0.01), 5 per cent (p<0.05), and 10 per cent (p<0.10) level, respectively.

³ The reported t-test values were derived as

$$t = \frac{\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_2}{\sqrt{\frac{n_1 n_2}{n_1 + n_2}}}$$

where

$$s = \sqrt{\frac{(n_1 - 1)s_1^2 + (n_2 - 1)s_2^2}{n_1 + n_2 - 2}}$$

\bar{x}_1 and \bar{x}_2 are sample means of the participants in the base year (2010-11) and comparison year (2012), respectively, and n_1, n_2 represent project participants in the current year (2012) and base year (2010-11), respectively.

The spending side also shows a similar fashion. The expenditures for crop and livestock have increased significantly during this period. The average household expenditures for the beneficiary from 2010-11 to 2012 increased by more than 155 per cent for crops (from Tk. 2,985 to 7,641), 311 per cent for vegetables (from Tk. 396 to 1,627), and 152 per cent for chicken (from Tk. 1,002 to Tk. 2,530). Overall, farm expenditures increased by 149 per cent (from Tk. 6,609 to Tk. 16,481). The annual average expenditure of the project participants demonstrates notable growth of 63 per cent (from Tk. 61,467 to 100,236). The FGD participants reported that their expenditures for human development, such as food, clothing, education, medical care and others have increased compared

to 2010-11. It was also found that the EPIA project participants decreased a little bit the proportion of total land available for vegetable cultivation. Although not statistically significant, the project participants decreased the proportion of land under vegetable cultivation by 1.2 per cent (from 0.81 to 0... 8 0 decimal).

It is evident from the study that households' land increased 58 per cent between 2008-09 and 2012 but households' land did not increase between 2009-10 and 2012 and between 2010-11 and 2012. Rather land and pond have decreased. One plausible explanation of such findings may be that as Bauphal upazila of Patuakhali district is one of the most disaster-prone areas, natural disasters such as cyclone, tidal waves and saline water intrusion in the agricultural land are very common. This upazila observed huge damage and losses of crops and fisheries during the cyclone 'Aila' on 27 May 2009. Although the income of people increased, but due to high cost of land and use of the income to meet the damages caused by 'Aila', they could not manage investment in acquisition of new land. In many cases, the beneficiaries took lease of land and pond for farm activities and possibly due to the same reasons they could not afford taking lease of the same amount of land and pond that they utilised in the previous years.

One positive impact of the project is the increase in income of beneficiaries. This obviously resulted in increased welfare if not in terms of increased assets but in terms of decreased liabilities. If income continues to increase and natural disasters like 'Aila' are less frequent in future, then welfare should increase. However, making a definitive conclusion about the nature and direction of welfare of the beneficiaries that might result from the project is beyond the scope of this study.

This project mainly focused on agriculture and farm activities which may not be sustainable in the long-run because the project area is vulnerable to climate change and natural disasters. The project could also focus on some non-farm activities specially skill development trainings to the clients and could provide other livelihood assets such as sewing machine, nets, boat, agricultural equipment, rickshaw/van, *auto*, etc. that would generate sustainable income from non-farm activities.

Overall, the empirical findings suggest that the EPIA project has brought about significant changes among its beneficiaries located in a comparatively backward area of Bangladesh. The year-by-year assessment reveals that considerably positive changes took place in income and asset building of the beneficiaries in a quite short period of time in a rural coastal area where the problems of multiple natural hazards like cyclone and salinity are recurrent phenomenon. The positive changes that took place in income from crop, livestock,

fishery and vegetables indicate that their standard of living has increased, which contributed positively in poverty reduction and socio-economic development of the locality. It is evident from EPIA project that integrated agriculture could increase household income from farm activities. Therefore, the positive outcomes and lessons can be learnt through further in-depth study in the project area, scaled up and replicated widely in other backward areas of the country through necessary customisation. The policy recommendations are as follows:

- The government could scale up this project concept to other districts to increase income of the poor people.
- Along with farm activities the government could also focus on skill development of the target groups especially young household members.
- The donors should come forward with similar project especially in the coastal and other poverty stricken districts.
- The government should develop and distribute hybrid and saline resistant varieties for agriculture development in the coastal areas.

5. Concluding Remarks

This study is a systemic effort to apply the theory of change to comprehend the positive and significant changes brought about by the EPIA project at Bauphal upazila, which is a disaster-stricken and vulnerable coastal area. The major findings about the changes that EPIA brought about can be summarised as follows. In most cases, the family income of the families changed due to their involvement in the EPIA project. It was found that increase in income for those with poultry and fisheries project were higher than those with vegetables projects. Poultry projects seemed to be more profitable than the fisheries as it takes less time to produce the output to sell in the market. The nutrition intake of the beneficiaries (through spending on the food items) are now much better as they consume fish, chicken meat, eggs and vegetables more than they used to do prior to enrolment with EPIA. Vegetable intake has increased significantly followed by fish intake. The study finds evidence in favour of increase in income and assets of the beneficiaries. However, evidence could not be established in favour of the contention that the increase in assets was primarily due to their involvement in the projects. It was found that on an average, there has been a dropout rate of around 17 per cent among the beneficiaries selected by EPIA. However, the dropouts are mainly from the earlier two batches of beneficiaries selected in 2008-09 and 2009-10. None has dropped out from the batch of beneficiaries selected in 2010-11 which

indicate that selection process has attained efficiency through learning. The results suggest that the good practices and successful areas can be replicated in similar areas for bringing in sustainable changes in developmental outcomes and economic empowerment of rural population in Bangladesh.

Narottam Gaan**STATE, IDENTITY AND SECURITY: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE****Abstract**

In the traditional concept, state has been central to security. Search for survival, identity and security has been embedded in the state. Security of state has been synonymous with that of the people. In anarchical international system, the states being in a situation of self help, security dilemma strives for more security in order to secure what has been considered as security. This is because the security that a state has always seems to be inadequate. The sources of security threats as well as the provider of security remain with the state. With the emergence of other non-state sources of security threats, the adequacy of states as provider of security has been challenged by critical theories like Copenhagen and other widening schools of thought. The Westphalian preoccupation of international relations with statist approach is overdrawn. Upon the failure of these schools to provide any alternative to state, the state retains it being the largest collective organisation for universal purpose of security.

1. Introduction

From the very dawn of human civilisation till today the primordial instinct of all living organisms and human beings for self preservation and survival has remained paramount. The evolution of man's gradual passage into various organisations starting from family, groups and finally into state has been imperatively goaded by the inescapable proclivity for preservation of the self. This is as true for human beings as for all institutions and states. Self entails identity - a distinguishable competitive existential and ideational element that inspires a person to occupy a covetous position exacting respect, dignity, status and recognition of one's superiority from others in terms of glory, power and wealth. As individuals vie for this for carving out a respectable niche, the states similarly in the global scene in realistic parlance strive for dominance and superiority in terms of material and military power. This search for identity and self preservation has been the principal cause of competition, conflict and war among the states in the absence of a government of governments at the international level.

Preservation of identity and survival is the main task of security through the instrumentality of power. In Hobbesian paradigm, power, status and dignity of a state

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need to be preserved and perpetuated. Accordingly, what is secured comes under the label of security. More power and security is required to secure what is already secured.

In case of individuals, the very feeling of inadequacy of preservation of self, survival and identity by self help impelled them in their voyage to land ultimately in the state. The identity of the individuals *per se* the people has become synonymous with the identity of the state. The security of the state is the security of the people. This is found resonated in a popular adage in Britain: "when the king or queen of Britain sleeps nicely in Buckingham palace in the night, the people of Britain sleep safely with their windows and doors open." The identity - creation and reinforcement of a psychological space coincides and merges with the territorial space that is the state. This is the dominant theme in the realism and neo-realism literature on security studies which focuses on the centrality of state as referent object of security.

The problem is that the new developments and changes in global scene in the post realism period have challenged the outsized significance of state as the centre of security studies in view of demystification of the belief that the state's overpowering and unrivalled military strength has not been successful in providing security to the individual human beings. With feminist movements, rise of religious groups and ethnic upsurges, migration of people, environmental crisis and climate change, the psychological space merging with state gets separated and a yawning gap erupted between the two spaces. The focus is no longer on the state rather on individual human being leading to human security i.e., to address the non-traditional, non-state centric spaces that were not considered important earlier or in realist and neo-realist schools of thought on security analysis. This is the thread that the critical security studies select to weave their widening approaches to security in defiance of dominant realist and neo-realist paradigms.

The paper is an attempt to understand security critically from both realism and neo-realism paradigms and critical security theories as well, but with their limitations. It challenges their analysis focusing on individual as the main referent subject of security without marginalising the state. The paper ends with the question mark as to what is alternative to state. It has made a content analysis of the literatures available on contemporary security studies.

2. Defining and Understanding Security: Realist and Neo-realist Paradigms

"Security" is derived from the Latin word *Securitas*, which is a variation of *securas*, meaning, "without care." When a human being or a person moves, acts, thinks or expresses or does something without care or fearlessly without being affected by or in absence of the perturbation of limitation exerted upon by any other or any source, or condition it means that person is established in security or perched in a

“carefree situation”. In other words, security is not an imagery of a hermitically sealed or insulated situation which does not recognise the existence of similar or dissimilar stereotypes of that person. The very word “security” implies the existence of similar or dissimilar which implants or is likely to engender a sense of fear that the “carefree” situation is in danger of being vitiated. Conceptualised further, the very existence of similar or dissimilar stereotypes is what defines, constitutes or adds meaning to the very word “security”. The similar or dissimilar stereotypes are termed as the other in order to define a situation as having threatened or very likely to threaten the very existence of the self or the actor in terms of its survival and identity.

“Carefree situation” means wherein that person lives or hopes to live without being perturbed by forces inside or outside that threatens or decimates his/her physical existence as human being. Thus, what comes to be included within the very conceptual understanding of security is that person’s existence in physical, mental, intellectual, moral and spiritual realm without similar threats. Security means the very act of distancing away spatially the other to a position where the danger of threat looks slender or absent. The very subjective imperative of an individual to perpetuate living as a human being without fears of extinction distinguished from others’ similar survival instinct is what comes within the ambit of security and to live distinguishably and in a dignified way from that of others is what is called identity. This quest for security is to secure identity that ultimately culminates in a state. These two aspects of security can be said as “identity concerns” of persons or human beings. Identity and security are embedded epistemologically in the same conceptual edifice. Negatively speaking, security means the outstripping of the forces both inside and outside that are likely to interfere into the carefree situation. Positively understood, security implies the “creation of a carefree situation” where the individuals as person/human beings flourish or find their best selves. This ‘being of individual/state’ needs emphatically the perpetuation of the physical existence in maintenance of that environment where it looks relatively dignified, distinguishable and ethnocentric which is entwined with it as identity concerns. These two functions of ‘security’ are very much concerned with the protection of identity of individual/human persons (the former) and flourishing of that identity (the latter).

2.1 *Defining Identity*

Identity and security are conceptually embedded. “Identity” in the first category implies differentiation (physical, biological, intellectual, psychological and moral) from other similar or dissimilar (other human beings, women, plants, trees, animals and insects). It is both descriptive and explanatory to justify the grounds on which the person wants to be specifically demarcated from others and needs special treatment on dichotomies like superior/inferior, self/other, civilised/uncivilised, developed/underdeveloped, white/black, order/chaos etc. This understanding of identity is premised on a Newtonian/Cartesian view of the Universe as divided,

fragmented, separated and disjunctive parts and whole divide. As self atomised possessive self sufficing individual, the self is set against the non-self as the other the potential threat to existence or identity within the non-similar/dissimilar – plants, trees, animals, insects and the entire 'nature'. The entire 'concept of security' as couched in traditional orthodoxy has been built on this divisive and dichotomist view constituting the foundation of realism/neo-realism in national and international politics. The hierarchical political and economic system within a state differentiating between public and private and the international system differentiating between rich/ poor, developed/developing, north/south, white/black has been built on this issue of differentiation/sequestration by the issue of survival and identity. Protection of this differentiated identity has been defined as the concept of security. This logic of differentiation has been buttressed strongly by argumentation through the endowment of reason, superior knowledge or through the use of force (military means). Hence, comes in the use of power i.e., power of knowledge or mastery over others through scientific and technological means and power of military. The most advanced and civilised nation is one who has mastered the nature, technological and scientific knowledge, gadgets and ingenuity for subduing others, through the exercise of power. Thus, redefining identity in these terms through power has been the mainstream security parlance today.

2.2 Identity as Identification

Identity in the second category implies identification. Given the Hobbesian portrayal of human nature as self-sufficing, self atomised individual drawn on Newtonian/Cartesian metaphor of particles independently of and unrelated to the whole, identity is essentially the self aggrandising individuality – a bundle of desires, and cravings for a living that is commodious, inordinate and exorbitant at the expense of other human beings and non-human entities. Here identity was the external – the development of the materialistic world for its own luxuries and commodious living. A commodious, extravagant, inordinate and exorbitant life pattern was the identity that was the keystone of development – the capitalist liberal market economy reducing the entire world not only to a market place but a hunting ground for dollar driven predators. Thus, security entwined with identity and western concept of development, has been the facilitator to create that "carefree situation" where the predator by virtue of differentiation mentioned above enjoys the best self through superimposing a feeling of an "ethnocentric ego identity" over and above all others by means of power. Globalisation, in other words has been synonymous with the western defined security to facilitate the penetration of this 'ethnocentric ego' into other spheres through lifting of borders by the use of power (knowledge and military).

Here identity is with the external objectified world, just a Newtonian conglomeration of independent and autonomous particles concerned with not raising the self over the biblical sin but horizontally mingling with the sheaths of desires

and cravings on which the western concept of development has been built. All the individuals/nation states are on a competition to define development on this linear thinking of sameness and flattened world, without seeking identity with any other non-linear category that may be obtained from their own cultures or civilisations.

2.3 *Identity with the State: Merging Psychological and Territorial Space*

Within a geographically defined and territorially bound space the supposed assumption on which all the individuals are flattened homogeneously to the sameness of identity has been the mystical representation of what is called state. Security means, thus, to protect this flattened sameness of individuals identified with the state. To cite the basket metaphor where in all the things remain as separate entity but the basket remains the shield against any eventuality. Similarly, the state is the conglomeration of this flattened sameness of individuals and acts as the shield against any eventuality that may cause the loss of their identity. Thus, the individuals aggregated together in the basket state constitute "the people". State and People are assured to be in unity. Like a shepherd providing a sense of identity and security to its flock, the state provides the most effective means of expressing a particular people's sense of identity and uniqueness by differentiating it from others and satisfying what Benedict Anderson has evocatively referred to as its "metaphysical."¹ The security of state is synonymous with the security of the people.

The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 was epochal in that it homogenised all the varieties and diversities of heterogeneous people into an abstract and mythical political entity known as state. The supposed identity of people anchored with state as nationalism was the powerful hegemonic identity which closed the discovery of all possibilities of spawning or resurrection of all other equally powerful rival identities ranging from religion and ethnicity to gender and profession that are not anchored or only weakly anchored in territory, and therefore, sovereignty. Identities deeply embedded in psychological space were assumed to be merged with political space christened as state. But the Westphalia convention defining state as boundary making and spatial distancing assured that the political space is congruent with the psychological space. This assumed congruence between the political space and psychological space till today has emboldened the state with the *raison d'etre* both to wrest obligation from people and legitimacy to rule and become the principal referent object of security and identity.

Identities demarcate psychological rather than territorial space that is the way in which identities and loyalties are distributed. As a result, the political space can be reconceptualised in terms of psychological distance or the degree of dissimilarity between cognitive frameworks or ways of looking at, assigning meaning to and

¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1983.

coping with the world.² Where psychological distance is great, the likelihood of misperception and understanding and, therefore, conflict is high and the prospect for forming and sustaining a moral community is low. The state as the principal referent object of security and identity is thus challenged and revisited. The more the dissonance and incongruence between these two spaces, the more is the erosion of unifying power of citizenship and potency of sovereign symbols.

For most of the past four hundred years, security has been intimately associated with the state. This is so because security is the script according to which the political is institutionalised/performed in the state. To argue that neo-realism is statist is hardly a new insight. It has long meant protection from organised violence caused by armed foreigners. Since 1648, territorially based states have been defined as the dominant organising principle for separating “us from them”; security’s identification with state is not surprising. Throughout history, it was competition and struggle among different claimants that swayed decisively in favour of consolidation of the state’s military capabilities along with its bureaucratisation over all those that accelerated the process of perpetuation of the state and cemented people’s identity with the latter. As its monopolistic use of violence capability both offensive and defensive was legitimised the state became not only the chief provider of security, but became its chief interpreter, for much of history, “security” simply meant what the states said it meant. The ‘being of the state’ in terms of survival and identity evolved in this way historically into an ethnocentric, superior and hegemonic institution legitimised in people’s identity and security has resulted in today what is called a ‘state of being’. In identity and security of the state itself the people find theirs. Hence, the state of being always is on a perpetual and constant move to attain that ‘being of state’. The people is held as mere passive onlooker and unmoved and in contrast, the state moves and searches for identity and security through the means of power.

3. The Concept of State as Political Entity

“The concept of state presupposes the concept of the Political.”³ Statehood is a political phenomenon and product and thus cannot be considered unproblematic. If state is delivered by the process of carving out “the specifically political distinction on which political actions and purposes are based is the distinction between Friend and Enemy.”⁴ The Enemy is simply the “other”, the “alien”, the “outsider” which defines the boundaries of a community. Statehood is based on the definition and delineation of such community - a state is always a state of or for some community. Political order created by state as security product is based on a violent decision about the distinction between Friend and Enemy, Inside(r) and Outside(r). The Political is thus an

² Jonathan Boyarin, “Space, Time and the Politics of Memory”, in Jonathan Boyarin (ed.), *Remapping Memory: The Politics of Time Space*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.

³ Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

⁴ *Ibid.*

inherently agonistic concept constantly involving explicit or implicit decisions about the line between us and them. It can be argued against Schmitt that his realist analysis of state is too aggressive and bellicose for reducing politics to a conflict to the death between political entities. In his realist analysis, he reiterates that states are caught up in an anarchical state of war' in which the absence of any kind of order pits one against the other in eternal antagonism. But the reality is different; except some incidents of conflict, the relationship between and among states have been peaceful. This has been more so in a world of interdependence. This argument would point out that in some parts of the world the logic of enmity has been transcended and while states still incorporate different identities, this difference can no longer be described in terms of hostility or conflict. In a rejoinder to this criticism, Behnke points out, "It makes too much out of it, since the friend – enemy distinction is not supposed to describe the empirical reality of states' relations. War between states appears as only the ultimate possibility in a broad spectrum of political choices and strategies. It delineates as minimal condition against which international politics has to be conducted, but it does not determine the forms and modes of politics as such."⁵

3.1 *Friend - Enemy Dichotomy*

Thus, the act of distinguishing between friend and enemy by state in order to be constitutive act at the ontological not empirical level is to be understood as agonistic not antagonistic. For Schmitt, the identification of the enemy, of another political entity involves the recognition of equality between these entities. The other is not a foe or an adversary that has to be vanquished, converted or annihilated. As an enemy, the other is to be treated as equal and while war is always a possibility between enemies, this war is always circumscribed, regulated and part of an overall order. "In order to be political, in order to constitute the units of the international system, the distinction between friend and enemy must establish order rather than chaos."⁶

The West reinforced by Newtonian and Cartesian logic of difference, separateness and individualised particles tends to think that whatever exists outside self can be considered as the other positioned in situation of being a threat to the self. The protection, preservation and flourishing of self in contrast to 'the other' is what is defined by security. The international system built on this western view has resulted in the division of the world into self atomised, individualised egoistic self perpetuating sovereign states set against each other on a 'self vs. the other', friend – enemy modes. Competitive arms race both nuclear and conventional between and among states was considered as requirements of security, an investment in the elevation of ego to be fortified against similar egos through power.

⁵ Andreas Behnke, "Re-cognizing Europe , NATO and the Problem of Securing identities" in Adrian Hyde Price and Lisbeth Aggestam (eds.), *New Perspectives on Security and Identity in Europe*, London: Macmillan, 2000.

⁶ Andreas Behnke, "Postmodernizing Security", paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Joint Sessions, Mannheim, on 26-31 March 2011.

If this be the universalised view, on which security is premised to protect, preserve and flourish the “carefree space” and the claimants to this huge task happens to be the state – sovereigns in a pluralistic setting by virtue of its being legitimate, recognised and political through relations of power, then it is bound to differentiate itself from others and turn this difference into enmity. For a state to compromise on its identity would mean its death.

3.2 *Security is Antecedent to and Raison d’être of Statism*

What is gleaned from the above is that security is more than a goal or a policy of pre-established states versus pre-established threats. Security precedes states. Security is first of all about the very designation and delineation of state and, therefore, its enemies. Security, in other words, produces the state as an institutionalised community in opposition to other states. Security politics are, thus, not simply about the protections of ontologically unproblematic entities, rather one should think of them as the reiterative performance of statehood.⁷ In James Der Derian’s words: “We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, on a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it.”⁸ He continues by tracing this ontotheology to a central commitment within Western Philosophy, the notion of a centre as a site from which the forces of authority, order and identity philosophically defined and physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos and difference.⁹

Western philosophy and the service routed in Judeo-Christian tradition begin with the premise that the universe is inherently an agglomeration of atomic entities or separate building blocks always in chaos without bringing in order and unity. So, chaos is seen as a ceaseless threat both psychological and social – something to be overcome by control or elimination. Psychologically, it drives the ego to become all powerful and controlling. It, thus, creates a hegemonic impulse over those who are different to constitute the ‘other’. The other that is to be reinvented or discovered is not from within but from an outside centre. In the international system, it is the centre of power enjoyed by the hegemonic power America to impose upon the world its own defined concept of order through military power. Within a determined and territorially bound political space, it is the sovereign state from which the order and identity flow and in the anarchic international system, it is from those who have the uncontested supremacy and hegemony flow order and stability. That is why the search for such order has been the main foundation of security on a view of the international system being composed of states which are situated in a friend / enemy, inside / outside and self versus the other syndrome.

⁷ Synthia Weber, “Performative States”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No.1, 1998.

⁸ James Der Derian, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche and Baudrillard” in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

⁹ *Ibid.*

From the above analysis, it can be garnered that security as a set of practices that mediates between friend and enemy becomes constitutive and performative in the production of statehood. This distinction is the very one that is established by and establishes sovereignty. In Schmitt's words, "Sovereign is the one who decides on the exception. Only this definition can do justice to sovereignty as a luminal concept."¹⁰ Sovereignty, thus, bestows a shell like nature to statehood: within we find those who belong in this place, outside we find those who cannot be allowed in.¹¹ Thus, the modern concept of security is predicted upon the possibility of drawing the line between inside and outside, friend and enemy in an unambiguous fashion. Its task is to policing this line of differentiation in order to eliminate any kind of ambiguity that the ambiguity about decision, about friend and enemy might engender.¹² Security, state and sovereignty are together embedded in the traditional western security ontotheology. Coasted to this tradition, the contemporary national and international security discourses tend to define security as the preservation and stabilisation of boundaries and identities through the identification of otherness as threat and danger.¹³

Reason leads to truths and truth is singular, clear, fully apparent, completely explicable and demonstratable free of ambiguity. Those who do not reason in this way or do not reach the same conclusions are a threat, for they invite chaos and confusion. They are the other. These non-westerners are believed to be irrational and whatever explanations they offer for their beliefs, rituals and customs are dismissed as such. This belief in the superiority of western reassuring is related to the control of epistemologies based on categories of knowledge which in turn reflect the West's own peculiar history. It has had the effect of producing exclusion and simplistic binary categories of true/false, good/evil, self/other, and so on.¹⁴

"The state created *ex nihilo*, was an artificial ordering of individual parts, not bound together by cohesion, as an organic community, but united by fear."¹⁵ Security thus understood in western parlance in binary categories is mainly against the other which does not conform to what is in the West thought as based on reason and order. In the international system, the other is inferior and irrational and must be subdued by fear and hegemonic exercise of power.

Then security is premised on the sovereign decision between friend and enemy. What constitutes and justifies the state is the security very act of drawing

¹⁰ Carl Schmitt, *op. cit.*

¹¹ Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and Ambivalence*, Cambridge: Polity Press: 1991.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Andreas Behnke, "The Enemy Inside: The Western Involvement with Bosnia and the Problem of Securing Identities", *Alternatives*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1998; David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Revised Edition, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998; Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the other, "The East" in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

¹⁴ Stephen Toulmin, *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*, New York: The Free Press, 1990.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

the line between and among nations on binary categories. Then security reads to be seemed in order to keep state perpetuating in the hearts and minds of people.¹⁶

From a realist/neorealist perspective, security, state and people are ontologically in unity. Hence, the psychological space in the cognitive templates of human mind for identity consider with the territorially bounded political space known as the state. Hence, the people as a unit is assumed as homogenous not in the sense of forming an organic community but in the sense of being a conglomeration of ingredient, self sufficing and autonomous particles individually.

But in case of incongruence between the psychological space and the political space with the proliferation of heterodox articulations of various loyalties and identities that transgress the sovereign boundaries of the political, the assured unity is busted and challenges the conceptual understanding of security in terms of unity. In the traditional sense, the survival of the state depends to a large extent on its ability to end such rise of subversive tendencies within inside and to preserve its traditional identity against the proliferation of otherness. Walt admonishes against expanding the concept into new avenues and against giving in to the temptations of post modern prolixity.¹⁷ In post modern times, however, the transversal flows of people, culture, information, commodities and patterns of interaction proliferate, this conventional notion of security becomes problematic and gets challenged.

Security of states has come to dominate the conventional understanding of the meaning of security because other forms of political community have been rendered almost unthinkable. The realists' fixation with the state is itself a normative preference. As Reus-Smit has argued that many realists implicitly think of the state as an idealised political community wherein "security can be reduced to a minimal conception of state survival which is seen as synonymous with aggregate individual security."¹⁸

4. Securitisation or Desecuritisation: Copenhagen School

Ole Waever's concept of 'securitization – desecuritization' can be understood as a response to the contemporary problems that have warped our understanding of security in conventional parlance. Waever argues that security should be understood as a speech act, through which certain phenomena, actors, or events are designated as threats to the states and security of the state. In other words, "security refers to those cases where a threat or development is designated is incompatible with the state's sovereignty which leads to a test of will and force thereby testing whether the

¹⁶ Joseph Strayer quoted in Ian S. Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank*, Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 38.

¹⁷ Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", *International Studies Quarterly*, 1991, p. 221.

¹⁸ Christian Reus-Smit, "Realist and Resistance Utopias: Community, Security and Political Action in the New Europe", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 21, 1992, p. 17.

state is a sovereign state.”¹⁹ After all, “the ability to fend off a challenge is the criterion for establishing oneself as a sovereign unit, forcing the others to recognize one’s sovereignty and thereby gaining identity.”²⁰

What is the defining characterisation of the sovereign is to designate the unusual or exceptional as threat and to label actors as enemies. Apart from this constitutive act, the performative part of the sovereign is to recourse to all means including the use of violence in order to thwart, expel or defeat the enemy. Security is always itself a violent interaction not a pacific state of affairs. Since security issues always invoke the sovereign to exercise exceptional means, securitised issues are removed from the play of equal political actors, rather, the point of securitisation is to expel issues and actors from the political realm.²¹ As threats and dangers they are to be relegated to the outside of the political community. The idea of securitisation describes processes “in which the socially and politically successful ‘speech act’ of labeling an issue a ‘security issue’ removes it from the realm of normal day to day politics, casting it as an existential threat calling for and justifying extreme measures.”²²

The processes can have different ‘referent objects’, depending on whether they belong to an economic, environmental, political, military or societal spheres or sectors. Thus, the act of defining security according to Copenhagen School is contingent upon a speech act, assuming that the articulation of security is a crucial form of security action. As Waever puts it, “by uttering ‘security’ a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area and then claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.”²³ The defining textual feature of securitisation is, therefore, a specific security rhetoric which is characterised by survival, priority of action and urgency,²⁴ a claim to a mode of exceptionality that is contained in the definition of security.

What emerged out of Waever’s analysis of traditional concept of security centering on the idea of national survival is this conceptualisation of distinct modes. In Waever’s concept, the realist meaning of security thus continues to exist as a rhetorical claim as a distinct field of practice that distinguishes (accordingly to realism) security from other fields. Speaking ‘security’ successfully, therefore, incorporates an issue into this particular realm of exceptionality with all the consequences this may have. Applying John L. Austin’s concept of “performative utterances”,²⁵ Waever argues

¹⁹ Ole Waever, “Societal Security: The Concept” in Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lamaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. London: Pinter: 1993, p. 6.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Michael C Williams, “Modernity, Identity and Security: A Comment on the Copenhagen Controversy”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1998, p. 435.

²³ Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization” in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, (ed.), *On Security*, *op. cit.*

²⁴ *Ibid.* Also see, Ole Waever, “Securitization: Taking Stock of a Research Programme in Security Studies”, *Unpublished Manuscript*, 2003, p. 10.

²⁵ John L. Austin, *How to do things with Words*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.

that the very 'utterance of security' is more than just saying or describing something but the performing of an action. Performative utterances do not just describe but face the potential to create a new reality. Similarly, for the Copenhagen School the modes of exceptionality of dealing with an issue in a new way traversing beyond the traditional true/false dichotomy, the performative utterances have the potential to let an audience tolerate violation of rules that would otherwise have been obeyed.²⁶

Drawing insights from Derrida²⁷ and Butler²⁸, Waever stresses on the always political and indeterminate nature of the speech act related to its context. Acknowledging their analysis, Waever argues, "A speech act is interesting because it holds the insurrecting potential to break the ordinary, to establish meaning that's not already in the context. It reworks and produces a context by the performative success of the act."²⁹

Thus, striking a concordant note with Schmitt, Arendt, Butler and Derrida, Waever argues that a speech act has an indeterminate force of its own that is not related to features of an existing context. The Copenhagen School characterised by three elements: the speech act, the securitising actor and the audience, has not clearly spelt out the exact relationship between the actor and audience. It is clear that the Copenhagen School regards securitisation as an inter-subjective act of a securitising actor acting towards a significant audience. "Thus rather than reducing threat assessments to a single actor, most often the state, the Copenhagen School splits the actor into two elements: the securitising actor performing a securitising move by uttering a security speech act, and the relevant audience accepting or refusing this move. With that a certain threat is no longer simply assessed but its interpretation and representation is negotiated between an actor and relevant audience."³⁰ In the above analysis, the question is whether the audience is synonymous with the homogenous people. Where the audience is diverse and several and having different identities for social security, then which audience is persuaded to accept the security move. The implications of these several audience on the security move remain problematic to be addressed. If security move is inter subjectively held which implies voluntarily held as opposed to aspects of coercion, repression and silence, then the problems remain.³¹ The answer to the question whether the audience is a manufactured one

²⁶ Ole Waever, 1998, *op. cit.*

²⁷ Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context", *Limited Inc.*, Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988, pp. 162-254.

²⁸ Judith Butler, "Performativity's Social Magic", in Theodore R. Schatzki and Wolfgang Natter (eds.), *The Social and Political Body*, New York: Guilford Press, 1996, pp. 29-47.

²⁹ Ole Waever, "EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post Sovereignty Orders", in Morton Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (eds.), *International Relations Theory and Politics of European Integration*, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 286; Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*, London: Lynne Rienner, 1998, p. 46.

³⁰ Holger Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond" *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 13, 2007, p. 361.

³¹ Lene Hansen, "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2000, pp. 285-306.

has not been spelt out. What is the role of mass media, elites and dominant groups in manufacturing audience? Is the speaker-audience model most appropriate for non-democratic authoritarian regimes? When Waever refuses to cling to the traditional sender-receiver view of communication³² and reposes faith in the speaker-audience model, had this can be reconciled with the Deridarian and Schmittian elements?

The Copenhagen School has focused on the 'speech act' ignoring the context of such acts, failing to specify how audiences, the specific local audience, sociological conditions and choice of policy tools affect the likely outcome and motivation of securitising moves. Critical security studies has attacked the Copenhagen School for reifying the wrong notion of security that does not, for them, answer the security needs of most of the world population³³ while all these are fundamental issues for the Copenhagen School, none of them challenges the basic account of security hinging on emergency and existential threats.³⁴ Julia Trombetta explores how securitisation of climate change has come in a new guise.³⁵ For her, securitisation is a process of contextualising real meaning production rather than carbon-copying a singular and conventional logic of security into reality. Waever and Buzan continuously fluctuate between the terms process and speech act/utterances as if both were synonymous. The act is at the same time defined as an intersubjective process of constructing a threat and as just an utterance itself. "It can be argued that (the decision to act) performativity of security utterances as opposed to the social process of securitisation, involving (preexisting) actors, audience (s) and (contexts), are so different that they form two rather autonomous centre of gravity."³⁶

If securitisation is defined in opposition to normal politics, as a politics of exception or abnormal politicisation,³⁷ unmaking it implies a retrieval of the conditions of normal politics; desecuritisation means bringing issues back to the "normal haggling of politics."³⁸ It can be seen as an attempt at retrieving the normality of politics. Huysmans³⁹ has defined desecuritisation as "unmaking politics which identifies the community on the basic of the expectations of hostility. The discursive construction of security frames normal politics as a political spec tale of alternative discourses. The discursive construction of security allows for its parallel discursive deconstruction and

³² Ole Waever, "Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools" in *Security Theory and Their Origins Between Core and Periphery*, paper presented at the 45th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, on 17- 20 March 2004.

³³ Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation", *Review of International Relations*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1991, pp. 313-326.

³⁴ Corry Olaf, "Securitization and 'Riskification': Second-order Security and the Politics of Climate Change", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, p. 241.

³⁵ Maria Julia Trombetta, "Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analyzing the Discourse", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 21, No.4, 2008, pp. 585-602.

³⁶ Holger Stritzel, *op. cit.*

³⁷ Alker Hayward, "Emancipation in the Critical Security Studies Project" in Ken Booth (ed.), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, London: Lynne Rienner: 2005.

³⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, 1998, *op. cit.*

³⁹ Jef Huysmans, "The Question of the Limit: Desecuritization and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political Realism", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1998.

normality appears as contested process of construction / deconstruction. There exist tensions between discursive construction and the meaning of exceptional politics which need to be analysed.

5. Emancipatory Approach

Emancipation plays a central role in the security studies of the critical school. The attempt to relate security strategies to the process of human emancipation is central to all the unambiguously critical security studies approaches. Both defines emancipation as "the freeing of the people from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do."⁴⁰ This remains problematic in that it does not directly address the problem of resolving conflicting claims to emancipation and maximising the freedom of one person of a group without simultaneously constraining that of others. The state level definition of security threat can conflict with that of the individual or the very definition of what constitutes a security threat which privileges the decisive few may clash with what an individual human being considers as threat. Emancipation as an objective as such has the ability to transcend the borders of state, nation, race, sex or others. Booth has argued that emancipation should take precedence over concerns with power and order as it produces true security. Security is distinguished from order and power and redefined as inclusive of all individuals and even all those who have been hollowed out of the traditional purview of security. Emancipation is normative engagement with normal politics the normative separation of security from power and order is problematic, as it accounts neither for the transformation of normality nor for the political effects of security.⁴¹

Many felt the need to reformulate the concept of emancipation in relation to normality. In a Foucault inspired approach, normality is the result of exclusions and forms of disciplinary and bio political regulation of populations.⁴² Security is, therefore, not simply exceptional but has constitutive effects upon the normal. Normality is simultaneously a field of struggle, where techno logics for constituting subjects and ordering of the social come up against the intransigence of political agency and resistance of political subjects. The question remains ragging had emancipatory moves remained away from and independently of power operations.⁴³ Security is the exact opposite and negation of insecurity. Security is defined conditions what is considered

⁴⁰ Ken Booth, *op. cit.*

⁴¹ Richard Wyn Jones, "On Emancipation: Necessity, Capacity and Concrete Utopias" and Alker Hayward, "Emancipation in the Critical Security Studies Project", in Ken Booth, (ed.), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2005.

⁴² Stefan Elbe, "AIDS, Security, Biopolitics", *International Relations*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2005, pp. 403-419; Jef Huysmans, "A Foucaultian View on Spill Over: Freedom and Security in the EU", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2004, pp. 294-318.

⁴³ Benjamin J Muller, "(Dis)qualified bodies: Securitization, Citizenship and Identity Management", *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2004, pp. 279-294.

as insecurity. If security defines what is insecurity, then it entails an engagement, struggle and competition among various individuals, opposing dominant social groups, professionals and agencies for placing their respective perception and notion of order to be securitised. Thus, security becomes political and the very act of policing the insecurity turns out to be a mode of redrawing the lines of fear and security at both the individual and collective level.⁴⁴

The most difficult problematic to be tackled is the emergence and consolidation of professional network of security agencies that try to impose and monopolies the truth about danger and risk through the power knowledge nexus. The Paris school treats security as a technique of government and investigates the intentions behind the use of power games. Instead of focusing on speech acts, it emphasises practices, audiences and contexts that enable and constrain the production of specific forms of governmentality.⁴⁵ In same it can be said that the Paris School emphasised that the field of security is determined not only by the sovereign power to kill but also by the discursive ability to produce an image of the enemy with which the audience identifies.⁴⁶

The process of securitisation / desecuritisation involves the question of the widening of the field of security. The widening aspect is reflected in the post Buzan extension of the concept to embrace the environment, economic, societal and political. The focus is no more on the state but has been diversified away to the level, situation and conditions which appear to threaten an individual human being.

6. Security Trap

The widening of the security agenda to include everything, when justified by a concern to free people from fear and threat might turn into what it is called 'security trap'.⁴⁷ It refers both to the non-intentional dimension of the consequences of widening and to the fact that these consequences might clash with the underlying intention. It means by securitising more issues and securitising them more one cannot feel established in a situation of security free from threat and fear. No doubt, the very process of one issue being securitised assures a specific form of politicisation but the way security is to be provided becomes the concern of professionals. As warned by many scholars, one risks having the social issues securitised for oneself by more established security professionals.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*, London: Routledge, 2006.

⁴⁵ Hierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2005, pp. 171-201; Philippe Bonditti, "From Territorial Space to Networks: A Foucauldian Approach to the Implementation of Biometry", *Alternatives*, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2004, pp. 465-482.

⁴⁶ C.A.S.E Collective, "Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 37, No. 4, December 2006, p. 457.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

“In other words, even when widening the security agenda with the explicit intention of demilitarizing international security, the signifier security might on the contrary subordinate these issues to governmental security agencies, thus foreclosing the range of political options available to deal with the issues. Even if securitization is a political process it might legitimate practices that depoliticize the approach to the securitized issues by giving preference to coercive approaches.”⁴⁹

Thus, in this way securitising more and more issues falls into the security trap. If securitisation is a discursive strategy of deflecting away from the state-centric approaches to security, by widening, it means bringing the state back into the centre of gravity. Bigo has pointed out that “the securitisation of social issues raises the issue of protection by securitising the audience, which the security discourses address. Insecuritisation will translate into a social demand for the intervention of coercive state and its agencies through reassurance discourses and protection techniques.”⁵⁰ In other words, the processes of securitisation and of insecuritisation are inseparable. This means that one is confronted with a security dilemma: the more one tries to securitise social phenomena in order to ensure security, the more one creates intentionally or unintentionally a feeling of insecurity. Suppose, a street is filled with military personnel in order to prevent terrorist attacks as a policy of reassurance to the public, the result is it might create a feeling of anxiety in public.⁵¹ The logical consequence is “the politics of maximal security are also politics of maximal anxiety.”⁵²

7. Exceptionalism and Security

The concept of security arises only when something happens beyond the borders of what constitutes normalcy being disturbed. That implies the question of exceptionalism built into the security system. What happens within the order, or established norms, founds the base of legitimacy of a political system. Within the established norms and nuances what cannot be challenged and dealt with can be said as creating the situation of exceptionalism demanding exceptional response or measure thus putting legitimacy into question. The situation of exceptionalism is invoked to justify and mobilise an array of violent and illiberal practices. The critical approaches to security have conversed upon the concept of exceptionalism as a means of contesting and analysing the transformation of normalcy into exceptionalism.

⁴⁹ Christian Olsson, “Military Interventions and the Concept of the Political: Bringing the Political Back into the Interactions between External Forces and Local Societies” in Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, (eds.), *Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes: The (in) Security Games*, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006, pp. 165-204; Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

⁵⁰ Bigo Didier, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”, *Alternatives*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2002, pp. 63-92.

⁵¹ Emmanuel Pierre Guittet, “Military Activities Inside the National Territory: The Case of France”, in Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala (eds.), *Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes*, Paris: L’Harmattan: 2006, pp. 137-165.

⁵² C.A.S.E, *op. cit.*

Schmitt's⁵³ declaration that "sovereign is he who decides on the exception", can be said as endowing the political authorities with exceptional prerogatives to deal with security threats. The 'exception' is a situation of radical danger and contingency for which no prior law, procedure or anticipated response is adequate. It is a perilous moment that exceeds the limits of precedent, knowledge, legislation and expected predictability. To claim that the 'exception' brings about a fundamental existential necessity for unlimited, unconstrained exceptional sovereign decision implies the imperatives of performative logic of security that Schmitt insists on. Exceptionalism for Schmitt is not simply an appendage to normal politics but a legitimisation of a political authority which has the capacity to constitute new political and legal orders.

The advent of exceptional situation entails a priori objective imperatives prompting the sovereign to declare it as exceptional and argue for unlimited, unconstrained, exceptional sovereign power. Here the focus is on what constitutes exceptional objectively. But in Schmitt's analysis, the focus is more on sovereign exceptionalism meaning it is the sovereign to decide what exceptional situation is. That means exceptionalism from the very beginning is entangled in an authoritarian decisionist politics that declares what are exceptional situations that enjoin upon the sovereign to invoke legitimate authority to contentious policies and practices. Exceptionalism may be a convenient cloak to cover up the invidious design on the part of the sovereign to invoke legitimate authority to illegitimate and perilous measures.

What remains problematic is how do exceptions and exceptional situations come to be considered as exceptional? How are practices of exceptionalism and claims about exceptions authorised? The securitisation theory is an attempt⁵⁴ to understand how policy matters declare conditions of exceptional threat in order to legitimate the practices of exceptionalism. If securitisation theory entails a speech act or democratically deliberated and arrived at decisions regarding what constitutes 'exceptional' and invokes sovereign exceptionalism, no where "security matters" are slipped away from the elites who represent state to decide on behalf of the latter what constitutes a security threat. These elitists' views and concepts of security driven by their discursive logic and strategies are reinforced by the securitisation theory and add credence to Schmitt's logic.

On the other hand, Bigo⁵⁵ argues that by focusing instead on the security professionals who manage 'unease' within a society on a daily basis, exceptional security practices can be better understood in the context of ongoing processes of technocratic, bureaucratic and market driven routinisation and normalisation.

If securitisation theory focuses on speech act and argumentation in the discursive field, then claims about what constitutes "exceptional situation" demanding

⁵³ Carl Schmitt, *op. cit.*

⁵⁴ Ole Waever, 1998, *op. cit.*

⁵⁵ Bigo Didier, *op. cit.*

exceptional treatment can be subject to a process of argument, application of reasons, presentation of evidences and commitment to convincing others of the validity of one's position. These claims then remain open to the emancipatory possibility of a communicative ethics that may "avoid the excesses of a decisionist account of securitization."⁵⁶

8. Conclusion

The neo-realist theory and critical security theory are seemingly disparate approaches to security studies. From a paradigmatic perspective, these theories are putatively separated by incommensurable foundational concepts. Yet, all of these identify dynamics of collective mobilisation as the crux of power politics. Neo-realism involves two actors on a friend-enemy dichotomy pulling resources to rectify a perceived security deficit. Securitisation involves a process in which construction of a referent object as an existential threat induces individuals and social groups to orient their behaviour towards specific ends. It rejects the realist privileging of state as the referent object of security and threats and use of force as the subject of security.

In realism and neo-realism, the main referent object of security is the state and it is synonymous with the security of the people on a priori assumption that once the state is secured all the rest remain secured. As the referent object of security, state can be both a guardian angel and global gangster.⁵⁷ The security that a state has in a particular time is always not in a state of being but in a state of becoming with addition of more arms and ammunitions as it feels always inadequate in the context of the other thinking and doing the same way. The decisionist unit remains with the state.

The Copenhagen school, the other widening schools and critical theorists challenging the premise of realism and neo-realism focus on the process by which an issue becomes an issue of security threats. The process of securitisation is more akin to being called as democratisation of security by which the consensus is reached through speech act and arguments about whether an issue be securitised. Though the decisionist unit remains with the state, it is through a speech act that an issue is securitised. Thus, the centre of gravity of security is discursively deflected away from the state to various nodal points where the referent object of security is located. This discursive shifting away from state means to acknowledge the fact that the sources of security threats are no longer the state and bust the myth that security of state is the security of the people. State is no longer the end and its military wherewithal are not the solution to all multifarious non-state centric sources of security threats.

⁵⁶ Michael C Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 4, 2003, p. 522.

⁵⁷ N. Wheeler, "Guardian Angel or Global Gangster: The Ethical Claims of International Society Revisited", *Political Studies*, Vol. 44, 1996.

An alternative possible referent is that of society as adduced by Waever. To him, society "is about identity, the self conception of communities and those individuals who identify themselves as members of a particular community."⁵⁸ The advantage of operating with this perspective is that it allows a separate conception of society to operate in conjunction with that of the state. This impelled Waever to develop idea of societal security as distinct from state security. But this perspective has also limitations because in a divergent society people having multifarious identities in terms of religion, gender, culture and ethnicity often clashing with each other.

A further possibility is accepting individual as the ultimate security referent. Using the individual as the security referent in this way is complicated by the complex variety of identities and needs that individuals can possess, though there may be a virtue simply in multiplying the potential number of security referents beyond the state. The referent will vary according to the particular issue that needs to be securitised. But it is the state that remains as the means by which security is to be provided to individuals at various levels.

For a number of critics of the traditional security approach and Copenhagen school, the state is the problem rather than part of solution in many security issues. If the state is considered as the means and the referent object of security remains the individuals for their emancipation then it sounds illogical to privilege the security of the means. Because in many cases the sources of security threats being the non-state sources, state as the means fail to meet these new non-traditional security threats.

State as the principal referent object of security is based on the assumption that it represents the idealised form of community. The critical international theory "challenges the state role as the sole constructor of identity and invites rethinking the nature and limits of moral and political community under changing global conditions."⁵⁹ The state as moral being and socially binding force is territorially bound and remains confined to the binaries-inclusion/exclusion, insider/outsider. The critical theory approach to extend the idea of moral and political community beyond the frontiers of state echoing Karl Deutsch's concept of security community and Booth's interest in it as central to human emancipation runs counter to the conventional understanding of state as central to security. But recent proponents of security community approach have very convincingly recognised the central place of the state in such theorising.⁶⁰

Can this Westphalian definition of security be a reliable guide to rethink security in a post modernised and globalised world? There has been growing transverse flow of people due to displacement and migration from country to

⁵⁸ Ole Waever, 1998, *op. cit.* pp. 66-67.

⁵⁹ Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory" in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), *Theories of International Relations*, London: Macmillan, 1996, p.168.

⁶⁰ Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective", in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 14.

country creating a strange situation of articulation of differences within societies that no longer adhere to ruling or hegemonic discourses of identity.⁶¹ In this age of globalisation, what has been the most spectacular phenomenon is the burgeoning proliferation of intercourse, interconnections and interdependence at various levels including trade, commerce, business, culture, climate change and health issues among states, individuals and non-governmental organisations. Security in this context must refer to safeguarding the coexistence and intercourse of strangers, rather than the separation of friends from enemies. What emerges significant here is that in the present world, security is not about creation of the wedge between 'self and the other' and protection of friends from enemies but protection and promotion of highways of connections between them. It enables political conduct not by delineating an inside from an outside, but by enabling the transversal flows across, indeed the transgression of boundaries. Here constructivism appears significant. Inter- subjective exchange of ideas, convergence of interests on a preferred course of action and interactions and communications redefine security not solely in militaristic tones shifting the focus from anarchic international system to international society.

To perform all functions to provide security to all individuals at various levels on divergent issues and to address multifarious identity issues require a too centralised state. As one authority states, "In short, the state is too central to the large scale business of human life to be ignored or put aside, whether for ideological or idealistic reasons."⁶² For example, on the issues of climate change the states are playing a leading and missionary role for sustaining the earth and survival of humanity. No state however, powerful may be, has not shown any sign of shirking its responsibility. In the conceptualisation of human security, while the focus of security has been shifted from state to individual, the responsibility of state has increased manifold not purely in military terms but in terms of development, ensuring human rights and fulfilling basic human needs.

There has been a *mélange* of literature and research on security contesting the traditional approach to security centering on state. With human beings becoming profusely vulnerable to a plethora of threats not only from state but from other non-state sources, the state centric approach in all cases has not been effective and successful and even has proved its inadequacy. This has led to rethinking of security from a critical theory perspective. It holds that the concept of state security does not necessarily encompass security for the people. The Copenhagen school, on the other hand, has shown how invoking the concept of security is a discursive process that erases all rules of normal politics. This alternative insight puts a special kind of responsibility on people doing security, since invoking the word starts a process beyond democratic politics.⁶³ All these have generated a great debate on

⁶¹ Zygmunt Bauman, *op. cit.*

⁶² Olav F. Knudsen, "Post - Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 363.

⁶³ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, 1998, *op. cit.*

the location of referent object of security suggesting a shift from state to individual or societal level. All these arguments are well put forth and reasoned but yet there has not been a shred of evidence of shift of focus from state to individual. On the contrary, within the compass of the state, authority and responsibility are included in all those threats to which the individuals have been vulnerable. The understanding and conceptualisation of security seems to be constrained by the inability of all these non-traditional schools to consider alternative forms of community other than the state. In the words of Walker, "The security of states dominates our understanding of what security can be and who it can be for, not because conflict between states is inevitable, but because other forms of political community have been rendered almost unthinkable. The claims of states to such a monopoly of legitimate authority in a particular territory have succeeded in marginalizing and even erasing other expressions of political identity-other answers to questions about how we are."⁶⁴

What non-traditional security and widening of security analysis does distancing away from national territorial bound security is that it marks a spatial turn with focus on non-national spaces of security which cover for example, climate change, cyber space, terrorism, spread of pathogens etc.⁶⁵ Such spaces have become objects of security securing the security of the individual though the implications of this remain largely under theorised in security studies. That does not in any way denude the state, its interests and practices of its immense significance, all of which very much constitute the kernel and gravamen of global security concerns and analysis. It does, however, more significantly, entail that the fetishisation and reification of national/state as the only space in which security practices and discourses are formed. It implies identifying and theorising non-national spaces of security and analysing how these interact with state practices and with each other. What it needs is the securitisation of these spaces. This opens new vistas of research in future on security studies.

⁶⁴ R. B. J. Walker, "Security, Sovereignty and the Challenges of World Politics", *Alternatives*, Vol. XV, No.1, 1990, p. 6.

⁶⁵ Fiona B Adamson, "Spaces of Global Security: Beyond Methodological Nationalism", *Journal of Global Security Studies*, Vol. 1, Issue. 1, 2016, pp. 19-35.

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